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1 Introduction and Roadmap 
Life is but a continuous process of energy conversion and transformation. The accomplishments of 
civilization have largely been achieved through the increasingly efficient and extensive harnessing of 
various forms of energy to extend human capabilities and ingenuity. Energy is similarly indispensable 
for continued human development and economic growth. Providing adequate, affordable energy 
services is a necessary (even if by itself insufficient) prerequisite for eradicating poverty, improving 
human welfare, and raising living standards worldwide. Without economic growth, it will also be 
difficult to address social and environmental challenges, especially those associated with poverty. 
Without continued institutional, social, and technological innovation, it will be impossible to address 
planetary challenges such as climate change. While all components of the energy system undergo 
continuous changes, the ultimate purpose of energy production and use remains unchanged: the 
provision of convenient and affordable energy services for human needs. Energy extraction, conversion, 
and use always also generate undesirable by-products and emissions – at a minimum in the form of 
dissipated heat. Energy cannot be created or destroyed – it can only be converted from one form to 
another, along a one-way street from higher to lower grades (qualities) of energy. Although it is 
common to discuss energy “consumption,” energy is actually transformed rather than consumed.  
This Energy Primer1 aims at a basic-level introduction to fundamental concepts and data that help 
to understand energy systems holistically and to provide a common conceptual and terminological 
framework before examining in greater detail the various aspects of energy systems be them 
technological, economic, or environmental. As such the text aims to provide a basic introductory reader 
suitable for the core content of any introductory-level energy class or as framing complement to more 
specialized energy classes. Customary energy texts usually focus on describing current energy 
industries through a supply side perspective, which this Energy Primer does not intend to duplicate. (In 
depth treatments of energy supply and industry aspects of energy systems are provided in Chapters 11 
to 15 of the Global Energy Assessment, all available online.2) 
Instead, this text was written with the intent to serve as complementary reading material that 
emphasizes in particular three traditionally less represented perspectives: 1) a systems view, allowing 
the reader to understand how the different components of our energy systems are interconnected and 
interdependent; 2) a focus on energy service demand as ultimate core driver of energy systems; and 3) a 
long-run historical context that helps the reader to understand how current energy systems have 
emerged and what characteristic rates of change are in these large-scale systems. 
After an introduction and Primer roadmap (Section 1), Section 2 introduces the fundamental 
concepts and terms used to describe global energy systems (Section 2.1) and then proceeds with an 
overview of the most fundamental driver: the demand for energy services (Section 2.2) including global 
long-term trends in terms of useful and final energy. Section 2.3 then summarizes the major links 
between energy services and primary energy resources at the global level for the year 2005. This 
section also contains a summary of major energy units and scales (with technical details given in 
Appendix A). 
Section 3 then turns to a historical perspective on energy transitions, covering both energy end-
use demand and services using the United Kingdom as example (Section 3.1), as well as global energy 
                                                 
1 This text extends and updates Chapter 1 of the Global Energy Assessment (GEA) (Grubler et al., 2012) which draws on 
earlier publications with comparable content by the authors including: Goldemberg et al., 1988; Nakicenovic et al., 1996a; 
1998; Rogner and Popescu, 2000; Grubler, 2004; and WEA (World Energy Assessment), 2004. 
2 http://www.iiasa.ac.at/web/home/research/Flagship-Projects/Global-Energy-Assessment/Chapters_Home.en.html 
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supply and decarbonization (Section 3.2), and concludes with a brief introduction into the relationship 
between energy and economic growth (Section 3.3). A long historical perspective is important in 
understanding both the fundamental drivers of energy system transitions, as well as the constraints 
imposed by the typically slow rates of change in this large, capital-intensive system characterized by 
long-lived infrastructures (Grubler et al., 1999). 
Section 4 then discusses the central aspect of energy efficiency, summarizing key concepts and 
measures of energy efficiency (Section 4.1), and estimates of global energy (Section 4.2) and exergy 
(Section 4.3) efficiencies as well as energy intensities (Section 4.4). 
Section 5 provides a summary of key concepts (Section 5.1) and numbers of global energy 
resources that provide both key inputs and key limitations for energy systems. Fossil, fissile (Section 
5.2), and renewable resources (Section 5.3) are covered comprehensively in energy and carbon terms 
along with a basic introduction to energy densities, which are particularly critical for renewable energy 
(Section 5.4). 
Section 6 provides a summary of major energy flows associated with production, use, and trade 
of energy (Section 6.2) and energy conversions (Section 6.3) that link energy resources to final energy 
demands. After an introduction and overview (Section 6.1), production, use, and trade of both direct 
(Section 6.2.1) and indirect “embodied” energy, (Section 6.2.2) are discussed, and all energy trade 
flows summarized in Section 6.2.3. The discussion of energy conversions is short, as it is dealt with in 
customary energy textbooks and also in detail in the various chapters of GEA. After an introductory 
overview (Section 6.3.1), the electricity sector is briefly highlighted (Section 6.3.2). 
Section 7 summarizes the main impacts of global energy systems on the human and natural 
environment in terms of human health impacts and airborne emissions, including greenhouse gases 
(Section 7.2) and other pollutants where the energy sector plays an important role (Section 7.3). These 
two categories of impacts are highlighted here as comprehensive global inventory data allow a 
comprehensive assessment. Both are central social and environmental externalities associated with all 
energy conversions. 
Section 8 then complements the global synthesis by highlighting the vast heterogeneities in levels, 
patterns, and structure of energy use, by first introducing basic concepts and measures (Section 8.1), 
before addressing the heterogeneity across nations (Section 8.2), within nations (Section 8.3), as well as 
energy disparities (Section 8.4). This Section is of critical importance, given the objective of providing 
a global overview in this Primer. The inevitable top-down perspective involving Gigatonnes and 
Terawatts often glosses over differences in time, social strata, incomes, lifestyles, and human 
aspirations which are highlighted here. 
Lastly, Section 9 provides a primer on basic economic concepts related to energy end-use and 
energy supply. After an Introduction (Section 9.1), costs and prices are introduced (Section 9.2). basic 
economic concepts relating to energy demand (Section 9.3) and energy supply (Section 9.4) are 
discussed as well as methods for aggregating various different cost components explained (Section 9.5). 
The Section concludes with a discussion of externalities drawing on illustrative EU studies (Section 
9.6). 
Appendix A returns to the rather technical, but nonetheless fundamental, aspect of units, scales, 
and energy accounting intricacies. This document uses uniformly the International System (SI) of 
(metric) units and has also adapted a uniform accounting standard for primary energy following GEA 
to achieve consistency and comparability across the different sections. This is especially important in 
the energy field, that to date continues to use a plethora of vernacular units and accounting methods. 
Appendix A also contains a more detailed exposition of the concept of levelized costs of energy 
(LCOE), which is a key concept on energy cost accounting. 
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Appendix B provides convenient summary tables of conversion and emission factors, and 
summarizes the various levels of regional aggregations used throughout GEA and also in this Primer. 
2 The Global Energy System 
2.1 Description of the Global Energy System 
The energy system comprises all components related to the production, conversion, and use of energy. 
Key components of the energy system comprise: primary energy resources which are harnessed 
and converted to energy carriers3 (energy vectors such as electricity or fuels such as gasoline), which 
are used in end-use applications for the provision of energy forms (heat, kinetic energy, light, etc.) 
required to deliver energy services (e.g., thermal comfort or mobility). The key mediator linking all 
energy conversion steps from energy services all the way back to primary resources are energy 
conversion technologies. Energy systems are often further differentiated into an energy supply and an 
energy end-use sector. The energy supply sector consists of a sequence of elaborate and complex 
processes for extracting energy resources, for converting these into more desirable and suitable forms 
of secondary energy, and for delivering energy to places where demand exists. The part of the energy 
supply sector dealing with primary energy is usually referred to as “upstream” activities (e.g., oil 
exploration and production), and those dealing with secondary energy as “downstream” activities (e.g., 
oil refining and gasoline transport and distribution). The energy end-use sector provides energy services 
such as motive power, cooking, illumination, comfortable indoor climate, refrigerated storage, and 
transportation, to name just a few examples. The purpose of the entire energy system is the fulfillment 
of demand for energy services in satisfying human needs. 
Figure 2.1 illustrates schematically the architecture of the energy system as a series of linked 
stages connecting various energy conversion and transformation processes that ultimately result in the 
provision of goods and services. A number of examples are given for energy extraction, treatment, 
conversion, distribution, end-use (final energy), and energy services in the energy system. The technical 
means by which each stage is realized have evolved over time, providing a mosaic of past evolution 
and future options (Nakicenovic et al., 1996a). 
Primary energy is the energy that is embodied in resources as they exist in nature: chemical 
energy embodied in fossil fuels (coal, oil, and natural gas) or biomass, the potential kinetic energy of 
water drawn from a reservoir, the electromagnetic energy of solar radiation, and the energy released in 
nuclear reactions. For the most part, primary energy is not used directly but is first converted and 
transformed into secondary energy such as electricity and fuels such as gasoline, jet fuel, or heating oil 
which serve as energy carriers for subsequent energy conversions or market transactions (Nakicenovic 
et al., 1996a). 
Final energy (“delivered” energy) is the energy transported and distributed to the point of retail 
for delivery to final users (firms, individuals, or institutions). Examples include gasoline at the service 
station, electricity at the socket, or fuel wood in the barn. Final energy is generally exchanged in formal 
monetary market transactions, where also typically energy taxes are levied. An exception are so-called 
                                                 
3 In the literature (e.g. Rosen, 2010, Scott, 2007, Escher, 1983) also the term energy currency is used to highlight the fact 
that different energy carriers are to a degree interchangeable and can be converted to whatever form is most suitable for 
delivering a given energy service task. Like monetary currencies, energy currencies are also exchangeable (at both an 
economic and [conversion] efficiency price). A concise compendium of energy-related concepts and terms is given in 
Cleveland and Morris, 2006. 
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non-commercial fuels – i.e., fuels collected by energy end-users themselves such as fuel wood or 
animal wastes, which constitute important energy sources for the poor.  
The next energy transformation is the conversion of final energy in end-use devices such as 
appliances, machines, and vehicles into useful energy such as the energy forms of kinetic energy or heat. 
Useful energy is the last measurable energy flow before the delivery of energy services. It is measured 
at the crankshaft of an automobile engine, by the mechanical energy delivered by an industrial electric 
motor, by the heat of a household radiator or an industrial boiler, or by the luminosity of a light bulb. 
The application of useful energy provides energy services such as a moving vehicle (mobility), a warm 
room (thermal comfort), process heat (for materials manufacturing), or light (illumination). 
Energy services are the result of a combination of various technologies, infrastructures (capital), 
labor (know-how), materials, and energy forms and carriers. Clearly, all these input factors carry a price 
tag and, within each category, are in part substitutable for one another. From the consumer’s 
perspective, the important issues are the quality and cost of energy services. It often matters little what 
the energy carrier or the “upstream” primary energy resource was that served as input. It is fair to say 
that most consumers are often unaware of the upstream activities of the energy system. The energy 
system is service driven (i.e., from the bottom-up), whereas energy flows are driven by resource 
availability and conversion processes (i.e., from the top-down). Energy flows and driving forces 
interact intimately. Therefore, the energy sector should never be analyzed in isolation: it is not 
sufficient to consider only how energy is supplied; the analysis must also include how and for what 
purposes energy is used (Nakicenovic et al., 1996a). 
Figure 2.2 illustrates schematically the major energy flows through the global energy system 
across the main stages of energy transformation, from primary energy to energy services, with typical 
examples. For an exposition of energy units see Box 1 below and Appendix A. 
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Figure 2.1. The energy system: schematic diagram with some illustrative examples of the energy sector 
and energy end use and services. The energy sector includes energy extraction, treatment, conversion, 
and distribution of final energy. The list is not exhaustive and the links shown between stages are not 
“fixed”; for example, natural gas can also be used to generate electricity, and coal is not used 
exclusively for electricity generation. Source: adapted from Nakicenovic et al., 1996a. 
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Figure 2.3. Illustrative examples of energy units and scales. 
2.2 Energy Services 
Despite the centrality of energy services for the energy system, their measurement and statistical 
reporting is sparse. As the different types of energy services – from passenger and goods transport to 
illumination, to materials produced and recycled, to information communicated – are so diverse, 
activity levels are non-commensurable (i.e., cannot be expressed in common units). Hence energy 
service levels are often assessed via their required energy inputs (useful, final, or primary energy) rather 
than by their actual outputs. This can distort the picture quite substantially, as those energy services 
with the lowest conversion efficiency (and thus highest proportional energy inputs) are over-weighted 
in the energy accounts. Measuring services via inputs rather than outputs can also significantly mask 
the enormous efficiency gains which have historically characterized technological change in energy 
end-use applications (from candles to white diode lighting, or from horses to electric vehicles), and 
which generally go unnoticed in long-term estimates of economic productivity and welfare growth (see 
Nordhaus, 1998). 
A notable global assessment of energy service provision is given by Cullen and Allwood (2010) 
and summarized in Table 2.1 below. The assessment used primary energy as a common energy metric, 
which is problematic for energy services due to the ambiguities of primary energy accounting 
conventions (see Appendix A). Using primary energy inputs to characterize energy services also gives 
greater weight to lesser efficient energy service provision chains. A passenger-km traveled by car is 
accounted and weighted for by its much larger primary energy inputs (crude oil) compared to a 
passenger-km traveled by bicycle (food caloric intake). The multitude of energy services summarized 
here can be conveniently grouped into three broad categories and are treated in greater depth in separate 
chapters of the Global Energy Assessment: Industry (Chapter 8, Banerjee et al., 2012), Transportation 
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(Chapter 9, Kahn Ribeiro et al., 2012), and Buildings (Chapter 10, Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2012), which are 
the physical structures in which the remainder of energy services are provided. 
Table 2.1. Estimated levels of energy services and corresponding shares in primary energy per service 
type for the year 2005. Source: adapted from Cullen and Allwood, 2010. 
Energy service 2005 levels Units 
As a percentage of pro-
rated primary energy use 
(including upstream 
conversion losses) 
Thermal comfort 30 1015 m3K (degree-volume air) 19% 
Sustenance (food) 28 1018 J (food) 18% 
Structural materials 15 109 MPa2/3m3 (tensile strength x volume) 14% 
Freight transport 46 1012 ton-km 14% 
Passenger transport* 32 1012 passenger-km 14% 
Hygiene 1.5 2.8 
1012 m3K (temperature degree-volume of hot water) 
1018 Nm (work) 11% 
Communication 280 1018 bytes 6% 
Illumination 480 1018 lumen-seconds 4% 
* The original passenger transport data have been corrected by adding non-reported categories provided by GEA Chapter 9, 
Kahn Ribeiro et al., 2012. 
It is useful to put these rather abstract engineering-type summary estimates of energy service 
levels into perspective – for example, on a per capita basis for a global population of 6.5 billion in 2005. 
These illustrative global average levels of energy service provision should not distract from the vast 
heterogeneity in levels of energy service provision between rich and poor, or between urban and rural 
populations (see Section 8 below). 
Transport: The 46 trillion tonne-km and 32 trillion passenger-km translate into a daily average 
mobility of some 13 km/day/person, and transporting on average 1 tonne/day per capita over a distance 
of some 20 km. 
Industry: The structural materials summarized in Table 2.1 translate in absolute terms into close 
to 2 billion tonnes (Gt) of cement, 1 Gt of crude steel, some 0.3 Gt of fertilizer, 0.1 Gt of non-ferrous 
metal ores processed, and over 50 million tonnes of plastics produced per year (UN, 2006a, 2006b). 
Estimates of the global total material flows reveal a staggering magnitude of the industrial metabolism 
(Krausmann et al., 2009). In terms of tonnage, humankind uses each year (values for 2005) some 12 Gt 
of fossil energy resources, some 6 Gt of industrial raw materials and metals (ores and minerals), 23 Gt 
of construction materials (sand, gravel, etc.), and an additional 19 Gt of biomass (food, energy, and 
materials), for a total material mobilization of approximately 60 Gt/yr, or more than 9 tonnes/yr per 
capita on average. The use of around 10 Gt of energy thus enables the “leverage” of the mining, 
processing, refinement, and use of an additional 50 Gt of materials. 
Buildings: The size of the residential and commercial building stock worldwide (2005 data) 
whose internal climate needs to be maintained through heating and cooling energy services is estimated 
to be about 150 billion m2 (including some 116 billion m2 residential and 37 billion m2 commercial 
floor space, see GEA Chapter 10, Ürge-Vorsatz et al., 2012) which corresponds to approximately 20 m2 
per person on average. 
Useful energy as a common energy input denominator minimizes distortions among different 
energy service categories, as it most closely measures the actual energy service provided. Useful energy 
estimates based on the 2005 energy balances published by the International Energy Agency (IEA, 
2007a and 2007b) using typical final-to-useful conversion efficiencies available in the literature 
(Eurostat, 1988; Rosen, 1992; Gilli et al., 1996; BMME, 1998; Rosen and Dincer, 2007) have been 
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developed by Grubler et al., 2012. A similar methodology was also used by De Stercke (2014) in 
developing a novel data set of useful energy balances for major countries, regionions and the world 
since 1900. It should be noted that the available energy balances are based on an economic sectoral 
perspective, which does not always perfectly correspond with particular energy service types. For 
instance, transport energy use is reported by mode of transport (road, rail, sea, air) in the underlying 
IEA statistics, which does not allow differentiation between passenger and goods transport. 
It needs also to be emphasized that different forms of useful energy (such as thermal versus 
kinetic energy) are not interchangeable, even when they are expressed in a common energy unit and 
aggregated. Global totals for useful and final energy inputs per energy service category are summarized 
in Table 2.2 (see also Figure 2.9 below) for the year 2005 and as historical trends in Figures 2.4 and 2.5. 
Regional details are given in Figures 2.6 and 2.7 below. 
Table 2.2. Energy service levels, world in 2005, as estimated by their corresponding useful and final 
energy inputs (in EJ, and as share of total; see also Footnote 6). Source: final energy: data from IEA, 
2007a and 2007b; useful energy: estimates by Grubler et al., 2012.  
Energy service Final 
energy 
As percentage of 
total final energy 
Useful 
energy 
As percentage of total 
useful energy 
[EJ] [%] [EJ] [%] 
Transport 
Road 66.9 20.3 13.7 8.1 
Rail 2.3 0.7 1.1 0.7 
Shipping 9.0 2.7 3.0 1.8 
Pipelines 2.9 0.9 0.9 0.5 
Air 10.3 3.1 3.0 1.8 
Total transport 91.4 27.7 21.7 12.9 
Industry 
Iron and steel 14.4 4.4 11.5 6.8 
Non-ferrous metals 4.0 1.2 1.9 1.1 
Non-metallic minerals 11.1 3.4 4.5 2.7 
Other 58.7 17.8 44.3 26.3 
Total industry 88.2 26.8 62.2 36.9 
Other sectors
Feedstocks 30.2 9.2 25.0 14.8 
Agriculture, forestry, fishery 7.5 2.3 3.0 1.8 
Residential 81.0 24.6 35.6 21.1 
Commercial and other 31.4 9.5 21.0 12.5 
Total other sectors 150.1 45.5 84.6 50.2 
Grand Total 329.7 100.0 168.5 100.0 
 
The largest category of energy service demands arise in industry (62 EJ of useful energy in 2005), 
with the dominant energy service application being (high-temperature) industrial process heat 
associated with the processing, manufacturing, and recycling of materials. Feedstocks refer to non-
energy uses of energy, where energy carriers serve as a raw material (e.g., natural gas used for the 
manufacture of fertilizers), rather than as an input to energy conversion processes proper. Feedstocks 
are also associated with industrial activities (the chemical sector) and add another 25 EJ of useful 
energy to the 62 EJ of industrial energy service demands. 
The residential and commercial sectors (some 57 EJ of useful energy in 2005) are dominated by 
the energy use associated with buildings, both in maintaining a comfortable indoor climate (heating and 
air conditioning), as well as various energy services performed within buildings such as cooking, 
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hygiene (hot water), and the energy use of appliances used for entertainment (televisions) or 
communication (computers, telephones). Agriculture, forestry, and fisheries are comparatively minor in 
terms of useful energy (3 EJ) and are only summarily included in the “other sectors” category here. 
Transport is comparatively the smallest energy service category when assessed in terms of useful 
energy, with an estimated level of 22 EJ (some 13% of total useful energy, but due to low conversion 
efficiencies, some 28% in total primary energy, see Table 2.1 above). Road transportation (cars, two- 
and three-wheelers, buses, and trucks) are the dominant technologies for providing mobility of people 
and goods. Due to the low final-to-useful conversion efficiency associated with internal combustion 
engines (some 20% only, with 80% lost as waste heat of engines and associated with friction losses of 
drive trains), road transport accounts for only 8% of useful energy but for approximately 20% of total 
final energy. This example once more highlights the value of an energy service perspective (Haas et al., 
2008) on the energy system, by looking at service outputs rather than final or primary energy inputs 
that overemphasize the least efficient energy end-use applications. Nonetheless, it needs to be noted 
that transportation is one of the fastest growing energy demand categories. This adds further emphasis 
on efforts to improve transport energy efficiency, which has both technological (more efficient 
vehicles), as well as behavioral and lifestyle dimensions (changing mobility patterns, shifts between 
different transport modes – e.g., by using public transportation or bicycles instead of private motorized 
vehicles). 
Global trends since 1900 of different energy service categories at the level of useful energy are 
shown in Figure 2.5 and at the level of final energy in Figure 2.5. 
In terms of useful energy, energy service provision for thermal comfort (low-temperature heat) 
and for transformation of materials and manufacturing of goods (high temperature heat), followed by 
industrial non-energy uses where energy serves as feedstock dominate the historical growth pattern. 
Stationary power (mechanical drives, mostly for industry) and mobility are comparatively smaller 
compared to thermal energy services. Other useful energy uses and illumination (lighting service 
provision) remain minor useful energy categories globally. Global useful energy demand has grown by 
almost a factor 30 since 1900 (from 7 EJ in 1900 to 194 EJ in 2010, De Stercke, 2014) or slightly above 
3% per year which is much faster than final or primary energy, illustrating the impact of improved 
efficiency in energy use conversion and the increasing availability of high quality energy carriers. 
Due to the different conversion efficiencies between final to useful energy, the relative shares and 
magnitude of final energy flows per type of demand category (Figure 2.5, following the IEA definition 
of demand sectors) are different compared to the useful energy perspective illustrated in Figure 2.4. 
Transport final energy in particular is much higher in terms of final energy compared to useful energy. 
Globally, final energy use has increased from some 29 EJ in 1900 to some 363 EJ in 2010 (De Stercke 
2014), or a factor close to 13 (2.3%/yr annual compound growth rate). 
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Figure 2.4. Global useful energy demand by type of energy service provision 1900-2010 (in EJ). 
Source: De Stercke (2014). 
 
Figure 2.5. Global final energy input for different energy demand categories (in EJ), 1900-1970 from 
De Stercke (2014), 1971 to 2010 adapted from IEA, 2012.  
Figure 2.6 shows the 2005 useful energy needs for major world regions and disaggregated by 
energy end-use sector. Useful energy instead of final energy gives a better indication of the relative 
importance of different end uses as closer to the actual energy services delivered and –as discussed 
above-- less distorted by the different conversion efficiencies across end-use applications. 
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hydropower, and modern renewables that are not used in their original resource state but converted into 
electricity. Electricity is the energy carrier with the highest versatility of providing different energy 
forms required for various energy services (heat, light, mobility). Crude oil also needs to be converted 
(refined) to the liquid fuels required for energy end-uses (gasoline, diesel, kerosene, for cars, trucks, 
and aircraft), or for further secondary energy conversions (e.g., fuel oil-fired power plants generating 
electricity). Coal is a major input for electricity generation and for specific industrial uses (metallurgy) 
but is not often used in direct form outside these two applications (remaining uses for residential 
heating/cooking are declining rapidly due to air pollution concerns). Conversely, natural gas is a major 
energy carrier directly used as final energy and for end-uses, mainly due to its convenience (grid 
delivered, no combustion ashes to dispose of) and cleanliness. Natural gas is also increasingly being 
used in electricity generation, where the advent of highly efficient combined cycle power plants with 
flat economies of scale (i.e., costs per MW capacity are not significantly different across different plant 
sizes) allows fast construction of modular units. Due to the low emission characteristics of these highly 
efficient conversion processes, plants can also often be located in high demand density areas, thus 
opening up the possibility of using (“recycling”) waste heat from electricity generation for industrial 
and residential customers, a scheme known as cogeneration or combined heat and power production 
(CHP). 
 
Figure 2.8. Global energy flows (in EJ) from primary to useful energy by primary resource input, 
energy carriers (fuels) and end-use sector applications in 2005. Source: data from IEA, 2007a; b 
(corrected for GEA primary energy accounting standard), and Cullen and Allwood, 2010. 
From an energy systems perspective, the electricity sector assumes a special role (also the reason 
why it is discussed in greater depth in Section 6.3 on Energy Conversions below.) Electricity 
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August 2015 16 ©IIASA 
generation is the energy conversion process that can accommodate the greatest diversity of primary 
energy inputs. As shown in Figure 2.8, all primary energy carriers enter to different degrees into 
electricity generation, from biomass, to all fossils, nuclear, hydro, and new renewables. Electricity is 
also a very specific energy carrier: its absolute cleanliness at the point of end-use (not necessarily at the 
point of electricity generation, however) and its high energy quality translate into the greatest versatility 
and flexibility in delivering whatever type of energy form and energy service required.  
However, electricity cannot be stored easily, which means that generation needs to follow the 
inevitable intertemporal variations of electricity demand over the seasons, during the day, even during 
minute-intervals. This variation in electricity demand over time is enshrined in the concept of load 
curves that describe the instantaneous use of electric power (in Watts or typically rather GW) over time 
(on a daily, weekly, or monthly basis). A cumulative load curve over all of the 8760 hours of a year, 
sorted by declining GW load, yields a load duration curve (or cumulative load curve) that helps to 
design a whole electricity system and to dimension different types of power plants used for peak, 
intermediate, and base load electricity generation. 
Overall, there is great variation in energy systems structures across different regions as a result of 
differences in the degree of economic development, structure of energy demand, and resource 
availability, among others (see also Section 8 below). These differences are summarized at the level of 
useful, final, and primary energy respectively for the 5 GEA regions and the world in Figure 2.9. 
 
Figure 2.9. World energy use: primary energy (by fuel), final energy (by energy carrier), and useful 
energy (by sector/type of energy service) for the world and five GEA regions for 2005 (in EJ). Source: 
based on IEA, 2007a and 2007b (corrected for GEA primary accounting standard) and Grubler et al., 
2012. For a definition of the GEA regions, see Appendix B. 
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3 Historic Energy Transitions 
3.1 Transitions in Energy End-Use (United Kingdom) 
Levels and structure of energy services have changed dramatically since the onset of the Industrial 
Revolution, reflecting population and income growth and, above all, technological change. Due to the 
“granular” nature of energy services, the measurement intricacies discussed above, and the traditional 
focus of energy statistics on (primary) energy supply, it is not possible to describe long-term transition 
in energy services and energy end-use on the global scale. Long-term detailed national-level analyses 
are available for the United States (Ayres et al., 2003) and the United Kingdom (Fouquet, 2008), as 
well as (for shorter time horizons) in the form of useful energy balances for Brazil (BMME, 1998). 
The long-term evolution and transitions in energy end-use and energy services is described below 
for the United Kingdom over a time period of 200 years. The United Kingdom is used as an illustrative 
example, not only due to the level of detail and time horizon of the original data available, but 
particularly because of its history of being the pioneer of the Industrial Revolution, which thus 
illustrates the interplay of industrialization, income growth, and technological change as drivers in 
energy end-use transitions. 
Figure 3.1 illustrates the growth in energy service provision for the United Kingdom since 1800 
by expressing the different energy services in terms of their required final energy inputs. Three main 
periods can be distinguished:  
 a regular expansion of energy services in the 19th century that characterized the emergence of 
the United Kingdom as a leading industrial power, in which growth is dominated by industrial 
energy service demands and to a lesser degree by rapidly rising transportation services enabled 
by the introduction of steam-powered railways;  
 a period of high volatility as a result of cataclysmic political and economic events (World War I, 
the Great Depression of 1929, and World War II) that particularly affected industrial production 
and related energy services; and  
 a further (more moderated) growth phase after 1950, again punctuated by periods of volatility, 
such as the energy crisis of the 1970s (characterized by the gradual decline of industrial energy 
services, compensated by strong growth in passenger transportation resulting from the diffusion 
of petroleum-based collective, and individual transport technologies (buses, aircraft, and cars).  
At present, levels of energy services appear saturated at a level of above 100 GJ of final energy 
input equivalent per capita. Industry (with an ever declining share) accounts for about 30% of all 
energy services, residential applications (with a stable share) for another 30%, and transportation 
(with an ever growing share) for about 40% of total energy services. 
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3.2 Transitions in Energy Supply Systems (Global) 
The history of energy transitions is a story of development interlaced with periods of crisis and 
shortages. The Neolithic revolution brought the first transformational change. Hunters and gatherers 
settled and turned to agriculture. Their energy system relied on harnessing natural energy flows, animal 
work, and human physical labor to provide the required energy services in the form of heat, light, and 
work. Power densities and availability were constrained by site-specific factors, with mechanical 
energy sources initially limited to draft animals and later to water and windmills. The only form of 
energy conversion was from chemical energy to heat and light – through burning fuel wood, for 
example, or tallow candles (Nakicenovic et al., 1998). It is estimated that early agricultural societies 
were based on annual energy flows of about 10–20 GJ per capita, two-thirds in the form of food for 
domesticated animals and humans, and the other third in the form of fuel wood and charcoal for 
cooking, heating, and early industrial activities such as ore smelting (Smil, 2010). China already 
experienced acute wood and charcoal shortages in the north of the country by the 13th century. In 
Europe, and particularly in the UK, fuel wood became increasingly scarce and expensive as forests 
were overexploited without sufficient replanting or other conservation measures (Ponting, 1992).4  
The fuel crisis was eventually overcome through a radical technological end-use innovation: the 
steam engine powered by coal. The steam cycle represented the first conversion of fossil energy 
sources into work; it allowed the provision of energy services to be site-independent, as coal could be 
transported and stored as needed; and it permitted power densities previously only possible in 
exceptional locations of abundant hydropower (Smil, 2006). Stationary steam engines were first 
introduced for lifting water from coal mines, thereby facilitating increased coal production by making 
deep-mined coal accessible. Later, they provided stationary power for what was to become an entirely 
new form of organizing production: the factory system. Mobile steam engines, on locomotives and 
steam ships, enabled the first transport revolution, as railway networks were extended to even the most 
remote locations and ships were converted from sail to steam. While the Industrial Revolution began in 
England, it spread throughout Europe, the United States and the world (see Gales et al., 2007, Kander et 
al., 2008, and Warr et al., 2010). 
Characteristic primary energy use levels during the “steam age,” (the mid-19th century in 
England), were about 100 GJ/yr per capita (Nakicenovic et al., 1998). These levels exceed even the 
current average global energy use per capita. By the turn of the 20th century, coal had become the 
dominant source of energy, replacing traditional non-fossil energy sources, and supplied virtually all of 
the primary energy needs of industrialized countries. 
Figure 3.3 shows the exponential growth of global energy use at a rate close to 2%/yr since the 
advent of the Industrial Revolution. Figure 3.4 is based on the same data and shows relative shares of 
different primary energy sources. Substitution of traditional energy sources by coal characterized the 
first phase of the energy revolution – the “steam revolution” – a transformation that lasted until the 
early 1920s when coal reached its maximal share of close to 50% of primary energy. 
                                                 
4 See also Perlin (1989) on the role of wood in the development of civilization. In fact, the first coal uses in the UK date 
back to Roman times, and coal was already being used for some industrial applications (e.g., brewing beer) before the 
Industrial Revolution. The absence of new and efficient end-use technologies for coal use (the later steam engine) implied 
only very limited substitution possibilities of traditional biofuel uses by coal before the advent of the Industrial Revolution. 
Note also that the fuel wood scarcity did not cause or induce the numerous technological innovations including the steam 
engine that led to the Industrial Revolution. These were not caused by price escalation associated with an early “fuel wood 
peak,” but rather resulted from profound transformations in the social and organizational fabric and incentive structures for 
science and entrepreneurship (see Rosenberg and Birdzell, 1986). 
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Figure 3.3. History of world primary energy use, by source (in EJ). Source: updated (IEA, 2012, BP, 
2014) Grubler et al., 2012.  
 
Figure 3.4. Structural change in world primary energy (in percent). Source: Figure 3.3.  
The second “grand” energy transformation also lasted for about 70 years. Primary energy demand 
increased even more rapidly, reaching 5% or even 6% growth annually, from the late 1940s to the early 
1970s. This development phase was characterized by increasing diversification of both energy end-use 
technologies and energy supply sources. Perhaps the most important innovations were the introduction 
of electricity as an energy carrier which could be easily converted to light, heat, or work at the point of 
end-use, and of the internal combustion engine, which revolutionized individual and collective mobility 
through the use of cars, buses, and aircraft (Nakicenovic et al., 1998). Like the transition triggered by 
the steam engine, this “diversification transformation” was led by technological innovations in energy 
end-use, such as the electric light bulb, the electric motor, the internal combustion engine, and aircraft, 
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as well as computers and the Internet, which revolutionized information and communication 
technologies.  
However, changes in energy supply have been equally far-reaching. In particular, oil emerged 
from its place as an expensive curiosity at the end of the 19th century to occupy the dominant global 
position, where it has remained for the past 60 years. The expansion of natural gas use and 
electrification are other examples of important changes in energy supply in the 20th century. The first 
electricity generation systems were based on the utilization of small-scale hydropower, followed by a 
rapid expansion of thermal power-generating capacity utilizing coal, oil, and more recently, natural gas. 
Commercial nuclear power stations were increasingly put into operation in the period from 1970 to 
1990. Renewable sources other than hydropower have become more intensively explored for electricity 
generation since the mid-1970s, with most of the new capacity being added during the past decade. 
Despite these fundamental changes in the energy system from supply to energy end-use, the 
dynamics of energy system transformations have slowed down noticeably since the mid-1970s (Grubler, 
2012). Figure 3.4 shows that after oil reached its peak market share of some 40% during the early 
1970s, the 1990s and the first decade of the 21st century saw a stabilization of the historical decline in 
coal’s market share, and a significant slowdown in the market growth for natural gas and nuclear. Since 
2000, coal has even experienced a resurgence, mostly related to the massive expansion of coal-fired 
power generation in rapidly developing economies in Asia.  
The shift from fuels such as coal with a high carbon content to energy carriers with a lower 
carbon content such as natural gas, as well as the introduction of near-zero carbon energy sources such 
as hydropower and nuclear, has resulted in the decarbonization of energy systems (Grubler and 
Nakicenovic, 1996; Grubler, 2008). Decarbonization refers to the decrease in the specific emissions of 
carbon dioxide (CO2) per unit of energy. Phrased slightly differently, it refers to the decrease in the 
carbon intensity of primary or any other energy form.  
The growth in total emissions can be conveniently decomposed by the following identity (where 
annual percentage growth rates are additive) covering their main determinants of emissions and their 
growth: population, income, energy efficiency, and carbon intensity: CO2 = Population x GDP/capita x 
Energy/GDP x CO2/Energy (proposed by Ehrlich and Holdren, 1971, and applied for CO2 by Kaya, 
1990). Due to spatial heterogeneity in trends and variable interdependence, caution is advised in 
interpreting component growth rates of this identity especially at the global level. Decarbonization 
therefore describes the trends in the carbon intensity of the Kaya identity. (For a discussion of energy 
intensity trends see Section 4.4 below.) 
Figure 3.5 illustrates the historical trend of global decarbonization since 1850 in terms of the 
average carbon emissions per unit of primary energy (considering all primary energy sources). The 
dashed line indicates the same trend but excluding biomass CO2 emissions, assuming they have all been 
taken up by the biosphere under a sustainable harvesting regime (biomass regrowth absorbing the CO2 
released from biomass burning). Historically, emissions related to land-use changes (deforestation) 
have far exceeded5 carbon releases from energy-related biomass burning, which suggests that in the 
                                                 
5 Cumulative emissions of fossil fuels between 1800 and 2000 are estimated to have released some 290 GtC (gigatonnes of 
elemental carbon – to obtain CO2 multiply by 44/12, yielding 1060 GtCO2), compared to land-use-related (deforestation, but 
excluding energy-related biomass burning) emissions of some 155 GtC. Total cumulative energy-related biomass carbon 
emissions are estimated at 80 GtC from 1800 to 2000 (all data from Grubler, 2002). Houghton (1999) estimates a net 
biospheric carbon flux (deforestation plus biomass burning minus vegetation regrowth) over the same time period (net 
emissions) of 125 GtC, which suggests that only a maximum (attributing –quite unrealistically – all residual net biospheric 
uptake to fuel wood) of 30 GtC (155 GtC deforestation release minus 125 GtC net biospheric emissions), or a maximum of 
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past, biomass, like fossil fuels, has also contributed significantly to increases in atmospheric 
concentrations of CO2. 
 
Figure 3.5. Decarbonization of primary energy (PE) use worldwide since 1850 (kg of CO2 emitted per 
GJ burned). Note: For comparison, the specific emission factors (OECD/IPCC default emission factors, 
LHV basis) for biomass (wood fuel), coal, crude oil, and natural gas are also shown (colored squares). 
See also discussion in text. Source: updated from Grubler and Nakicenovic, 1996 and Grubler et al., 
2012. 
The global rate of decarbonization has been on average about 0.3% annually, about six times too 
low to offset the increase in global energy use of some 2% annually. Again, the significant slowing of 
historical decarbonization trends since the energy crises of the 1970s is noteworthy, particularly due to 
rising carbon intensities in some developing regions (IEA, 2009), and in general due to the slowed 
dynamics of the global energy system discussed above.  
Decarbonization can be expected to continue over the next several decades as natural gas and 
non-fossil energy sources increase their share of total primary energy use. Some future scenarios (for a 
review see Fisher et al., 2007) anticipate a reversal of decarbonization in the long term as more easily 
accessible sources of conventional oil and gas become exhausted and are replaced by more carbon-
intensive alternatives. Others foresee continuing decarbonization because of further shifts to low-
carbon energy sources, such as renewables and nuclear energy. Nonetheless, virtually all scenarios 
foresee some increases in the demand for energy services as the world. Depending on the rate of energy 
efficiency improvement, this mostly leads to higher primary energy requirements in the future. As long 
                                                                                                                                                                        
38% (30/80) from energy-related biomass burning has been absorbed by the biosphere historically. In the past, biofuel 
combustion for energy can, therefore, hardly be classified as “carbon neutral.” Evidently, in many countries (at least in 
Northern latitudes) forests and energy biomass are harvested currently under sustainable management practices that in many 
cases (avoiding soil carbon releases from changing vegetation cover) will qualify as “carbon neutral.” The extent of current 
net carbon releases of energy-related biomass burning in developing countries remains unknown. 
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as decarbonization rates do not significantly accelerate, this means higher carbon emissions compared 
to historical experience. 
3.3 Energy and Economic Growth 
The relationship between economic growth and energy use is multifaceted and variable over time. The 
relationship is also two-directional: provision of adequate, high-quality energy services is a necessary 
(even if insufficient) condition for economic growth. Provision of adequate energy services is 
insufficient for economic growth in the sense that human (education) and social (functioning 
institutions and markets) capital as well as technology (innovation) are also important determinants of 
economic growth (see Barro, 1997). In turn, economic growth increases the demand for energy services 
and the corresponding upstream energy conversions and resource use. 
 
Figure 3.6 summarizes the long-term history of economic and energy development for a few 
countries for which such long-term data (since 1800) are available. To separate the impacts of 
population growth, both economic output (GDP) and (primary) energy use are expressed on a per capita 
basis. Thereby, the usual temporal dimension of historical comparisons is replaced by an economic 
development metric in which countries are compared at similar levels of per capita incomes (GDP). 
There are two ways of comparing GDP across different national economies depending on which 
exchange rate is used to convert a given national currency into a commensurable common currency 
(usually dollar denominated): at market exchange rates (MER) and in terms of purchasing power 
parities (PPP). The former are based on national accounts and official market (e.g., bank) exchange 
rates, while the latter are calculated based on relative prices for representative baskets of goods and 
services across countries denominated in an accounting currency of International$ (that equals the 
US$ in the United States). At present, differences between GDP rates denominated in MER and PPP 
exchange rates are comparatively minor among industrialized countries, and to simplify the exposition 
only MER-based GDP values are shown for the UK and Japan (MER and PPP GDPs are identical in 
the case of the US by definition). However, differences are significant in the case of developing 
economies (with PPP-based GDPs usually being larger than MER-based GDPs by a factor of two to 
three due to the much lower domestic price levels in developing countries –and hence the higher 
purchasing power of their population compared to industrialized ones), and, therefore, both GDP 
measures are shown in the case of China and India. 
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Figure 3.6. Primary energy use (GJ) versus GDP (at market exchange rates (MER) in 2005US$) per 
capita. Source: USA, Japan: updated from Grubler, 1998, UK: Fouquet, 2008, India and China: IEA 
(2010) and World Bank (2010). Note: Data are for the United States (1800–2008), United Kingdom 
(primary and final energy, 1800–2008), Japan (1922–2008), China (1950–2008), and India (1950–
2008). For China and India, also GDP at purchasing power parities (PPP, in 2005International$) are 
shown. 
Three observations help to understand the relationship between economic and energy growth:  
 the importance of metrics;  
 the overall positive correlation, that is, however, variable over time; and  
 the distinctive differences in development paths among different countries and their economies. 
First, both the starting points and the growth rates (the slopes of the trend lines shown in Figure 
3.6) of economies are dependent on the economic metric chosen for comparing incomes across 
countries (MER or PPP). For instance, China’s and India’s GDP per capita in 1970 are estimated to 
have been approximately US$170 and US$250, respectively (in US$2005), based on MER, and $700 
and $1000 (in International $2005), respectively, when based on PPP, which compares to the GDP of 
the US of approximately US$1000 (at US$2005 rates) of 200 years ago, and to that of Japan in 1885 
(Based on MER. Using PPP, Japan’s GDP per capita in 1885 is estimated to have been well above 
$4000 (in 2005International$). 
Thus, developing countries are by no means in a better position for economic “take-off”; they are 
not comparatively “richer” today than today’s industrialized countries were some 100 or even 200 years 
ago, albeit enjoying unique development opportunities due to new technologies and improved 
communication and trade flows (Grubler, 2004). This illustrates the time dimension of economic 
development that entails many decades. Developing countries are today at the beginning of a long 
uphill development path that will require many decades to unfold and is also likely to include setbacks, 
as evidenced by the historical record of the industrialized countries. However, overall levels of energy 
use can be expected to increase as incomes rise in developing countries. 
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The overall positive correlation between economic and energy growth remains one of the most 
important “stylized facts” of the energy development literature, even if the extent of this correlation and 
its patterns over time are highly variable. Although the pattern of energy use growth with economic 
development is pervasive, there is no unique and universal “law” that specifies an exact relationship 
between economic growth and energy use over time and across countries. The development trajectory 
of the US illustrates this point. Over much of the period from 1800 to 1975, per capita energy use in the 
US grew nearly linearly with rising per capita incomes, punctuated by two major discontinuities: the 
effects of the Great Depression after 1929, and the effects of World War II (recognizable by the 
backward-moving “snarls” in the temporal trajectory of both income and energy use per capita shown 
in Figure 3.6). However, since 1975, per capita energy use has remained remarkably flat despite 
continuing growth in per capita income, illustrating an increasing decoupling of the two variables as a 
lasting impact of the so-called “energy crisis” of the early 1970s, an experience shared by many highly 
industrialized countries. It is also important to recognize significant differences in timing. During the 
100 years from 1900 to 2000, Japan witnessed per capita income growth similar to that experienced by 
the US over 200 years (Grubler, 2004). This illustrates yet another limitation of simple inferences: 
notwithstanding the overall evident coupling between economic and energy growth, the growth 
experiences of one country cannot necessarily be used to infer those of another country, neither in terms 
of speed of economic development, nor in terms of how much growth in energy use such development 
entails. 
Lastly, there is a persistent difference between development trajectories spanning all of the 
extremes from “high energy intensity” (the US) at one end of the scale to “high energy efficiency” 
(Japan) at the other (see also the discussion on energy intensities in Section 4.4 below). The 
relationship between energy and economic growth thus depends on numerous and variable factors. It 
depends on initial conditions (e.g., as reflected in natural resource endowments and relative price 
structures) and the historical development paths followed that lead to different settlement patterns, 
different transport requirements, differences in the structure of the economy, and so on. This twin 
dependency on initial conditions and the development paths followed to explain differences among 
systems is referred to as “path dependency” (Arthur, 1989). Path dependency implies considerable 
inertia in changing development paths, even as conditions prevailing at specific periods in history 
change – a phenomenon referred to as “lock-in” (Arthur, 1994). Path dependency and lock-in in energy 
systems arise from differences in initial conditions (e.g., resource availability and other geographical, 
climatic, economic, social, and institutional factors) that in turn are perpetuated by differences in policy 
and tax structures, leading to differences in spatial structures, infrastructures, and consumption patterns. 
These in turn exert an influence on the levels and types of technologies used, both by consumers and 
within the energy sector, that are costly to change quickly owing to high sunk investment costs, hence 
the frequent reference to “technological lock-in” (Grubler, 2004)  
The concepts of path dependency and technological lock-in help to explain the persistent 
differences in energy use patterns among countries and regions even at comparable levels of income, 
especially when there are no apparent signs of convergence. For instance, throughout the whole period 
of industrialization and at all levels of income, per capita energy use has been lower in Japan than in the 
US (Grubler, 2004). The critical question for emerging economies such as China and India is, therefore, 
what development path they will follow in their development and what policy leverages exist to avoid 
lock-in in energy- and resource-intensive development paths that ultimately will be unsustainable, 
which puts energy efficiency at the center of the relationship between the economic and energy systems. 
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4 Energy/Exergy Efficiency and Intensity 
4.1 Introduction 
Energy is conserved in every conversion process or device. It can neither be created nor destroyed, but 
it can be converted from one energy form into another. This is the First Law of Thermodynamics. For 
example, energy in the form of electricity entering an electric motor results in the desired output – say, 
kinetic energy of the rotating shaft to do work – and in losses in the form of heat as the undesired 
by-product caused by electric resistance, magnetic losses, friction, and other imperfections of actual 
devices. The energy entering a process equals the energy exiting. Energy efficiency is defined as the 
ratio of the desired (usable) energy output to the energy input. In the electric motor example, this is the 
ratio of the shaft power to the energy input electricity. Or in the case of natural gas for home heating, 
energy efficiency is the ratio of heat energy supplied to the home to the energy of the natural gas 
entering the furnace. This definition of energy efficiency is sometimes called First Law efficiency 
(Nakicenovic et al., 1996a). 
A more efficient provision of energy services not only reduces the amount of primary energy 
required but, in general, also reduces costs and adverse environmental impacts. Although efficiency is 
an important determinant of the performance of the energy system, it is not the only one. In the 
example of a home furnace, other considerations include investment, operating costs, lifetime, peak 
power, ease of installation and operation, and other technical and economic factors (Nakicenovic et al., 
1996a). For entire energy systems, other considerations include regional resource endowments, 
conversion technologies, geography, information, time, prices, investment finance, age of infrastructure, 
and know-how. 
As an example of energy chain efficiency, Figure 4.1 illustrates the energy flows in the supply 
chain for illumination services (lighting). In this example, electricity is generated from coal in a thermal 
power station and transmitted and distributed to the point of end-use, where it is converted to light 
radiation by means of an incandescent light bulb. Only about 1% of the primary energy is transformed 
to illumination services provided to the end-user. In absolute terms, the majority of losses occur at the 
thermal power plant. The conversion of chemically stored energy from the coal into electricity comes 
along with the production of a significant amount of heat as a by-product of the process – which, if not 
used, constitutes a large part of the supply chain losses. Idle losses at the point of end-use reflect the 
amount of time when the light bulb is switched on with the illumination service not being needed at that 
moment – for example, when the user is temporarily not present in the room. This is very similar to the 
concept of a “load factor” referring to the capacity utilization of plant and equipment. For instance, in 
typical commuting situations in industrialized countries there are no more than 1.2 passengers per 
automobile, which is a lower load factor than for 2-wheelers (bicycles and scooters) in most cities of 
developing countries. 
In this example, abundant opportunities for improving efficiency exist at every link in the energy 
chain. They include shifting to fuels that allow a higher conversion efficiency (e.g., natural gas) and 
more efficient conversion, distribution, and end-use technologies (e.g., combined cycle electricity 
generation, fluorescent or LED lighting technologies), as well as behavioral change at the point of end-
use (e.g., reducing idle times). Integration of energy systems is another approach to reduce losses and 
improve overall system efficiency. An example of such system integration is combined heat and power 
production, where low temperature residual heat from thermal power production is utilized for space 
heating, a technique which can raise overall energy efficiency of the power plant up to 90% (Cames et 
al., 2006). At the point of end-use, idle losses can be reduced through changed user behavior and 
control technology such as building automation systems that adapt energy services to the actual needs 
of the user. 
Energy Primer             www.energyprimer.org 
August 2015 28 ©IIASA 
 
Figure 4.1 Illustrative example of the compound First Law efficiency of an entire energy chain to 
provide the energy service of illumination. Index: primary energy entering system = 100%. 
4.2 Energy Efficiencies 
In 2005, the global efficiency of converting primary energy sources to final energy forms, including 
electricity, was about 67% (330 EJ over 496 EJ; see Figure 1.2 above). The efficiency of converting 
final energy forms into useful energy is lower, with an estimated global average of 51% (169 EJ over 
330 EJ; see Figure 2.2 above). The resulting average global efficiency of converting primary energy to 
useful energy is then the product of the above two efficiencies, or 34%. In other words, about two-
thirds of global primary energy use does not end up as useful energy input for providing energy 
services but is dissipated to the environment in the form of waste heat (or what is colloquially termed 
energy “losses”). 
4.3 Exergy Efficiencies 
How much energy is needed for a particular energy service? The answer to this question is not so 
straightforward. It depends on the type and quality of the desired energy service, the type of conversion 
technology available, the fuel used, including the way the fuel is supplied, and the way how energy 
services are provides (infrastructures and organizations). Initially, energy efficiency improvements can 
be achieved in many instances without elaborate analysis through common sense, good housekeeping, 
and leak-plugging practices. Obviously, energy service efficiencies improve as a result of sealing 
leaking window frames or the installation of a more efficient furnace. Or if the service is transportation, 
getting to and from work, for example, using a transit bus jointly with other commuters is more energy-
efficient than taking individual automobiles. After the easiest improvements have been made, however, 
the analysis must go far beyond energy accounting. 
While the First Law of Thermodynamics states that energy cannot be destroyed the Second Law 
of Thermodynamics implies that no process is possible in which the sole result is the absorption of heat 
and its complete conversion into work. That means that heat and work are not of equal quality, as work 
can be fully converted into heat while heat cannot, even in the ideal case, be converted fully into work. 
As both laws are valid for all energy conversion processes, it is therefore not sufficient to consider 
energy efficiency, i.e., taking only First-Law aspects into account. Instead of energy analysis is a 
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comprehensive analysis should be based on exergy, since this property takes into account all Laws of 
thermodynamics.6 
Here the concept that something may get lost or destroyed in every energy conversion device or 
transformation process is useful. This “something” is called “availability,” which is the capacity of 
energy to do work. Often the availability concept is called “exergy”. Exergy is defined as the maximum 
amount of energy that under given (ambient) thermodynamic conditions can be converted into any other 
form of energy; it is also known as “availability” or “work potential.” Therefore, exergy defines the 
minimum theoretical amount of energy required to perform a given task. The ratio of theoretical minimum 
energy use for a particular task to the actual energy use for the same task is called exergy efficiency (see 
also Wall, 2006). 
Exergy can be defined as the maximum amount of work that can be obtained from a combined 
system of a considered mass- or energy flow and a reference environment. The reference environment 
is a model of the real surroundings with which an energy system under consideration could exchange 
heat and work, without changing its thermodynamic properties (such as temperature, pressure…). It is 
exactly defined in all physical properties relevant to the performed analysis (such as temperature, 
pressure und chemical composition). 
Exergy takes the First and the Second Law of thermodynamics into account and can be calculated for 
all energy- and mass flows. In a simplified way, exergy can be explained as a product of energy and 
energy quality (Jentsch, 2010).7 While the factor energy indicates that all losses of energy lead to losses 
of exergy as well, energy quality indicates what share of the considered energy flow can be converted 
into work in an ideal energy converter. 
Exergy analysis has two major advantages over energy analysis: A) It takes into account the 
different energy quality of the various energy forms and B) it can be applied universally – to all supply 
chains, energy systems and even to subprocesses. This makes exergy an ideal property for the 
thermodynamic analysis of energy systems, as effects of both fundamental thermodynamic laws (First 
and Second Law of Thermodynamics) are taken into account. 
The following example should help clarify the difference between energy and exergy. A well-
insulated room contains a small container of kerosene surrounded by air. The kerosene is ignited and 
burns until the container is empty. The net result is a small temperature increase of the air in the room 
(“enriched” with the combustion products). Assuming no heat leaks from the room, the total quantity of 
energy in the room has not changed. What has changed, however, is the quality of energy. The initial 
fuel has a greater potential to perform useful tasks than the resulting slightly warmer air mixture. For 
example, one could use the fuel to generate electricity or operate a motor vehicle. The scope of a 
slightly warmed room to perform any useful task other than space conditioning (and so provide thermal 
                                                 
6 Strictly speaking there are not two, but four laws of thermodynamics. The Zeroth, First, Second and Third Law of 
Thermodynamics. The Zeroth Law states that if two systems are in thermal equilibrium with a third system, they must be in 
thermal equilibrium with each other. This law helps define the notion of temperature. The “Third Law of Thermodynamics 
states: The entropy of a system approaches a constant value as the temperature approaches zero. This law helps to define 
entropy. As the exergy definition is based on specific temperature und entropy values it takes not only the commonly known 
First and Second Laws of Thermodynamics into account but also the lesser known Zeroth and Third Laws of 
Thermodynamics as well. Therefore there is no single thermodynamic property that allows a more comprehensive analysis 
than exergy. 
7 Commonly Exergy is described as the useful part of energy. However, the applicability of this notion is limited to heat 
above the temperature of the environment, electricity and work. Since this explanation cannot be used to explain the exergy 
of heat below the temperature of the environment (commonly termed: cold) and mechanical exergy of pressurized air, it is 
better to conceptualize exergy as the product of energy and energy quality – as this approach can be applied universally. 
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comfort) is very limited. In fact, the initial potential of the fuel or its exergy has been largely destroyed. 
Although energy is conserved, energy quality and consequently exergy is destroyed in all real-life 
energy conversion processes. This is what the Second Law of Thermodynamics says.  
Since exergy is a thermodynamic property which includes energy, in an ideal case with no 
destruction of energy quality, exergy is also conserved. Therefore a ratio of useful exergy output to 
total exergy input cannot exceed 100%. Consequently it is possible to calculate exergy efficiency8 as 
the ratio of useful output to used input of exergy.9  
An example should help clarify the difference between energy and exergy efficiencies. Boilers 
used to heat buildings are typically 70% to 80% energy efficient, with the latest best-performing 
condensing boiler operating at energy efficiencies greater than 90%. This may suggest that only 
minimal energy savings should be possible, considering these high energy efficiencies of boilers. Such 
a conclusion is incorrect. The quoted efficiency is based on the specific process being used to operate 
the boiler – combustion of fossil fuel to produce heat. The energy quality of the fuel is 100% and 
therefore significantly higher than that of the required heat for space heating – with an energy quality of 
approximately 5% at 4°C reference temperature (Jentsch, 2010). The energy efficiency of 80% gives a 
misleading impression that only modest improvements are possible. The exergy efficiency of 4% in this 
case can be expressed as a product of energy efficiency and the ratio of energy quality of useful product 
and fuel (80% x 5%/100% = 4%) which says that a 25-fold reduction in final heating energy is 
theoretically possible by changing technologies and practices. Thus, although significant savings 
cannot be attained by reducing energy losses to the surroundings there is an improvement potential in 
terms of matching the energy quality of the source better to the energy quality required by the service. 
This can be only attained by replacing the fuel-consuming boiler with another technology that is more 
exergy efficient.  
However, in practice, the theoretical maxima of an exergy efficiency of 100% can never be 
achieved, since exergy destroying effects such as friction and resistance are present in all supply chains. 
More realistic improvement potentials for energy conversion chains might allow an improvement in the 
range of 50% exergy efficiency. In addition to further efficiency improvements resource and 
consequently primary energy consumption of energy services can also be decreased by a lower useful 
energy demand – for instance, in reducing the thermal losses of a heated or air conditioned building to 
its environment via better insulation of walls and windows that maintains the level of comfort and thus 
the level of energy service delivered. 
It becomes obvious that it is not sufficient to account for energy-in versus energy-out ratios 
without due regard for the quality difference of demand and source – and thus, the exergy destroyed in 
the process. Minimum exergy destruction implies an optimal match of energy quality of demand caused 
by the desired energy services and the supply from the used energy sources.  
There are many examples for exergy analysis of individual conversion devices (e.g., losses 
around a thermal power plant) as well as larger energy systems (cities, countries, the entire globe). This 
literature is reviewed in detail in Nakicenovic (1996a). Estimates of global and regional 
                                                 
8 The calculation of exergy efficiency requires significant attention to the details of definition for input and output flows – as 
there is potential for significant mistakes. An overview over definitions and rules applicable to exergy analysis can be found 
in Jentsch, 2010. 
9 In some sources exergy efficiency is also termed “Second Law efficiency”. However, this notion is somewhat misleading 
as exergy efficiency also takes energy efficiency and therefore “First law efficiency” into account. In order to avoid 
confusion the term “Second Law efficiency” is not used in this Primer, where we refer to exergy efficiency. Exergy 
efficiency is sometimes also termed exergetic efficiency. 
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primary-to-service exergy efficiencies vary typically from about 10% to as low as a few percent (see 
also Ayres, 1989, Gilli et al., 1996, and Nakicenovic et al., 1996b). 
Although exergy destruction can never be totally avoided due to physical limitations such as 
friction and resistance, the calculation of exergy efficiencies provides a solid foundation to obtain the 
best energy systems possible. Energy systems with the lowest exergy efficiencies identify those areas 
with the largest potentials for efficiency improvement. For fossil fuels, this implies the areas that also 
have the highest emission mitigation potentials. However, the optimization of exergy efficiency is not 
only a technical task but must also overcome other barriers, such as social behavior, vintage structures, 
financing of capital costs, lack of information and know-how, and insufficient policy incentives. 
The principal advantages of exergy efficiency are that the dimension of energy quality is taken 
into account and that almost all technologies can be evaluated by exergy efficiency due to the universal 
applicability of exergy. Often exergy analysis can be usefully extended to also consider derived ratios 
such as exergy per unit of activity, similar to the case of energy intensity (see Section 4.4 above). 
Depending on the used balance boundaries, exergy analysis can provide the basis for a just comparison 
of different technologies and supply chains as well as a means for the clear identification of inefficient 
process steps. A further advantage of exergy efficiency is that the concept can be transferred to the 
assessment of energy service provision, which is not possible in energy efficiency calculations. By 
comparing an actual configuration (a single driver in an inefficient car) with a theoretically ideal 
situation (a fuel-efficient car with five people in it), respective exergetic service efficiencies while 
maintaining the same type of energy service (i.e., not assuming commuting by bicycle) can be 
determined. This is important, especially as the available literature suggests that efficiencies in energy 
end-uses (in the conversion of final to useful energy and of useful energy to energy services) are 
particularly low (see Figure 4.2).  
 
Figure 4.2 Estimated exergy efficiencies (average for OECD countries) from primary exergy (=100%) 
to useful exergy and to services by energy carrier (fuel). Source: adapted from Nakicenovic, 1993. 
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4.4 Energy Intensities 
A related concept to that of energy efficiency is that of energy intensity. Instead of measuring 
input/output relations in energy terms, as is the case for energy efficiency, energy inputs are divided by 
a range of appropriate activity indicators that represent the energy service provided (such as tonnes of 
steel produced, vehicle-km driven, floorspace inhabited, monetary measures of output, number of 
employees, etc.) to yield energy intensity indicators. Such comparative benchmarking across countries, 
industries, or products, yields valuable insights into potentials for efficiency improvements related to 
various activities (comparing current intensities to best practice), and is applied widely in the 
corresponding energy efficiency improvement and greenhouse gas (GHG) mitigation literature (see 
Fisher et al., 2007; and the GEA end-use Chapters 8, 9, and 10, Banerjee et.al., 2012; Kahn Ribeiro et. 
al., 2012; Ürge-Vorsatz et.al., 2012). Extending this concept to entire energy systems and economies 
yields a widely used indicator of energy intensity, per unit of economic activity (GDP, which is the 
monetary quantification of all goods and services consumed in an economy in a given year subject to 
market transactions. Recall here that GDP – like energy- is a flow variable and, therefore, does not 
measure wealth or welfare which are stock variables.). 
This parsimonious indicator is appealing because of its relative simplicity (usually a single 
number) and seeming ease of comparability across time and across different systems (global and/or 
national economies, regions, cities, etc.). However, its simplicity comes at a price. First, the indicator is 
affected by a number of important measurement and definitional issues (see the discussion below). 
Second, the underlying factors for explaining differences in absolute levels of energy intensities across 
economies and their evolution over time requires detailed, further in-depth analysis using a range of 
additional explanatory variables. They cannot be distilled from an aggregate indicator such as energy 
intensity of the national or global GDP. 
The literature on energy intensities, their trends, and drivers is vast (for useful introductory texts 
see, e.g., Schipper and Meyers, 1992; Nakicenovic et al., 1996a; Greening et al., 1997; Schäfer, 2005; 
Baksi and Green, 2007; Gales et al., 2007). Apart from definitional, accounting, and measurement 
conventions, differences in energy intensities have been explained by a set of interrelated variables 
including demographics (size, composition, and densities – e.g., urban versus rural population), 
economics (size and structure of economic activities/sectors – e.g., the relative importance of energy-
intensive industries versus energy-extensive services in an economy; per capita income levels), 
technology and capital vintages (age and efficiency of the production processes, transport vehicles, 
housing stock, etc.), geography and climate, energy prices and taxes, lifestyles, and policies, just to 
name the major categories. 
In terms of energy and economic accounting, energy intensities are affected by considerable 
variation depending on which particular accounting convention is used (and which is often not 
disclosed prominently in the reporting reference). For energy, the largest determining factors are 
whether primary or final energy is used in the calculations, and if non-commercial (traditional biomass 
or agricultural residues, which are of particular importance in developing countries) are included or not. 
Another important determinant is which accounting method is used for measuring primary energy (see 
Appendix A). For GDP, the largest difference in energy intensity indicators is the conversion rate used 
for expressing a unit of national currency in terms of an internationally comparable currency unit based 
on either MER or PPP exchange rates (see the discussion in Section 3.3 above). 
Figure 4.3 illustrates some of the differences in the evolution of historical primary energy 
intensity for four major economies in the world: China, India, Japan, and the United States. It shows a 
number of different ways of measuring energy intensity of GDP. The first example can be best 
illustrated for the US (where there is no difference between the MER and PPP GDP measure by 
definition).  
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Figure 4.3. Energy intensity improvements over time (top) and against per capita income (bottom) US 
(1800–2008), Japan (1885–2008), India (1950–2008), and China (1970–2008).  Source: see Figure 3.6. 
Note: Energy intensities (in MJ per $) are always shown for total primary energy (bold lines) and 
commercial primary energy only (thin lines) and per unit of GDP expressed at market exchange rates 
(MER in 2005US$) and for China, India, and Japan also at purchasing power parities (PPP in 
2005International$). For the United States, MER and PPP are identical.  
The (thin red) curve shows the commercial energy intensity. Commercial energy intensities 
increase during the early phases of industrialization, as traditional and less efficient energy forms are 
replaced by commercial energy. When this process is completed, commercial energy intensity peaks 
and proceeds to decline. This phenomenon is sometimes called the “hill of energy intensity.” Reddy 
and Goldemberg (1990) and many others have observed that the successive peaks in the procession of 
countries achieving this transition are ever lower, indicating a possible catch-up effect and promising 
further energy intensity reductions in developing countries that still have to reach the peak. In the US, 
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for example, the peak of commercial energy intensity occurred during the 1910s and was higher than 
Japan’s subsequent peak, which occurred in the 1970s (Nakicenovic et al., 1998). More important than 
this “hill” in commercial energy intensities is, however, a pervasive trends toward overall lower total 
energy (including also non-commercial energy) intensities over time and across all countries. 
Figure 4.3 also shows energy intensities for China and India for two alternative measures of 
converting national GDP to an internationally comparable level: using MER or PPP exchange rates. In 
the cases of India and China, MER energy intensities are very high, resembling the energy intensities of 
the now industrialized countries more than 100 years ago (Nakicenovic et al., 1998). This gives the 
appearance of very low energy efficiency in producing a unit of economic output in China and India, 
and by implication in other emerging and developing countries. However, China and India’s PPP-
measured GDPs are much higher than official MER-based GDPs suggest (and resulting PPP-based 
energy intensities much lower) due to generally much lower prices in the two countries compared to 
industrialized countries. This translates into a more favorable PPP exchange rate of the local currency 
compared to MER (often by a factor of two to three). Consequently, with the same dollar amount, a 
consumer can purchase more goods and services in developing countries than in more industrialized 
countries. PPP-measured energy intensities are thus generally much lower for developing countries, 
indicating substantially higher energy efficiencies in these countries than would be calculated using 
MER.  
The substantially lower energy intensity of GDP when expressed in terms of PPP rather than 
MER should be contrasted with the much lower energy intensity improvement rates in terms of PPP 
compared to energy intensities based on MER. The differences can indeed be substantial. In 2005 the 
energy intensity in China was about 33 MJ/US$2005 for MER, with an average historical reduction rate 
of 3.3%/yr since 1971, compared with about 14 MJ per 2005International$ for PPP for the same year 
and an improvement rate of 1.9%/yr. Since 1971, China’s per capita GDP in terms of MER has grown 
by some 7%/yr, whereas the estimated per capita GDP in PPP terms has grown by some 5%/yr, 
compared to a growth rate of per capita primary energy use of some 3%/yr (from 20 GJ in 1971 to 57 
GJ in 2005 and 71 GJ in 2008). Therefore, caution is needed when interpreting the apparent rapid 
energy intensity improvements, measured by MER-based GDPs, which are reported for some countries. 
In theory, as countries develop and their domestic prices converge toward international levels, the 
difference between the two GDP measures largely disappears (see the case of Japan in Figure 4.3).  
Adding traditional (non-commercial) energy10 to commercial energy reflects total primary energy 
requirements and yields a better and more powerful measure of overall energy intensity. Total energy 
intensities generally decline for all four countries in Figure 4.3. There are exceptions, including periods 
of increasing energy intensity that can last for a decade or two. This was the case for the US around 
1900 and China during the early 1970s. Recently, energy intensities are (temporarily) increasing in the 
economies in transition, due to economic slowdown and depression (declining per capita GDP). In the 
long run, however, the development is toward lower energy intensities. Data for countries with long-
term statistical records show improvements in total energy intensities by more than a factor of five 
since 1800, corresponding to an average decline of total energy intensities of about 1%/yr (Gilli et al., 
1990; Nakicenovic et al., 1998; Fouquet, 2008). Improvement rates can be much faster, as illustrated in 
the case of China discussed above (2–3%/yr for PPP- and MER-based energy intensities, respectively. 
Energy intensities in India have improved by 0.8%/yr (PPP-based) to 1.5%/yr (MER-based) over the 
                                                 
10 Traditional biomass fuels are often collected by end-users themselves and thus not exchanged via formal market 
transactions. Their collection costs in terms of effort and time can be substantial but are not reflected in official GDP 
estimates. (see Section 9.5 below). 
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period from 1970 to 2005. The much higher improvement rates of China compared to India reflects 
both a less favorable (less energy-efficient) starting point as well as much faster GDP per capita growth 
in China than in India. Faster economic growth leads to a faster turnover of the capital stock of an 
economy, thus offering more opportunities to switch to more energy-efficient technologies. The reverse 
side also applies, as discussed above for the economies in transition (Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union): with declining GDP, energy intensities deteriorate – i.e., increase rather than decline. 
It is also useful to look at long-term energy intensity trends using a more appropriate 
“development” metric than a simple calendar year. Even if in many aspects not perfect, income per 
capita can serve as a useful proxy for the degree of economic development. From this perspective, the 
vast differences in energy intensities between industrialized and developing countries are development 
gaps rather than inefficiencies in developing economies. For similar levels of income, energy intensities 
of developing countries are generally in line with the levels that prevailed in industrialized countries 
about a century ago, when these had similar low income levels (see lower graph, Figure 4.3). 
However, such a perspective also reveals more clearly distinctive differences in development 
patterns spanning all the extremes between “high intensity” (e.g., the US) and “high efficiency” (e.g., 
Japan). The United States has had at all times significantly higher energy intensities than other 
countries, reflecting its unique condition of originally prevailing resource abundance,11 coupled with a 
vast territory, and a comparative labor shortage that led to early mechanization and the corresponding 
substitution of human and animal labor by mechanical energy powered by (cheap) fossil fuels (David 
and Wright, 1996). The concepts of path dependency and lock-in (introduced above) describe these 
differences in development patterns and trajectories. Current systems are deeply rooted in their past 
development history. Initial conditions and incentives in place (such as relative prices) structure 
development in a particular direction, which is perpetuated (path dependent), ultimately leading to lock-
in – i.e., the resistance to change of existing systems (due to, e.g., settlement patterns, industrial 
structure, lifestyles). From this perspective, a rapid convergence of levels of energy intensity and 
efficiency across all countries would indeed be a formidable challenge, notwithstanding that all systems 
can improve their energy intensities toward an “endless” innovation “frontier” in energy efficiency. 
Energy intensity improvements can continue for a long time to come. As discussed above, the 
theoretical potential for energy efficiency and intensity improvements is very large; current energy 
systems are nowhere close to the maximum levels suggested by the Second Law of Thermodynamics. 
Although the full realization of this potential is impossible, many estimates reflecting the potential of 
new technologies and opportunities for energy systems integration indicate that the improvement 
potential might be large indeed – an improvement by a factor of ten or more could be possible in the 
very long run (see Ayres, 1989; Gilli et al., 1990; Nakicenovic., 1993; 1998; Wall, 2006). Thus, 
reductions in energy intensity can be viewed as an endowment, much like other natural resources, that 
needs to be discovered and applied. 
5 Energy Resources 
5.1 Introduction 
Energy resources – or rather occurrences – are the stocks (e.g., oil, coal, uranium) and flows (e.g., wind, 
sunshine, falling water) of energy offered by nature. Stocks, by definition, are exhaustible, and any 
                                                 
11 A similar case can be found in the development history of the former Soviet Union, whose long-term economic data are, 
however, too uncertain for cross-country comparisons of energy intensity. 
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resource consumption will reduce the size of the concerned stock. Flows, in turn, are indefinitely 
available as long as their utilization does not exceed the rate at which nature provides them. While the 
concept of stocks and flows is simple and thus intriguing, it quickly becomes complex and confusing 
once one is tasked with their quantification (the size of the “barrel”) or recoverability (“the size and 
placement of the tap”). Crucial questions relate to the definition and characterization of, say, 
hydrocarbons in terms of chemical composition, concentration of geological occurrence, investment in 
exploration, or technology for extraction. Just by accounting for lowest concentration occurrences or 
lowest-density flow rates, stocks and flows assume enormous quantities. However, these have little 
relevance for an appreciation of which parts of the stocks and flows may be or become practically 
accessible for meeting societies’ energy service needs. Private- and public-sector energy resource 
assessments, therefore, distinguish between reserves and resources, while occurrences are usually 
ignored for reasons of lack of technical producibility or economic attractiveness. Put differently, what 
is the benefit of knowing the size of the barrel when no suitable tap is available? 
Despite being used for decades, the terms energy reserves and resources are not universally 
defined and thus poorly understood. There are many methodological issues, and there is no consensus 
on how to compare reserves and resources across different categories fairly. A variety of terms are used 
to describe energy reserves and resources, and different authors and institutions have different 
meanings for the same terms depending on their different purpose. 
The World Energy Council (WEC, 1998) defined resources as “the occurrences of material in 
recognizable form.” For oil, it is essentially the amount of oil in the ground. Reserves represent a 
portion of resources and is the term used by the extraction industry. Reserves are the amount currently 
technologically and economically recoverable (WEC, 2007). Resources are detected quantities that 
cannot be profitably recovered with current technology but might be recoverable in the future, as well 
as those quantities that are geologically possible but yet to be found. Occurences include both reserves 
and resources as well as all additional quantities estimated to exist in the Earth’s crust. 
BP (2010a) notes that “proven reserves of oil are generally taken to be those quantities that 
geological and engineering information indicate with reasonable certainty, which can be recovered in 
the future from known reservoirs under existing economic and operating conditions.” Other common 
terms include probable reserves, indicated reserves, and inferred reserves – that is, hydrocarbon 
occurrences that do not meet the criteria of proven reserves. Undiscovered resources are what remain 
and, by definition, one can only speculate on their existence. Ultimately recoverable resources are the 
sum of identified reserves and the possibly recoverable fraction of undiscovered resources, and 
generally include production to date. 
Then there is the difference between conventional and unconventional resources (e.g., oil shale, 
tar sands, coal-bed methane, methane clathrates (hydrates), uranium in black shale or dissolved in sea 
water). In essence, unconventional resources are occurrences in lower concentrations, different 
geological settings, or different chemical compositions than conventional resources. Again, 
unconventional resource categories lack a standard definition, which adds greatly to misunderstandings. 
As the name suggests, unconventional resources generally cannot be extracted with technology and 
processes used for conventional oil, gas, or uranium. They require different logistics and cost profiles 
and pose different environmental challenges. Their future accessibility is, therefore, a question of 
technological development – i.e., the rate at which unconventional resources can be converted into 
conventional reserves (notwithstanding demand and relative costs). In short, the boundary between 
conventional and unconventional resources is in permanent flux. Occurrences are in principle affected 
by the same dynamics, albeit over a much more speculative and long-term time scale. Technologies that 
may turn them into potential resources are currently not in sight, and resource classification systems, 
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therefore, separate them from resources (often considering occurrences as speculative quantities that 
may not become technologically recoverable over the next 50 years). 
In short, energy resources and their potential producibility cannot be characterized by a simple 
measure or single numbers. They comprise quantities along a continuum in at least three, interrelated, 
dimensions: geological knowledge, economics, and technology. McKelvey (1967) proposed a 
commonly used diagram with a matrix structure for the classification along two dimensions (Figure 
5.1): decreasing geological certainty of occurrence and decreasing techno-economic recoverability 
(Nakicenovic et al., 1996a). The geological knowledge dimension is divided into identified and 
undiscovered resources. Identified resources are deposits that have known location, grade, quality, and 
quantity, or that can be estimated from geological evidence. Identified resources are further subdivided 
into demonstrated (measured plus indicated) and inferred resources to reflect varying degrees of 
geological assurance. The techno-economic dimension accounts for the feasibility of technical 
recoverability and economic viability of bringing the resource to the market place. Reserves are 
identified resources that are economically recoverable at the time of assessment (see the BP definition 
above). 
 
Figure 5.1. Principles of resource classification, illustrating the definition of the three fundamental 
concepts: reserves, resources, and occurrences. Source: adapted from McKelvey, 1967. 
Undiscovered resources are quantities expected or postulated to exist under analogous geological 
conditions. Other occurrences are materials that are too low-grade, or for other reasons not considered 
technically or economically extractable. For the most part, unconventional resources are included in 
other occurrences. 
Reserve and resource estimations, as well as their production costs, are subject to continuous 
revision for several reasons. Production inevitably depletes reserves and eventually exhausts deposits, 
while successful exploration and prospecting adds new reserves and resources. Price increases and 
production cost reductions expand reserves by moving resources into the reserve category and vice 
versa. Technology is the most important force in this process. Technological improvements are 
continuously pushing resources into the reserve category by advancing knowledge and lowering 
extraction costs. The outer boundary of resources and the interface to other occurrences is less clearly 
defined and often subject to a much wider margin of interpretation and judgment. Other occurrences are 
not considered to have economic potential at the time of classification. Yet over the very long term, 
Energy Primer             www.energyprimer.org 
August 2015 38 ©IIASA 
technological progress may upgrade significant portions of occurrences to resources and later to 
reserves (Rogner et al., 2000). 
In contrast, long-term supply, given sufficient demand, is a question of the replenishment of 
known reserves with new ones presently either unknown, not delineated, or from known deposits 
presently not producible or accessible for techno-economic reasons (Rogner, 1997; Rogner et al., 2000). 
Here the development and application of advanced exploration and production technologies are 
essential prerequisites for the long-term resource availability. In essence, sufficient long-term supply is 
a function of investment in research and development (exploration and new production methods) and in 
extraction capacity, with demand prospects and competitive markets as the principal drivers. 
For renewable energy sources, the concepts of reserves, resources, and occurrences need to be 
modified, as renewables represent (in principle) annual energy flows that, if harvested without 
disturbing nature’s equilibria, are available sustainably and indefinitely. In this context, the total natural 
flows of solar, wind, hydro, geothermal energy, and grown biomass are referred to as theoretical 
potentials and are analogous to fossil occurrences. For resources, the concept of technical potentials is 
used as a proxy. The distinction between technical and theoretical potentials thus reflects the possible 
degree of use determined by thermodynamic, geographical, technological, or social limitations without 
consideration of economic feasibility. 
Economic potentials then correspond to reserves – i.e., the portion of the technical potential that 
could be used cost-effectively with current technology and costs of production. Future innovation and 
technology change expand the techno-economic frontier further into the previously technical potential. 
For renewables, the technical and economic resource potentials are defined by the techno-economic 
performance characteristics, social acceptance, and environmental compatibility of the respective 
conversion technology – for instance, solar panels or wind converters. Like hydrocarbon reserves and 
resources, economic and technical renewable potentials are dynamically moving targets in response to 
market conditions, demand, availability of technology, and overall performance. Conversion 
technologies, however, are not considered in this discussion on resources. Consequently, no reserve 
equivalent (or economic potential) is given here for renewable resources. Rather, the deployment 
ranges resulting from the GEA pathways (scenarios12) are compared with their annual flows. 
5.2 Fossil and Fissile Resources 
Occurrences of hydrocarbons and fissile materials in the earth’s crust are plentiful – yet they are finite. 
The extent of the ultimately recoverable oil, natural gas, coal, or uranium has been subject to numerous 
reviews, and still there is a large range in the literature – for example, for conventional oil between 
5500 EJ and 13,700 EJ – a range that sustains continued debate and controversy. The large range is the 
result of varying boundaries of what is included in the analysis of a finite stock of an exhaustible 
resource – for example, conventional oil only, or conventional oil plus unconventional occurrences 
such as oil shale, tar sands, and extra heavy oils. Likewise, uranium resources are a function of the level 
of uranium ore concentrations in the source rocks considered technically and economically extractable 
over the long run.  
                                                 
12 See GEA Chapter 17, Riahi et al., 2012. The GEA pathways are normative scenarios that illustrate possible transition 
pathways towards a more sustainable future in which a number of policy objectives are simultaneously fulfilled including 
achieving universal energy access, drastic reductions in energy-related human health impacts and air pollution, improved 
energy security, as well as limiting climate change to below 2°C above pre-industrial levels. As a result the scenarios draw 
only to a limited extent on the fossil resource endowment and utilize increasingly renewable resources. 
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Table 5.1 summarizes the global fossil and fissile reserves, resources, and occurrences identified 
in the GEA and contrasts these with the cumulative resource use (2005–2100) in the GEA pathways 
(see GEA Chapter 17, Riahi et al., 2012). 
At the low end, cumulative global oil production in GEA pathways amounts to little more than 
total historical oil production up to 2005 – a sign of oil approaching peak production but also of a 
continued future for the oil industry. At the high end, future cumulative oil production is about 60% 
higher than past production without tapping unconventional oil in significant quantities.  
The ultimate constraint on fossil fuel resources will however not be how much we can extract 
from nature, but how much resulting CO2 from fossil fuel combustion is tolerable from the perspective 
of limiting climate change “below dangerous levels”. Table 5.2 replicates the information from Table 
5.1, but in terms of corresponding carbon flows and stocks (in GtC, i.e., billion tonnes elemental carbon 
- to obtain CO2 multiply by 44/12) 
Table 5.1. Fossil and uranium reserves, resources and occurrences (in ZJ, 1021 J). Source: GEA 
Chapter 7, Rogner et al., 2012.a) 
  
Historical 
production 
through 
2005 
Production 
2005 
Cumulative 
extraction GEA 
scenarios 
2005 - 2100 
Reserves Resources 
Additional 
Occurrence
s 
  [ZJ] [ZJ] [ZJ]  [ZJ] [ZJ] [ZJ] 
Conventional oil 6.1 0.15  7 - 10 5 - 8 4 - 6   
Unconventional oil  0.5 0.02 0 – 0.5 4 -6  11 - 15 >40 
Conventional gas 3.1 0.09 8 - 12 5 - 7 7 - 9 
Unconventional gas  0.1 0.01 0.2 - 9 20 - 67 40 - 122 >1,000 
Coal(b) 6.7 0.12 3 - 17 17 - 21 291 – 435 >140
Conventional 
uranium(c) 1.2 0.02 2 -29 
2 7  
Unconventional 
uranium(d) n.a.    4 > 2,600 
a) The data reflect the ranges found in the literature; the distinction between reserves and resources is based on current 
(exploration and production) technology and market conditions.  Resource data are not cumulative and do not include 
reserves. 
b) Additional occurrences of coal were not assessed in GEA Chapter 7, Rogner et al., 2012, estimates given are from 
Nakicenovic et al., 1996a. 
c) Reserves, resources, and occurrences of uranium are based on a once-through fuel cycle operation. Closed fuel cycles and 
breeding technology would increase the uranium reserve and resource dimensions 50–60 fold. Thorium-based fuel cycles 
would enlarge the fissile-resource base further. 
d) Unconventional uranium occurrences include uranium dissolved in seawater 
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Table 5.2. Fossil resources (from Table 5.1) in terms of carbon flows, in GtC. 
  
Historical 
production 
through 2005 
Production 
2005 Reserves Resources 
Additional 
Occurrences 
  [GtC] [GtC] [GtC] [GtC] [GtC] 
Conventional oil 121 3.0 100 - 160 80 - 120   
Unconventional oil  10 8 8 - 120  220 - 300 >800 
Conventional gas 47 1.4 77 - 107 107 - 138   
Unconventional gas 2 0.2 306 – 1,025 612 – 1,867 >15,000 
Coal 173 3.2 439 - 542 7,508 – 11,223 >3,600  
Total 354 8.1 930 – 1,954 8527-13,648 >19,000 
 
Fossil fuel reserves, i.e., currently economically and technologically recoverable quantities range 
between 1,000 to 2,000 GtC, resources in the order of magnitude of 10,000 GtC and additional 
occurrences up to 20,000 GtC. These vast carbon “endowments” can be compared to the current 
atmospheric CO2 content of some 850 GtC. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change in its 5th 
Assessment Report estimates that in order to limit climate change below a 2°C target, the remaining 
carbon budget13 in terms of future emissions would have to stay below a range of 300 to maximum 
1,000 GtC, i.e., even below currently recoverable fossil fuel reserves, not to mention resources or 
occurrences. (The IPCC range reflects different probabilities or likelihood for obtaining the 2°C target 
and whether or not non-CO2 GHGs are taken into account (2013).) Traditionally, deposits of fossil 
fuels were considered a most valuable economic asset, but from a climate change perspective they 
represent a substantial environmental liability. 
5.3 Renewable Resources 
Renewable energy resources represent the annual energy flows available through sustainable harvesting 
on an indefinite basis. While their annual flows far exceed global energy needs, the challenge lies in 
developing adequate technologies to manage the often low or varying energy densities and supply 
intermittencies, and to convert them into usable fuels (see Section 5.4 below). Except for biomass, 
technologies harvesting renewable energy flows convert resource flows directly into electricity or heat. 
Their technical potentials are limited by factors such as geographical orientation, terrain, or proximity 
of water, while the economic potentials are a direct function of the performance characteristics of their 
conversion technologies within a specific local market setting. 
Annual renewable energy flows are abundant and exceed even the highest future demand 
scenarios by orders of magnitude. The influx of solar radiation reaching the Earth’s surface amounts to 
3.9 million EJ/yr. Accounting for cloud coverage and empirical irradiance data, the local availability of 
solar energy reduces to 630,000 EJ. Deducting areas with harsh or unsuitable terrain leads to a technical 
potential ranging between 62,000 EJ/yr and 280,000 EJ/yr. By 2100 the GEA pathways utilize up to 
1500 EJ/yr of solar radiation (see Table 5.3). Note: The flows, potential, and utilization rates in Table 
                                                 
13 “Limiting the warming caused by anthropogenic CO2 emissions alone with a probability of >33%, >50%, and >66% to 
less than 2°C since the period 1861–1880, will require cumulative CO2 emissions from all anthropogenic sources to stay 
between 0 and about 1560 GtC, 0 and about 1210 GtC, and 0 and about 1000 GtC since that period respectively. These 
upper amounts are reduced to about 880 GtC, 840 GtC, and 800 GtC respectively, when accounting for non-CO2 forcings as 
in RCP2.6. An amount of 531 [446 to 616] GtC, was already emitted by 2011.” (IPCC, 2013). 
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5.3 are given in terms of energy input – not as outputs (secondary energy or using any accounting 
scheme for equivalent primary energy – see Appendix A).  
The energy carried by wind flows around the globe is estimated at about 110,000 EJ/yr, of which 
some 1550 EJ/yr to 2250 EJ/yr are suitable for the generation of mechanical energy. (Wind, biomass, 
hydro, and ocean energy are all driven by the solar energy influx. Their numbers are, therefore, not 
additive to the solar numbers discussed above.) 
The GEA pathways range of wind utilization varies between 41 EJ/yr and 715 EJ/yr. The energy 
in the water cycle amounts to more than 500,000 EJ/yr, of which 160 EJ/yr could theoretically be 
harnessed for hydroelectricity. The GEA pathways utilize between 27 EJ/yr and 39 EJ/yr compared to a 
technical potential estimated at 53 EJ/yr to 57 EJ/yr. 
Net primary biomass production is approximately 2400 EJ/yr, which, after deducting the needs 
for food and feed, leaves in theory some 1330 EJ/yr for energy purposes. Accounting for constraints 
such as water availability, biodiversity, and other sustainability considerations, the technical bioenergy 
potential reduces to 160 EJ/yr to 270 EJ/yr, of which between 125 EJ/yr and 220 EJ/yr are utilized in 
the GEA pathways. The global geothermal energy stored in the Earth’s crust up to a depth of 5000 
meters is estimated at 140,000 EJ. The annual rate of heat flow to the Earth’s surface is about 1500 
EJ/yr, with an estimated potential rate of utilization of up to 1000 EJ/yr. 
Oceans are the largest solar energy collectors on Earth, absorbing on average some 1 million 
EJ/yr. These gigantic annual energy flows are of theoretical value only, and the amounts that can be 
technically and economically utilized are significantly lower. 
Table 5.3 Renewable energy flows, potential, and utilization in EJ of energy inputs provided by nature. 
Source: GEA Chapters 7 and 17, Rogner et al., 2012; Riahi et al., 2012 (see also GEA Chapter 11, 
Turkenburg et al., 2012, for a discussion of renewable resource inventories and their differences). Note: 
MSW = municipal (and other) solid wastes. 
  
Primary Energy 
Equivalent in 
2005 
Utilization 
in GEA 
pathways  
Technical 
potential 
Annual 
flows 
  [EJ] [EJ/yr] [EJ/yr] [EJ/yr] 
Biomass, MSW, etc. 46 125–220 160–270 2200 
Geothermal 1 1–22 810–1545 1500 
Hydro 30 27–39 50–60 160 
Solar < 1 150–1500 62,000–280,000 3,900,000 
Wind 1 41–715 1250–2250 110,000 
Ocean – – 3240–10,500 1,000,000 
Note: The data are energy-input data, not output. Considering technology-specific conversion factors greatly reduces the 
output potentials. For example, the technical 3150 EJ/yr of ocean energy in ocean thermal energy conversion (OTEC) would 
result in an electricity output of about 100 EJ/yr. 
5.4 Energy Densities 
The concept of energy density refers to the amount of energy produced or used per unit of land. The 
customary unit for energy densities is Watts per square meter (W/m2), referring to a continuous 
(average) availability of the power of one Watt over a year. Typical energy densities for demand as 
well as supply are illustrated in Figure 5.2. 
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Figure 5.2 Energy densities of fossil (grey) and renewable (green) energy supply and demand (red). 
Source: modified and adapted from Smil, 1991.  
Energy demand and supply densities have co-evolved since the onset of the Industrial Revolution. 
In fact, one of the advantages of fossil fuels in the industrialization process has been their high energy 
density, which enables energy to be produced, transported, and stored with relative ease, even in 
locations with extremely high concentration of energy demand, such as industrial centers and rapidly 
growing urban areas. The mismatch between energy demand and supply densities is largest between 
urban energy use, which is highly concentrated, and renewable energies, which are characterized by 
vast, but highly diffuse energy flows. (Exceptions are geothermal energy and urban [municipal] wastes, 
which are characterized by high energy density.) 
The density of energy demand in urban areas is typically between 10 W/m2 and 100 W/m2 and 
can reach some 1000 W/m2 in extreme locations, such as skyscraper complexes and high-density 
business districts (see Figure 5.2 for an illustration of Tokyo’s 23 wards [districts]). Conversely, 
renewable energies have typical energy supply densities of a few W/m2 under ideal conditions 
(assuming all land can be devoted to harnessing renewable energy flows). Under practical conditions 
(considering competing land-uses for agriculture and human settlements) renewable energies can yield 
typically between 0.1 W/m2 and 0.5 W/m2 (see also GEA Chapter 18; Grubler et al., 2012b). As a result, 
locally harvested renewable energies in densely populated areas such as cities can only provide a very 
small fraction (some one percent) of urban energy demand. Therefore, renewable energies also have to 
be harvested in locations where land and favorable renewable resource potentials are available, and 
need then to be transported over longer distances to urban centers with their high energy demand 
densities.  
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6 Production, Trade, and Conversions 
6.1 Introduction 
The energy system consists of an intricate web of energy conversion processes linking primary energy 
resources to the provision of energy services. A first overview of energy conversion, therefore, can be 
gained by looking at the associated energy flows (see Figure 2.8 above). Due to the associated 
conversion losses, the energy flows get larger the further upstream the energy system one moves, which 
is the reason why global primary energy flows (496 EJ) are about three times larger than useful energy 
flows (169 EJ) in 2005. 
As the geographical location of energy resources and “downstream” components of the energy 
system are distributed very unevenly, this section begins by describing major global primary energy 
flows from production, use, and trade of energy. 
6.2 Production, Use, and Trade 
The sheer size of global energy flows, that dwarf energy storage capacities, implies a fundamental 
energy market identity: production of energy flows needs to equal demand, and vice versa. As energy 
demand and production capacities are distributed unevenly geographically, this basic market identity 
translates into vast flows of energy trade. Energy is traded in three forms:  
 direct energy flows of primary energy (coal, crude oil, and natural gas) and secondary energy 
(primarily refined oil products); and  
 indirect (embodied) energy flows, in which energy is traded in the form of (energy-intensive) 
commodities (aluminum, steel, etc.) and products (fertilizer, steel rails, cars, etc.).  
The following sections summarize the status of primary energy production, trade, and use 
(defined as “Total Primary Energy Supply” – or TPES – in energy balances) for fossil fuels, as they are 
the dominant form of current global energy use (some 80% of primary energy) and of international 
energy trade flows.14 Figure 6.1 complements this fossil fuel dominated picture by showing the regional 
distribution of non-fossil energy production, where there is little international trade. 
6.2.1 Direct Energy 
Table 6.1 summarizes primary energy production, trade, and use15 for nine regions and the world in 
2005. From the TPES of some 390 EJ of fossil fuels in 2005, some 230 EJ (or close to 60%) are 
represented by energy imports. The share of traded energy (direct primary and secondary energy trade) 
in TPES is markedly different for different fuels: it is lowest for coal (18%), followed by natural gas 
(30%), and reaches 80% for crude oil. Including trade in refined oil products (secondary energy), oil-
related energy trade flows (172 EJ) actually exceed the global TPES of oil products (167 EJ). This 
apparent paradox results from the fact that large importers of crude oil have corresponding large 
refining capacities, becoming in turn large exporters of refined petroleum products. The international 
                                                 
14 Renewables are dominated by traditional biomass use that is harvested and used locally without international trade. 
Modern renewables such as hydropower, solar, or wind, or for that matter also nuclear power, enter the energy system as 
secondary energy carriers (predominantly electricity, with some direct heat), which are generally not traded internationally. 
International trade in biofuels remains comparatively modest at some 0.2 EJ in 2005. International trade in electricity is also 
small: slightly above 2 EJ in 2005. 
15 Production – Exports + Imports +/- Stock changes = TPES, or primary energy use. Due to space limitations this total is 
not shown in Table 6.1. 
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division of labor in energy means that a barrel of crude oil can be traded various times and in various 
forms across national boundaries (not to mention the multiple “virtual” trades of the same barrel on 
speculative and futures markets). A good (even if extreme) illustration is provided in the case of 
Singapore: total fossil fuel imports equal a staggering 880 GJ/capita, of which 210 GJ/capita are used 
as primary energy input to the Singapore economy (with 120 GJ/capita final energy use), 450 GJ/capita 
are re-exported as oil products, and an additional 220 GJ/capita exported as bunker fuels for 
international shipping and aviation (Schulz, 2010). In addition, Singapore’s energy trade is also 
characterized by vast energy flows embodied in exported products (petrochemicals) as well as in goods 
imported into this city state (see the discussion below). 
The largest annual international trade flows (from aggregate country imports or exports) in 2005 
were crude oil, with some 135 EJ, followed by oil products (40 EJ), natural gas (30 EJ), and coal (20 
EJ). 
In terms of regions, the largest16 exporters for crude oil were the Middle East (MEA) region 
(some 50 EJ), the former Soviet Union (14 EJ), and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC – 11 EJ), 
balanced from the oil import side with imports to Europe (27 EJ), the United States (24 EJ), and 
developing economies in Asia, excluding China, with 18 EJ. For gas trade, only exports from the 
former Soviet Union (10 EJ) and imports to Europe (13 EJ) are beyond the 10 EJ reporting threshold 
level adopted here. Inter-regional coal trade is comparatively small (with largest regional exports and 
imports of 8 EJ (Australia) and Europe (6 EJ), respectively). 
Perhaps the least known aspect of international energy trade is the significant exports and imports 
of petroleum products. Europe, while a main crude oil importer (27 EJ), nonetheless exports 11 EJ of 
oil products, in order to import in turn a further 13 EJ of oil products. The trade in oil products to/from 
other regions is much smaller. The picture emerging from the international energy trade is thus less one 
of directed “source–sink” energy resource flows, but rather one of an increasingly complex “foodweb” 
in which energy is traded in primary and secondary forms across multiple boundaries. 
As mentioned above, international trade in non-fossil energy is still very small compared to fossil 
fuels, but production especially of “new renewables” is expanding at high growth rates, albeit from a 
very low starting base. Figure 6.1 summarizes the regional breakdown of non-fossil fuel production for 
the year 2005 (“new renewables” include wind, solar, and geothermal). 
 
 
                                                 
16 Flows below 10 EJ are not discussed separately. Details are given in Table 6.1. 
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Table 6.1. World trade flows between regions (in EJ) for 2005. Source: data from IEA, 2007a and 2007b.  
  Coal Crude Oil Oil Products Natural Gas 
  Prod. Exp. Imp. Stock Changes Prod. Exp. Imp. 
Stock 
Changes Prod. Exp. Imp. 
Stock 
Changes Prod. Exp. Imp. 
Stock 
Changes 
Asia w/o China 14.4 -3.9 5.5 -0.2 7.6 -3.1 17.5 0.1 0.0 -6.9 6.8 0.1 9.4 -3.1 2.3 0.0 
China 48.0 -2.3 0.9 -0.7 7.6 -0.3 5.3 0.0 0.0 -0.8 2.4 0.0 1.8 -0.1 0.1 0.0 
EU27 8.5 -1.2 6.4 -0.1 5.4 -3.0 26.7 0.0 0.1 -11.9 13.2 -0.3 7.9 -2.5 13.3 0.0 
Japan 0.0 0.0 4.7 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.0 0.0 0.0 -0.4 2.2 -0.1 0.1 0.0 2.8 0.0 
LAC 2.2 -1.7 0.8 0.0 23.6 -11.0 3.0 0.0 0.2 -4.3 3.0 0.0 6.2 -1.1 1.0 0.0 
MAF 6.0 -2.0 0.6 0.0 72.3 -52.1 2.6 0.0 0.0 -8.4 3.7 0.0 17.1 -5.5 0.4 0.0 
rest-OECD 11.0 -7.5 1.0 0.1 12.2 -8.7 4.2 -0.1 0.8 -2.2 2.2 0.0 11.2 -7.1 1.4 0.3 
REF w/o EU 10.3 -2.9 0.9 -0.1 24.1 -13.6 2.0 0.0 0.0 -4.9 0.5 0.0 27.7 -9.7 4.0 -0.1 
USA 23.9 -1.2 0.8 0.1 13.3 -0.2 23.7 -0.2 0.2 -2.3 6.3 0.0 17.6 -0.7 4.2 0.1 
World trade 
between regions 124.3 -22.8 21.7 -1.0 166.3 -92.1 94.0 -0.2 1.2 -42.0 40.3 -0.2 99.1 -29.8 29.5 0.2 
World trade 
between 
countries (IEA 
data) 
121.8 -21.6 21.8 0.1 167.8 -133.8 133.9 -0.5  – -40.7 37.6  – 99.3 -30.0 29.4 0.3 
Note: the five GEA regions have been expanded to nine to better represent international trade flows. These nine regions represent well the major international energy trade flows 
obtained from aggregating inter-country trade flows based on IEA statistics. Only for crude oil, the inter-regional trade flows cover only 70% of the true international trade in crude 
oil (the difference is intra-regional trade – e.g., within the EU27 countries, or within Latin America (LAC) countries. 
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Figure 6.1. Production of non-fossil primary energy (GEA primary energy accounting, see 
Appendix A) by major world region for the year 2005. Source: adapted from IEA, 2007a, and 
2007b. 
Nuclear energy contributes about 28 EJ or 6% of global primary energy in 2005.17 Its 
production is dominated by a few countries of the OECD90 and REF regions, particularly the 
US, Japan, Russia and Europe (Figure 6.1). Most of the new nuclear capacities of the recent 
years were installed in Asia. Particularly China is building at the moment about 40 GW of new 
capacity and is planning to expand nuclear to 15% of its power generation or to about 80 GW of 
nuclear capacity by 2020 (present global nuclear capacities are around 390 GW).  
Renewables contribute more than 70 EJ (or 14%) to global primary energy use. About 25 
EJ of this total stems, however, from the traditional use of biomass in developing countries, and 
illustrate a widespread lack of access to modern and clean energy carriers (particularly in Asia 
and Africa). Traditional biomass is predominantly used for cooking and heating and is the major 
source of energy-related health impacts (see Section 7 below). The substitution of traditional 
biomass use in households needs thus to be one of the central objectives for any future energy 
transition.  
The development of modern renewables (hydro, and the “new renewables” wind, solar, 
and geothermal) has been particularly dynamic over the recent years. They contributed in 2005 
about 6% of total global primary energy. The major source is hydro (30 EJ) and to some extent 
wind (>1 EJ). Other renewables (mainly solar and geothermal) contributed about another 1.2 EJ 
primary energy in 2005. About half of the generation of modern renewable is located in the 
                                                 
17 Primary energy use based on GEA primary energy (substitution equivalent) accounting standard (see Appendix 
A). 
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OECD90 region with another 20% of generation in the LAC as well as ASIA regions (Figure 
6.1). 
6.2.2 Embodied Energy 
The literature and statistical basis of embodied energy flows is thin, as existing studies almost 
invariably focus on embodied CO2 emissions in international trade, without disclosing the 
underlying energy data. Notable exceptions are studies on embodied energy in the international 
trade of Brazil (Machado, 2000), China (Liu et al., 2010), and Singapore (Schulz, 2010). 
Current energy accounting and balances report direct energy flows, whereas embodied energy 
trade is quite under-researched and not reported systematically. 
The only data source available for estimating embodied energy flows is the GTAP7 
(Narayanan et al., 2008) database that contains data suitable for estimating the fossil fuel energy 
embodied in international trade flows by input-output analysis (Table 6.2). Important limitations 
and intricate methodological issues need to be considered when trying to estimate the energy 
embodied in internationally traded commodities and products based on multi-regional input-
output tables. The flows summarized in Table 6.2, therefore, need to be considered as order of 
magnitude estimates that await further analytical and empirical refinements. Nonetheless, even 
these “rough” data help to get a sense of proportion. GTAP7 estimates that (fossil) energy 
embodied in international trade amounts to some 100 EJ – i.e., some 20% of global primary 
energy use – compared to direct energy trade flows of some 190 EJ in 2005 when using the 
same regional aggregation18 as reported in Table 6.1.  
Table 6.2. Trade in embodied energy between major regions (in EJ, only fossil primary energy) 
as derived from the GTAP7 multi-regional input-output tables for 2005. Source: Narayanan et 
al., 2008. 
  EU US Japan REF 
Rest-
OECD
Asia 
w/o 
China 
Chin
a LAC Africa 
Sum of 
Exports 
EU   3.5 0.6 1.1 2.2 2.1 0.9 0.8 1.2 12.4
US 3.3   0.9 0.1 2.8 1.5 0.9 2.8 0.3 12.6
Japan 0.7 0.9   0 0.2 1.2 1.2 0.1 0.1 4.4
REF 6.1 1.3 0.3   1.1 1.5 1 0.4 0.3 12
Rest-
OECD 2.4 4.1 0.4 0.2 1 0.5 0.2 0.2 9
Asia w/o 
China  5.1 3.6 3.5 0.3 1.3   4.9 0.7 1.1 20.5
China 5.1 5.4 3 0.4 1.3 4.8   1 0.5 21.5
World 
embodied 
energy 
trade 
LAC 1.4 4.1 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.5 0.4   0.2 7.3
Africa 2.4 0.9 0.2 0 0.3 0.6 0.3 0.2   4.9
Sum of 
imports 26.5 23.8 9.1 2.2 9.6 13.2 10.1 6.2 3.9 104.6
 
                                                 
18 The difference between the 190 EJ intra-regional trade (nine regions) and the 230 EJ reported as international 
energy trade reflects the energy trade between countries within a given region (e.g., between Germany and France 
in the EU region, or between Indonesia and Bangladesh in the Asia-sans-China region) which is not counted in the 
regional trade flows but included in the global total trade numbers (summed from national statistics). 
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In other words, at least half of global primary energy use is traded among regions in either 
direct or indirect (embodied) form, which illustrates the multitude of interdependencies at play 
in the global energy system that go far beyond traditional concerns of oil import dependency. 
Assuming that the relative proportions of intra-regional to international trade flows hold for 
embodied energy flows in a similar way, as in the case of direct energy trade flows, then direct 
and embodied energy trade flows (of perhaps 400 EJ) approach the level of world primary 
energy use in the year 2005 (500 EJ). Evidently, these numbers must not be interpreted through 
the traditional lens of (additive) “net” energy trade flows. The nature of the international 
division of labor is precisely that a Joule of energy can be traded many times, hence the trade 
numbers discussed above include multiple double-counting. Consider two examples: Iran is a 
major oil producer and exporter but lacks sufficient domestic refining capacity. A barrel of oil 
exported to Singapore may be re-exported back to Iran in the form of gasoline, or it may be re-
exported back in the form of plastic or chemical products. The same physical energy thus ends 
up being counted twice as an international energy trade flow. China is a major steel producer, 
Australia a major exporter of metallurgical coal (used in the steel industry), and Germany a 
major car manufacturer. In our example, coal is exported from Australia to China, where it 
serves to produce steel, and this steel is exported from China to Germany, where manufacturers 
use it to produce German cars for export to China. Direct energy trade (coal) becomes embodied 
energy trade (steel), which in turn becomes embodied energy trade again (cars), with a physical 
Joule energy counted three times as international energy trade. This example also illustrates the 
great difficulties in comprehensive accounting of energy (or GHG emission flows) through 
multiple exchanges and trade flows. Who ultimately “owns” the corresponding energy or GHG 
“footprint”: the Australian coal producer, the Chinese steel manufacturer, the German car 
company, or the Chinese consumer (car buyer)? 
6.2.3 Energy Trade Flows 
Figure 6.2 summarizes all direct (primary and secondary) and indirect fossil fuel-related 
international trade flows in the form of a map to demonstrate the high degree of energy 
interdependence worldwide. The term interdependence suggests that the energy system is much 
more integrated than conventional wisdom or energy security concerns would suggest. Not only 
do many countries critically depend on oil exports from the Middle East, the Middle East also 
depends on numerous other countries for its supply of food, consumer products, and investment 
goods that all embody (part of) the region’s previous energy exports. 
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Figure 6.2a. World energy trade of fossil fuels: direct primary and secondary energy coal 
(black), oil and oil products (red) and gas (LNG light blue, pipeline gas: dark blue), in EJ. 
Source: Oil/gas energy trade for 2005 (BP, 2007), coal trade for 2008 (WCI, 2009). 
Crude oil and oil products 
Gas by pipeline and LNG 
Coal 
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Figure 6.2b. World energy trade of total direct energy (pink) as well as embodied energy in 
goods traded (grey), in EJ. Sources: Embodied energy trade for 2004 (GTAP7 database, 2010), 
direct energy trade for 2005 (BP, 2007) except coal (2008 trade, WCI, 2009). 
6.3 Conversions 
6.3.1 Introduction and Overview 
One way of looking at energy conversion processes is to consider the associated energy 
conversion capacity, which is a proxy of the aggregated size of energy conversion technologies 
and hence an indicator of the magnitude of technological change and capital replacement 
required for improving energy efficiency through the application of more efficient processes 
and technologies. Unlike the picture that emerges when looking at energy flows, the scale of 
energy conversion technologies portrays a different pattern in which energy end-use 
conversions dominate. Although global numbers are not available, this pattern of an increasing 
scale of energy conversion processes and devices revealed by the long-term history of the US 
energy system (Table 6.3) is quite characteristic of the global picture as well. 
Direct energy trade 
Embodied energy trade 
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Table 6.3. Installed capacity of energy conversion technologies (in GW) for the United States, 
1850 to 2000. Source: Wilson and Grubler, 2011. 
GW (rounded) 1850 1900 1950 2000 
stationary end-use 
thermal (furnaces/boilers) 300 900 1900 2700 
mechanical (prime movers) 1 10 70 300 
electrical (drives, appliances) 0 20 200 2200 
mobile end-use animals/ships/trains/aircraft 5 30 120 260 
automobiles 0 0 3300 25000
stationary supply 
thermal (power plant boilers) 0 10 260 2600 
mechanical (prime movers) 0 3 70 800 
chemical (refineries) 0 8 520 1280
TOTAL   306 981 6440 35140 
 
For instance, in 2000 the total installed capacity of all US energy conversion devices 
equaled a staggering 35 TW (that compares to a global energy flow of some 16 TWyr/yr).19  
Energy supply-related conversion processes account for some 5 TW, with 30 TW in energy 
end-use, most notably in the form of automobiles (25 TW). Assuming all cars ran on zero-
emission hydrogen fuel cells, the installed capacity of the existing car fleet would be about ten 
times larger than that of all electricity-generating power plants and could easily substitute the 
traditional utility-dominated centralized electricity-generation model by an entirely 
decentralized generation system, powered by cars during their ample idle times. Such drastic 
transformations in electricity generation have been proposed (e.g., Lovins et al., 1996), 
especially as a means of accommodating vastly increased contributions from intermittent 
renewables such as wind, solar thermal, or photovoltaic systems without the need for 
centralized energy storage. Even if currently futuristic, such daring visions of technology are a 
useful reminder that the analysis of energy systems needs to look beyond energy flows only and 
to always consider both major components of energy systems: energy supply and energy end-
use. 
6.3.2 Electricity Generation 
Electricity is growing faster as a share of energy end-uses than other direct-combustion uses of 
fuels. Between 1971 and 2008, world electricity production almost quadrupled from 19 EJ to 73 
EJ of secondary energy (see Figure 6.3) – an absolute increase of 54 EJ. Some 60% of this 
growth (32 EJ) was in countries outside the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD).  
Figure 6.3 depicts the fuel share in global electricity production. About 68% of global 
electricity is generated from the combustion of fossil fuels, with coal accounting for more than 
40% of total production. The share of oil in power production has decreased considerably from 
23% to 6% since the first oil crisis in 1973. On the other hand, the share of natural gas has 
increased from 12% to 21%. Renewable energy sources contribute about 18%, with hydropower 
                                                 
19 In other words, if all US energy conversion devices operated 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, they would 
transform energy flows twice as large as the entire world energy use. The fact that US primary energy of 100 EJ is 
equal to 20% of global primary energy use illustrates the comparatively low aggregate capacity utilization of 
energy conversion devices, particularly in energy end use. (Transportation surveys suggest, for instance, that on 
average a car is used only one hour per day). 
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accounting for more than 85% of this. Following a rapid expansion in the 1970s and 1980s, 
nuclear electricity generation has seen little growth since. 
Figure 6.3 also shows electricity production for the GEA regions for the base year 2005. 
Fuel mixes vary widely, primarily reflecting the availability of local energy resources and to 
some extent also reflecting past technical and financial capacity to invest in advanced 
technologies such as nuclear. Coal for electricity generation is most prominent in Asia, 
accounting for almost 70% of production. OECD and Africa also have significant shares of 
coal-based power generation. Nuclear energy is primarily used in OECD countries as well as in 
Eastern Europe and the countries of the former Soviet Union. It makes only a minor 
contribution in developing countries, except China, which currently has the most nuclear power 
under construction in the world. Hydropower is unevenly used, providing 66% of electricity in 
Latin America and the Caribbean. Non-hydro renewable energy in electricity production is low 
in all regions. However, as a result of various policy support mechanisms in a rapidly increasing 
number of countries, about half of current investments in power generation are in renewable 
generation.  
 
Figure 6.3. Electricity output by generating source in 2005: World and five GEA Regions in 
TWh and EJ (in italics). Source: IEA, 2007a and 2007b. Note: Circle areas are proportional to 
electricity generated. 
 
Figure 6.4 shows regional trends in electricity output: growth trends are across 
heterogeneous regions. Most additional electricity production since 1971 was actually in the 
OECD countries (+22 EJ), slightly larger than in the Asia region (+20 EJ/yr). More recent 
growth trends, however, change this picture dramatically. Since 1990, growth in electricity 
generation has focused heavily on Asia (most notably in China, an additional 16 EJ of 
electricity generated), followed by the OECD (+9 EJ) and all other developing countries 
combined (6 EJ). The REF region even experienced a slight drop in electricity output in the 
aftermath of its economic restructuring. 
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Figure 6.4. World electricity generation by five GEA Regions, cumulative total (in EJ of 
secondary energy generated per year). Source: derived from IEA, 2010. 
7 Energy impact on the Human and Natural Environment 
7.1 Introduction 
Energy extraction, conversion, and use have major impacts on the environment. It is important 
to recall that the term environment includes both the human as well as the natural environment 
and that energy systems affect both. Whereas energy systems impacts on the human 
environment can be assessed in terms of their impact on human health and longevity, a similar 
comparable overall metric of energy systems impact on the natural environment is not possible. 
Too many different types of impacts and the diversity of ecosystems affected (land, water, air) 
preclude their aggregation into a simple overall impact metric. Therefore the discussion below 
focuses on summarizing major energy sources of pollutants with a particular emphasis on air 
pollutants for which global pollutant inventory data are available. 
As illustration for the impacts of energy on the human environment consider that the 
largest single source of human health impacts of energy is associated with household air 
pollution resulting from the use of traditional biomass in open fires or inefficient cookstoves by 
the poor in developing countries. Its direct human health impacts are estimated by GEA to result 
in more than 2 million premature deaths plus a significant proportion of health impacts from 
outdoor air pollution (that total close to 3 million premature death per year). The health impacts 
from biomass-fueled cookstoves include respiratory, cardiovascular, and other diseases, with 
the greatest risk for women and children, making access to culturally acceptable, clean, and 
efficient cooking a priority policy concern. 
Impacts on the natural environment can be regrouped into two broad categories: the use of 
natural resources in the form of energy resources (fossil fuels and renewables) and in the form 
of land and water; as well as pollutants that affect soil, water, and air. None of these 
environmental impacts can be looked at in isolation: pollutants need to be considered in relation 
to the absorptive capacity of the environment and many pollutants have multiple effects across 
different spatial scales (local, regional to global) and across different environmental 
compartments. The natural resource requirements of energy systems need to be differentiated 
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whether they are consumptive in the sense that they either deplete a natural stock (like fossil 
resources) or exclude an alternative use of the same natural resource (e.g., the area covered by a 
power plant is no longer available for alternative uses for human settlements or agriculture) or 
whether resource use is non-consumptive as either using a renewable resource (e.g., sunlight) or 
allowing the subsequent use of the resource for other human activities (e.g., riverwater exiting a 
hydropower plant). 
7.2 Human Health Impacts of Energy 
Energy systems negatively affect global health in major ways today, causing directly perhaps as 
many as 5 million premature deaths annually — and more than 5% of all ill-health (measured as 
lost healthy life years). (Methods and metrics used for estimating health impacts from air 
pollution are discussed in Box 2). Air pollution from incomplete combustion of fossil fuels and 
biomass fuels is by far the single major reason that energy systems negatively affect global 
health, although ash, sulfur, mercury, and other contaminants in fossil fuels also play a role.  
Second in importance are worker risks in energy industries, such as coal and oil extraction. 
The largest exposures to energy-related air pollution occur in and around households, 
particularly in developing countries where unprocessed biomass (wood and agricultural wastes) 
and coal is used for cooking and heating in simple appliances.  The health impact of climate 
change, which is largely driven by energy use, is not large yet, but is growing. Table 7.1 
summarizes current health impacts from energy systems, showing that much bigger impacts are 
found in poor countries.  As explained in Box 2, this is due both to higher exposures to the 
pollutants and higher vulnerability, as indicated by higher background disease rates. 
Unless major policy interventions are undertaken, human use of energy is expected to 
continue contributing significantly to the global burden of disease for years to come.  
Table 7.1: Outdoor and household health impacts by world region and global for the year 2005 
(in millions of DALYs – disability adjusted life-years lost).  
Region Outdoor (impacts from  
solid fuel use in households)* 
Household 
World           22.6 (4.5-6) 41.6 
OECD 2.4  
REFS 1.9  
Middle East and N. Africa 0.6                          
South Asia                7.0 (2.1 -2.7) 13.8 
Pacific Asia               1.1 (0.2-0.3)   3.9 
Sub-Saharan Africa               0.9 (0.2-0.4) 18.6 
Centrally Planned Asia            8.4 (2-2.6) 4.6 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
                  0.3 (0.02-0.05) 0.8 
* Indicated in parenthesis are estimated outdoor health impacts attributable to use of solid fuels (biomass and coal) 
in households. Note that these estimates are based on interpolations between scenarios and are only indicative. 
Range represents the inherent uncertainty in calculating these impacts. 
Household air pollution: Estimates for 2005 put the burden of disease caused by 
household air pollution at about 2.2 million premature deaths and at 42 million DALYs 
annually (GEA, Chapters 4 and 17, Smith et al., 2012; Riahi et al., 2012). These deaths occur 
mainly among women and young children in developing countries because they receive the 
highest exposures to household air pollution from cooking and heating with solid fuels.  
Energy Primer             www.energyprimer.org 
August 2015 55 ©IIASA 
Although the fraction of households relying on solid fuels is slowly declining, the absolute 
numbers globally are still rising among the world’s poorest populations.  
The only way to ameliorate this health risk is through encouraging as many households as 
possible to use cooking fuels such as electricity (e.g., in high efficiency induction cookstoves), 
clean-burning gases and liquids made from biomass or petroleum fuels while initiating 
widespread promotion of new generations of advanced combustion biomass stoves. These 
stoves reduce biomass emissions to nearly the level of emissions from clean fuels, by using 
small blowers and other technical innovations.  
Outdoor air pollution: Outdoor air pollution from incomplete combustion and other 
emissions from fuel use is also an important health risk factor globally.  The GEA assessment 
(Chapters 4 and 17, Smith et al., 2012; Riahi et al., 2012) estimates that in 2005 it was 
responsible for some 2.7 million premature deaths and some 23 million DALYs annually 
(including between 4.6 to 5 million DALYs from outdoor air pollution caused by household 
solid fuel use, which are thus additive to the household [indoor] air pollution impacts of 42 
million DALYs presented in Table 7.1).   Outdoor air pollution affects not only urban areas, but 
many regions between cities, due to long-range transport of pollutants.  Poor household fuel 
combustion is also a significant contributor to outdoor pollution in many parts of the world, for 
example South Asia and China, which means that the goals for clean household and general 
ambient air pollution are linked.    
Occupational health impacts: Occupational injuries and illnesses, particularly in biomass 
and coal harvesting and processing (such as coal mining and transport), are the next most 
important impact on health from energy systems.  Only strict adherence to international norms 
for worker health and safety can blunt this impact. Despite substantial gains over the past 50 
years at some energy-related workplaces, health and safety systems do not exhibit best practices 
in many countries.  The advent of novel nano- and other engineered materials for advance solar 
and other energy systems potentially pose risks to workers and the public that need to be 
carefully investigated before widespread deployment to avert health impacts before they occur. 
Nuclear power impacts: Unlike biomass and fossil fuels, nuclear power systems are not a 
significant source of routine health impacts, although they often garner considerable public and 
policy concern.  Average radiation doses to workers in nuclear power industries have generally 
declined over the past two decades. For nuclear power facilities, as with large hydroelectric 
facilities, the major health risks lie mostly with high-consequence but low-probability accidents. 
These risks are difficult to compare to the impacts that occur day to day.  Even considering 
accidents such as Chernobyl and Fukushima, however, the health effects of these low-
probability risks do not seem to be large, on average, compared to current routine impacts of 
fossil and biomass fuels.  Nevertheless the few accidents that have occurred make clear that 
nuclear power systems can cause considerable stress, disruption, fear, and anger among affected 
populations, which in turn creates real impacts on health.    
Energy efficiency and health: Although energy efficiency is usually found to be the best 
overall first strategy to improve the sustainability of energy systems, there can also be 
downsides if done without care.  This has been seen, for example, in programs to improve the 
energy efficiency of buildings without considering the impacts on indoor air quality of reducing 
ventilation or use of improper materials. Forced ventilation systems (often coupled with heat 
recovery of exhaust air) are the option of choice combining energy efficient homes with indoor 
air quality. 
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Climate change, energy, and health: Climate change to date, to which energy systems are 
a significant contributor, is starting to have an important impact on health, probably exceeding 
200 thousand premature deaths annually by 2005, more than 90% among the poorest 
populations in the world.  It is expected, however, that both the health burden and the percent 
due to energy systems will rise under current projections of GHG emissions and background 
health conditions in vulnerable populations, which are largely in developing countries. Well 
over 20 million people along the vulnerable coastal regions of Bangladesh, Egypt, and Nigeria 
are estimated to be at risk of inundation from a one-meter sea level rise, not accounting for 
inevitable population growth. Other health impacts from climate change include the effects of 
heat waves, malnutrition, spreading infectious diseases, and resource-related conflicts (see Box 
3). 
Co-benefits of protecting the climate system and improving health: There are a number of 
opportunities to reduce the current burden of disease while also reducing the pressure on global 
climate.  Some relate simply to reducing energy use and its associated health and climate 
impacts through efficiency improvements. Others, however, take advantage of the relatively 
high health and climate risk per unit emission posed by targeting specific short-lived 
greenhouse pollutants produced by energy systems, in particular black carbon and the 
precursors to ozone such as methane.   Some of the energy-associated and health-damaging 
pollutants, such as sulfate and organic carbon particles, however, have cooling characteristics 
that create potential trade-offs between health and climate goals when controlling certain 
sources. 
Overarching concepts: Per unit useful energy, the health and climate benefits of emission 
reduction interventions rise with the fraction of incomplete combustion; and, also per unit useful 
energy, the health benefits of emission reduction interventions rise as the combustion is closer 
to the population, increasing the proportion of emissions inhaled by someone.  This is called 
intake fraction (see Box 4). 
From a health standpoint, in addition to reducing risk factors such as air pollution and 
climate change, there is equal importance to reducing vulnerability by improving background 
health conditions, particularly among the world’s poor. Meeting the UN Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs) as soon as possible will be critical and bringing modern energy 
services to the world’s poor is a necessary, if not sufficient, condition in doing so. 
 
Box 2: Air Pollution Health Impacts 
To quantify the health impacts of air pollution, the most reliable results derive from 
epidemiological studies of human populations, although some insight can be gained from 
laboratory studies of animals.  Basically, the disease patterns and pollution levels experienced 
by populations living in different conditions are compared using statistical models to estimate 
the portion of the difference in disease that is due to the difference in air pollution exposure and 
not to other factors, such as differences in nutrition, age distribution, smoking, etc.  The results 
are expressed in relative risk, i.e., the excess risk for a particular disease due to a specific 
increase in air pollution exposure. The best health data are available for small particle air 
pollution; usually in terms of PM2.5 or PM10 (particles less than 2.5 or 10 microns in size, 
small enough to penetrate deep into the lungs). Ozone exposures are also thought to cause ill-
health separately from particles. 
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Relative risks of air pollution exposures vary by disease category and age, for example for 
lung cancer in adults and pneumonia in children.   Some are very well understood, heart disease 
for example, while risks for other diseases are less clear, tuberculosis for example.   
In recent years, a new type of analysis has become possible that creates what are called 
Integrated Exposure Response (IER) relationships.  These combine results from studies of 
combustion particles across a wide range of exposure conditions: outdoor air pollution, 
secondhand tobacco smoke, household air pollution, and active smoking.  Although the actual 
exposures, represented by amount of particles inhaled, vary by factors of a 1000 or more 
between, for example, outdoor air pollution and active smoking, the relationship between 
exposure and disease is consistent.  Of course, larger exposures cause more ill-health than 
smaller ones, but in a steadily rising fashion with exposure.  This adds additional evidence for 
the overall relationship between combustion particles and ill health. 
To convert relative risks to actual health impacts requires an additional step, consideration 
of the background disease rate in the population.  Put simply, if a certain amount of air pollution 
causes a 20% increase in a particular disease, but the background rate of this disease is low, 
there will be relatively little actual health burden on the population.  In another population, 
however, with a higher background disease rate, the same pollution exposure and relative risk 
will cause a much bigger burden.  This is one reason why pollution exposures tend to cause 
more health burden in poor compared to rich countries.  Another reason, of course, is that 
exposures tend to be higher. 
Premature mortality is one metric used to compare the burdens of risk factors like air 
pollution, but has limitations because it does not account for the age of death or for morbidity, 
i.e, illnesses and injuries that affect health but do not lead directly to death.  In international 
health comparisons, therefore, the DALY (disability-adjusted life year) is often preferred.  It 
accounts for the age of death and the time spent with an illness or injury and presumes that all 
people have the potential to live equally long.   The degree that people do not reach their full 
life expectancy, therefore, is a measure of the impact of the risk factors that they are exposed to, 
including air pollution.  Thus a death of an 8-year old creates more lost DALYs than the death 
of an 88-year old.   In Table 7.1, health impacts are indicated in lost DALYs. 
In common with other modern health burden assessments of risk factors, therefore, the 
GEA estimates have three primary inputs: 1) background disease rates; 2) the size of the 
population exposed to each level of risk 3) and the relative risks, i.e., how much each disease is 
increased by the exposure for each population group.  It easy to understand, therefore, how the 
overall results might vary somewhat between assessments by different groups, which often start 
with somewhat different estimates of these three factors, which are often not well documented, 
particularly in poor populations.  The relative scale across risk factors, however, tends to be 
preserved within all assessments. 
The GEA is the only major published attempt to group risk factors into those related to 
energy systems. The most authoritative burden of disease assessment overall, the Comparative 
Risk Assessment (CRA) of the Global Burden of Disease Project, examined more than 60 risk 
factors, including many not directly associated with energy.  It treats all risk factors in an 
equivalent fashion giving policy makers the fairest comparisons of the relative impacts of 
different risk factors and potential health benefits of interventions across sectors.  The first CRA 
(for 2000) was published in 2004, and the latest one for 2010 (Lim et at. 2012) is available also 
at http://www.healthdata.org/gbd It includes estimates for household air pollution, occupational 
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risks, and outdoor air pollution, but does not specify which portion is due to specifically to 
energy systems. 
 
Box 3: Climate Change Health Impacts 
The health impacts of climate change are thought to be of three types: 
-- Direct impacts, such as those due to heat stress and severe weather events 
-- Impacts mediated through the environment, such as shifts in the location and activity of 
disease-carrying mosquitoes and waterborne disease organisms 
-- Impacts mediated through human-managed systems, such as reduced agricultural yields, 
forced migrations of populations, and loss of income in poor populations.  
It is the last category that is thought to pose the greatest potential human health risk, 
although also being the most difficult to predict.  This difficulty is primarily because the impact 
will depend not only on the degree of climate change, but also on society’s response.  Thus, the 
world has plenty of total food today, but nevertheless malnutrition is the single biggest cause of 
ill-health.  With climate change, food availability will be even less and, if nothing changes in 
society, malnutrition will rise.  On the other hand, if society acts in a concerted way, 
malnutrition could be eliminated even under conditions of severe climate change. 
In general, for the next decades climate change will not create any new diseases, but 
exacerbate existing ones.  Thus, it has its biggest health impact among the most vulnerable 
populations, which are already most at risk.  Indeed, the only published estimate of the burden 
of disease from climate change show more than 90% of the impact in poor countries, 
particularly in South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa, and nearly 95% of that impact in children 
under five years, who are already at most risk from malaria, malnutrition, diarrhea, and other 
conditions thought to be enhanced by climate change (McMichael, et al., 2004). 
As with most other important impacts from climate change, however, the largest, but most 
difficult to determine, health impacts will occur after mid-century if current trends continue.  To 
head them off, however, requires starting to make big changes several decades in advance to the 
world energy system and other sources of greenhouse emissions because of the inertia built into 
the energy and climate systems. 
The latest (2014) IPCC report (Chapter 11 of Working Group II, Smith et al., 2014) on 
health effects and co-benefits can be found at http://www.ipcc-wg2.gov/  
 
Box 4: Intake Fraction 
Health impacts of airborne and other pollutants depend on the exposure to the population of 
concern, which in turn depends not only on the amount and toxicity of emissions, but also their 
location with regard to the population.  Thus, if no one is downwind to breathe it, a pollutant 
released far from populations may not affect health significantly, while a pollutant released in 
the direct proximity of people can have a major effect, even if released in relatively small 
amounts.   The metric used to compare such situations is called “intake fraction” (iF) which for 
airborne pollutants is simply the amount inhaled by the population divided by the amount 
released (Bennett et al. 2002).  The difference between major categories of pollution can be 
several orders of magnitude as illustrated by Figure 7.1 below. 
Energy Primer             www.energyprimer.org 
August 2015 59 ©IIASA 
Such differences in intake fraction explain how a relatively small amount of pollution 
released from household cookstoves, which is emitted right in the breathing zones of the family, 
can have more impact that much more pollution released from, for example, a large power 
plant. 
 
Figure 7.1. Illustrative examples of intake fractions for typical sources of air pollution expressed 
as grams breathed in per ton emitted (Smith 1993). 
 
7.3 Impacts on the Natural Environment 
 
7.3.1 Overview of Environmental Impacts 
Table 7.2 presents a qualitative overview of impacts on the natural environment by major 
component affected and type of impact and also lists the dominant20 anthropogenic source. 
It is noteworthy that energy constitutes the dominant source of environmental impacts in 9 
out of 18 environmental stressors summarized in Table 7.2. Equally important is to realize that 
any particular pollutant can have multiple impacts. Emissions of CO2 lead to increases in CO2 
concentration that in turn affect climate and cause ocean acidification as well. Sulfur emissions 
impact the environment at multiple scales: at the local scale they affect human health, plant life, 
and can cause corrosion of buildings and structures, at the regional scale they contribute to 
acidic deposition (“acid rain”) causing acidification of soils and water bodies, and at the 
regional and global scale sulfate aerosols exercise an important impact on climate (cooling 
effect that masks part of the global warming signal arising from increasing greenhouse gas 
concentrations). It is beyond the scope of this Primer to review in detail the multitude of 
                                                 
20 An anthropogenic activity is classified as dominant here if it either accounts for more than 50% of the total or 
constitutes the single largest source. This categorization can be very time dependent. For instance, industrial 
sources had dominated mercury emissions in the 1992 and 2004. With successful policy induced emission 
reductions from industrial sources, now coal combustion is the single largest source of anthropogenic mercury 
emissions (UNEP, 2008). 
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environmental impacts. Instead, below Section summarizes the major source categories of 
pollution where energy plays a dominant role: air pollutants.21 
 
Table 7.2. Overview of major environmental impacts on the natural environment, major 
components affected and dominant anthropogenic source for the situation around the year 2005. 
Source: adapted/updated from Holdren, 1992; WEA, 2004; Emberson et al., 2011. 
 
 
7.3.2 Air Pollutants 
Table 7.3 summarizes the major sources of global GHGs and selected pollutant emissions. 
The main pollutants emitted in the combustion of fossil fuels are sulfur and nitrogen oxides, 
carbon monoxide, and black and organic carbon, including suspended particulate matter. In 
addition, fossil fuel combustion in the energy sector produces more CO2 than any other human 
activity, and contributes to about 30% of global methane (CH4) emissions. Altogether, the 
energy sector is thus the biggest source of anthropogenic GHG emissions that are changing the 
composition of the atmosphere. 
                                                 
21 This Primer does not suggest that other pollutants and emissions sources are not important, but rather that their 
assessment is beyond the scope of this energy focused précis. 
impacting:
environmental stressor caused mainly by:  resources biodiversity land soil water air climate
Resource use:
extraction of fossil fuels Energy X X X X X X X
extraction of minerals Industry X X X X X X
land use Agriculture X X X X
water use Agriculture X
Nutrient cycles and impacts on land and water:
nitrogen fixation Agriculture X X X
phosphorous cycle Agriculture X X
Pollutant emissions:
Oil spills Energy X
Cadmium Industry X X
Mercury Energy X X
Lead Industry X X
Sulfur Energy       X (1)       X (1) X X
Nitrogen (NOx) Energy       X (1)       X (1) X X
Carbon (BC/OC/CO) Energy X X
var. chemicals (VOCs) Energy X X
Particulates Energy X
Greenhouse gases:    
CO2 Energy       X (2) X
CH4 Agriculture X
N2O Agriculture X
(1) acidic deposition
(2) ocean acidification
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Table 7.3. Global GHG and pollutant emissions by source for the year 2005. Sources: data from 
Lamarque et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2011; IPCC-RCP database (http://www.iiasa.ac.at/web-
apps/tnt/RcpDb); Houghton, 2008; GEA Chapter 17, Riahi et al., 2012. 
 
Pollutant Emissions Main Greenhouse Gases 
Sulfur  NOx BC OC CO VOC PM2.5 CO2 CH4 N2O 
  TgSO2 TgNO2 Tg Tg Tg Tg Tg PgCO2 Tg Tg 
Energy & Industry 110.0 106.5 5.1 12.2 561.0 131.1 34.6 26.5 105.2 - 
international shipping 13.1 18.8 0.1 0.1 1.3 3.1 - - 0.5 - 
transport 3.4 34.6 1.2 1.3 162.0 28.5 2.9 - 1.0 - 
industry 27.0 17.2 1.6 2.3 115.3 31.8 13.2 - 0.9 - 
residential & commercial 8.8 9.6 2.1 8.2 261.3 38.6 15.7 - 14.3 - 
energy Conversion 57.7 26.3 0.1 0.3 21.1 29.1 2.8 - 88.5 - 
Non-Energy 4.1 20.8 1.6 23.6 475.3 81.8 32.2 6.8 233.4 - 
agriculture (animals, rice, soil) - 2.3 - - - 0.8 - - 134.4 - 
waste (landfills, wastewater, 
incineration 0.1 0.3 - - 4.1 1.5 - - 72.6 - 
waste (agricultural burning on 
field 0.2 0.6 0.1 0.7 19.9 2.7 - - 1.5 - 
savannah burning 1.6 11.6 1.5 10.9 222.0 35.1 - - 8.9 - 
forest fires 2.2 6.0 - 12 229.3 41.7 - - 16.0 - 
TOTAL 114.1 127.3 6.7 35.8 1036.3 212.9 66.8 33.3 338.6 12.1 
 
7.3.2.1 CO2 and other GHGs 
CO2 emissions from fossil energy use in 2005 are estimated at 7.2 PgC or 26.4 PgCO2 (Boden 
et al., 2010). This represents 80% of all anthropogenic sources of CO2 in that year, with the 
remainder associated with land-use changes (deforestation) (Houghton, 2008).  
Figure 7.2 shows the historical development of fossil energy CO2 emissions by major 
world regions (compared to global non-energy-related sources of CO2). Today’s industrialized 
countries contribute most to the present global CO2 emissions and have also emitted most of the 
historical emissions associated with the observed increase in atmospheric CO2 concentrations. 
Although they are presently at lower absolute levels, emissions are growing more rapidly in 
developing countries. The largest source of energy-related carbon emissions are coal and oil 
(including oil products for feedstocks), with each about a 40% share, followed by natural gas, 
which represents about 20% of carbon emissions from the energy sector.  
CH4 is the second largest GHG contributing to anthropogenic global warming. Energy-
related sources include coal production (where it is a major safety hazard), oil production (from 
associated natural gas), and natural gas production, transport, and distribution (leaks). 
Municipal solid waste, animal manure, rice cultivation, wastewater, and crop residue burning 
are the major non-energy-related sources of CH4 emissions. While CH4 emissions from energy 
accounted for only 30% of total CH4 emissions in 2005, the relative share of the energy sector 
has been continuously increasing due to the rise of fossil fuel use throughout the 20th century 
(see Figure 7.2).  
Other GHGs include nitrous oxide (N2O), tetrafluoromethane (CF4), sulfur hexafluoride 
(SF6), and different types of ozone-depleting hydro-fluoro-carbons (HFCs). These gases are 
predominantly emitted from non-energy sectors. N2O is the largest contributor to global 
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warming among these other GHGs (IPCC, 2001). Important sources of N2O include agricultural 
soil, animal manure, sewage, industry, automobiles, and biomass burning, with energy 
contributing about 5% to total N2O emissions. CF4, SF6, and HFCs are predominantly emitted 
by various industrial sources, with only minor contributions from the energy sector (and are, 
therefore, not reported separately here). 
 
Figure 7.2. Development of energy-related CO2 and CH4 emissions by region (compared to 
global non-energy sources) from 1900 to 2005 in Pg (CO2) and Tg (CH4). Source: data from 
Boden et al., 2010; Houghton, 2008; IPCC-RCP database www.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/tnt/RcpDb.  
7.3.2.2 Traditional Pollutants (SOx, NOx, Particulates, etc.) 
Energy-related air pollution is responsible for a number of health effects including increased 
mortality and morbidity from cardio-respiratory diseases (Brunekreef and Holgate, 2002 and 
Section 7.2 above). Developing countries in particular face the greatest burden of impacts from 
air pollution, both outdoor and indoor. They tend to have high long-term levels of exposure 
from pollution sources such as forest fires, biomass burning, coal-fired power plants, vehicles, 
and industrial facilities, thus implying relatively high health impacts. In addition, indoor air 
pollution due to the lack of access to clean cooking fuels adds to exposure to air pollution, 
particularly in large parts of Asia and Africa. According to the World Health Report 2002, 
indoor air pollution is the second largest environmental contributor to ill health, behind unsafe 
water and sanitation (WHO, 2002).  
Figure 7.3 shows the historical development of selected pollutant emissions by major 
world regions (compared to global non-energy-related sources). It builds upon the collaboration 
of major inventory experts (Lamarque et al., 2010; Smith et al., 2011).  
Unfortunately for some important pollutants, such as lead or particulate matter, 
comparable global inventories with historical trends do not exist. Information for these 
pollutants is usually summarized at the regional, national, or city level only. Below, the trends 
for various pollutants are summarized, starting with those that are dominated by emissions from 
the energy sector. 
Anthropogenic sulfur emissions have resulted in greatly increased sulfur deposition and 
atmospheric sulfate loadings and acidic deposition in and around most industrialized areas 
(Smith et al., 2011). High levels of ambient sulfur concentrations impact human health and 
cause corrosion. Sulfuric acid deposition can be detrimental to ecosystems, harming aquatic 
animals and plants, and is also damaging a wide range of terrestrial plant life. In addition, sulfur 
dioxide forms sulfate aerosols that have a significant effect on global and regional climates. The 
effect on global climate change of sulfate aerosols may be second only to that caused by CO2, 
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albeit in the opposite direction (Forster et al., 2007). Stratospheric sulfate aerosols back-scatter 
incoming solar radiation, producing (regional) cooling effects that mask the global warming 
signal from increased atmospheric concentration of GHGs. Sulfur is ubiquitous in the biosphere 
and often occurs in relatively high concentrations in fossil fuels, with coal and crude oil deposits 
commonly containing 1–2% sulfur by weight (and much higher in some deposits). The 
widespread combustion of fossil fuels from the energy sector has, therefore, greatly increased 
sulfur emissions into the atmosphere, with the anthropogenic component now substantially 
greater than natural emissions on a global basis (Smith et al., 2001; 2011). More than 90% of 
present sulfur emissions are released from the energy sector. Historically, global emissions 
peaked in the early 1970s due to the tightening of air pollution legislation particularly in 
industrialized countries and were decreasing until 2000. Sulfur emissions have resurged since 
(see Figure 7.3), with increased coal-related emissions in China, international shipping (using 
heavy fuel or “bunker” oil that has a particularly high sulfur content), and developing countries 
in general (Smith et al., 2011). 
Emissions from nitrogen oxides (NOx – predominantly nitrogen dioxide and nitric oxide) 
contribute to a wide variety of health and environmental problems (respiratory diseases such as 
asthma, emphysema, and bronchitis; heart disease; damage to lung tissue; acid rain). NOx is also 
a main component of ground-level ozone and smog and thus contributes to global warming. 
Similar to sulfur, NOx emissions are dominated by the energy sector, which accounts for more 
than 80% of total anthropogenic NOx emissions. Emissions from NOx have continuously been 
increasing with the use of fossil fuels at the global level. Emissions trends differ significantly, 
however, at the regional level. While control measures in industrialized countries have resulted 
in improved air quality and decreasing NOx emissions since the early 1980s, the rapid increase 
in NOx emissions in Asia and from international shipping have more than compensated for 
improvements elsewhere, leading to an overall global increase in emissions (see Figure 7.3).  
The incomplete combustion of carbon-containing fuels (fossil as well as biomass) causes 
emissions of carbon monoxide and other pollutants, including particulate matter, black carbon, 
and organic carbon.22 In addition, black carbon strongly absorbs solar radiation and is 
contributing to climate warming (although its net aggregated effect is subject to uncertainty), 
and its deposition is a significant contributor to Arctic ice-melt. In 2005, combustion from the 
energy sector contributed about 75% of the total anthropogenic emissions of black carbon, with 
forest fires and savannah burning accounting for the remainder. Due to relatively higher 
emissions coefficients of organic carbon and carbon monoxide from vegetation fires, the 
contribution of the energy sector is between 35% and 50% and thus smaller than for black 
carbon (see Table 7.3 above). Historically, industrialized countries were once the primary 
source of emissions from incomplete combustion. However, emissions of black carbon and 
organic carbon in the industrialized world have been declining since the 1920s, as have those of 
carbon monoxide since the 1980s. Major drivers of this trend are improved technology and the 
introduction of air quality legislation. Today, the majority of energy-related emissions from 
incomplete combustion occur in developing countries (see Figure 7.3), resulting in significant 
health risks, particularly from household combustion of solid fuels (mostly biomass) that affect 
                                                 
22 Black carbon: pure carbon (soot) emitted (“black smoke”) from the combustion of fossil fuels, biofuels and other 
biomass (vegetation burning). It absorbs sunlight and reradiates heat into the atmosphere, thus producing a climate 
warming effect. Organic carbon: carbon combined with oxygen/hydrogen atoms (organic radicals) mainly arising 
from the incomplete combustion (“brown” or “white smoke”) of biomass. Organic carbon aerosols (fine particles 
suspended in the atmosphere) tend to back-scatter sunlight, producing a cooling effect on climate. 
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between half and three-quarters of the population in most poor countries, particularly in rural 
areas.  
Volatile Organic Compounds (VOCs) are emitted by a variety of sources, including 
industrial processes (solvents), on-road vehicles, refineries, vegetation fires, and residential 
wood burning, as well as emanations from a wide array of household products. Total global 
anthropogenic VOC emissions are estimated at about 220 Tg in 2005, with the energy and 
industry sectors accounting for about 60% of the total. VOCs contribute to the formation of 
ground-level ozone and include a variety of chemicals, some of which have short- and long-
term adverse health effects. As for other pollutants, the energy and industrial emissions have 
been increasing substantially, and in the recent decades the major sources of VOCs have moved 
from the industrialized world to developing countries, which contribute about 75% of present 
energy and industrial VOC emissions. 
 
 
Figure 7.3. Development of energy-related pollutant emissions in Tg: sulfur (SO2), nitrogen 
oxides (NOx), black carbon (BC), organic carbon (OC), carbon monoxide (CO), and volatile 
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organic compounds (VOCs) by region (colors), compared to global non-energy sources (grey) 
from 1900 to 2005.  
8 Heterogeneity in Energy Use 
In addition to the temporal variations in energy use described above, there is a wide degree of 
heterogeneity in energy use across the globe: between countries, between industries, and 
between energy users. While aggregate energy statistics are insightful for describing the energy 
system globally, regionally, or nationally, they often mask large disparities in energy use both 
across and within national and regional boundaries. Heterogeneities are evident both in the 
quantities of energy used and in the structure of energy use across different nations and sub-
populations. These disparities stem, for the most part, from differences in incomes, production 
and consumption activities, and different lifestyles. A small part of these variations reflect also 
differences in climatic conditions and thus energy service needs across regions (e.g., 
heating/cooling energy demands). Differences also exist in the types of energy carriers that are 
predominantly used and the levels of access to these across countries and populations. 
8.1 Heterogeneity in Energy Use across Nations 
Akin to the uneven development of economies around the world, energy use and services 
provision vary significantly across countries. In 2005, the total final energy use was about 330 
EJ globally, with the average per capita final energy use about 50 GJ. However, this global 
average conceals enormous differences in final energy use per capita across nations. The 
starkest disparity in average national final energy use per capita can be found by comparing 
Qatar, the country with the highest average in 2005 (445 GJ/capita), with Eritrea, that with the 
lowest (<5 GJ/capita), a difference of a factor of close to 100. The OECD countries, with less 
than a sixth of the world’s population, account for over 45% of total final energy use (see Figure 
8.1). Developing countries, with about four-fifths of the world’s population, account for just 
under 40% of final energy use. OECD countries on average consume over 16 times as much 
final energy per capita than developing countries in South Asia and Africa. 
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Figure 8.1. World final energy (GJ) per capita versus cumulative population for 11 GEA regions 
sorted by declining per capita energy use (with final energy use disaggregated by sector and 
total, color bars); and total per capita final energy use for 137 countries in 2005 (black, solid 
line). 
Dashed horizontal line shows the average global final energy use per capita. Source: data from 
IEA, 2010. 
Differences in the amounts of final energy use per capita are mirrored in variations in the 
structure of energy use across regions and nations. In general, countries with higher levels of 
energy use per capita also use a larger proportion of their total final energy for transportation. 
For instance, the OECD countries use over a third of their final energy for transport. In contrast, 
in Africa and Asia, over 40% of final energy is for residential and commercial uses with 
typically only 15-20% for transport. Finally, in addition to variations in the levels and purposes 
of energy use across nations, countries also exhibit very divergent patterns in the forms of 
energy used. Nearly a third of all final energy use in developing countries is unprocessed 
biomass, with this fraction being close to 90% for some least-developed countries. In addition, 
about 20% of the population in developing countries lack access to, and so do not use, any 
electricity. In developed OECD countries, almost all final energy use is in the form of electricity 
or oil/gas products. These differences in patterns have implications for the level of energy 
services available across nations, as some carriers like traditional biomass used in traditional 
end-use devices like open-fire cookstoves have very low efficiencies, and are associated with 
high emissions and social externalities. 
8.2 Heterogeneity in Energy Use within Nations 
Often the variance in energy use within nations can be of the same or greater order of magnitude 
as that across nations. In such instances, aggregate national indicators disguise intra-national 
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disparities, sometimes significantly. Within nations, substantial differences in energy use exist 
across geographical regions, rural versus urban residents, and among other socio-economic and 
demographic sub-groups of the population. Spatial patterns of economic development and 
industrial activity are reflected in variations in quantities and structures of energy use within 
countries. In many developing countries, one can find evidence of a dual economy with 
substantial disparities in quantities and types of energy use between rural hinterlands, with poor 
infrastructure and low levels of economic development, and urban metropolitan areas that are 
the centers of industrial production and economic activity. Thus, for instance, as shown in 
Figure 8.2, the poorest 20% of the rural population in India have per capita energy use levels 
comparable to those estimated for the pre-agrarian European population some 10,000 years ago. 
Even the richest 20% of the rural population in India use only about half as much energy per 
capita as the richest 20% of India’s urban population, with their energy use levels comparable to 
the estimates for China in 100 B.C. Some of this difference in the quantity of energy used can 
be explained by disparities in income levels across rural and urban regions. However, large 
disparities in the structure of energy use are also evident, both in terms of uses of energy and the 
types of energy used, which largely reflects differences in access to modern energy forms and 
infrastructures. 
 
Figure 8.2. Per capita primary energy use by service category over time and across different 
populations. Sources: historical estimates: Smil, 1991; Japan, United States: IEA, 2010; India: 
Pachauri, 2007; Netherlands: Vringer and Block, 1995.  
The starkest disparities in energy use within (and between) nations are those between rich 
and poor people. Thus, as Figure 8.2 illustrates, the richest decile (top 10% in terms of income) 
of the Dutch population uses almost four times as much energy per capita as the poorest decile, 
which is about the same order of difference as between the richest and poorest urban Indian 
quintiles (lowest 20% in terms of income). The richest 20% of urban Indians use only a third as 
much of the energy used by the poorest 10% of the Dutch, albeit the richest 20% in India will 
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include many examples of very wealthy individuals whose energy use vastly surpasses that of 
the Dutch top 10% income class. As such, these illustrative numbers reflect the wide disparities 
in incomes and development levels across and within nations. The richest Dutch also use almost 
three times as much energy for food on average as their poorest compatriots. This, of course, 
does not imply that rich people eat three times as much as poor people in the Netherlands. 
However, the food habits and types of provisions consumed do differ. For instance, the rich 
Dutch eat more exotic fruits and vegetables (e.g., Kiwi fruit flown in from New Zealand) than 
the poor which explain their much larger food-related (embodied) energy use. The biggest 
differences in the structure of energy use between rich and poor people, both within and across 
nations, is the substantially larger share of energy used for transport and for the consumption of 
products and services. Poor people, by contrast, use the largest proportion of energy for basic 
necessities such as food and household fuels (cooking and hygiene). These differences illustrate 
the substantial variations in lifestyles and growing consumerism evident with rising incomes 
and retail market sophistication. 
As an illustration of differences in living standards, consumption patterns, energy access 
and what this implies both in terms of energy use and the services that this quantity of energy 
delivers for two very disparate population groups, Box 4 compares an average poor (bottom 
25% income) rural Indian with a top decile Dutch citizen. The population in the poorest rural 
quintile in India consumes 50 times less total energy per capita on average than the top decile of 
the Dutch population. This comparison is in terms of primary energy use i.e., it is inclusive of 
all direct and embodied energy used by these two respective groups. For the poor rural Indian 
about half of the total energy is used directly for household lighting and cooking, while about 
40% is energy embodied in food consumption and the remaining 10% is the energy embodied in 
all other non-food household consumption. For the rich Dutch, about a third of the total energy 
is used directly for purposes such as lighting, cooking, heating and to run home appliances, 
whereas only about 10% is energy embodied in food consumption and over 50% is energy 
embodied in other non-food consumption.   
 
Box 5: Contrasting the Energy Use and Services Available to the Poorest Rural Indian and 
Richest Dutch Citizens 
 
9GJ/capita
450GJ/capita
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Poorest Rural Quintile Richest Decile
India 2005 Netherlands 1990
En
er
gy
 in
 GJ
/c
ap
ita
Food Household Production Services Transport
0% 20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
Po
or
es
t R
ur
al
 Qu
in
til
e
in
 In
di
a 2
00
5
Ri
ch
es
t D
ec
ile
 in
N
et
he
rla
nd
s 1
99
0
Energy Primer             www.energyprimer.org 
August 2015 69 ©IIASA 
Figure 8.3. Structure of per capita primary energy use by service category (direct and embodied 
energy) for the bottom rural Indian income quintile (bottom 25%) and top Dutch decile (top 
10%) in absolute amounts (GJ/year/capita) and in structure (percent, insert). Sources: Figure 
8.2, India: Pachauri, 2007; Netherlands: Vringer and Blok, 1995. 
 
Table 8.1. Characterization of the consumption patterns and lifestyles of the poorest Indian and 
richest Dutch. 
 
Service 
Category 
Per capita consumption/use within the 
poorest rural Indian quintile 2005 
Per capita consumption/use within the 
richest Dutch decile 1990 
Food A diet comprising of largely cereals (< 70kg of rice 
and <50kg of wheat) and lentils (<8kg), with very 
limited self-grown seasonally available fresh 
vegetables and fruits or dairy products (<5kg of fruits 
and vegetables). No, or rare meat and fish 
consumption to celebrate special occasions (<3kg 
annually). Nutrient and calorie intake often below 
recommended dietary standards. Over half of the 
population in this group have a calorie intake  less 
than 80% below recommended standards and are 
considered under or malnourished. 
The Dutch consumes a diet of plenty with a large 
proportion of glasshouse or imported exotic fruits 
and vegetables, frozen and processed foods, 
meats, diary and fats. On average about 80 liters 
of beer, 22 liters of wine, 810 cigarettes, about 
130L soda and juice, about 120kg of dairy 
products, 87kg of meat, 60kg fresh vegetables, 
75kg fresh fruit, about 80kg potatoes, over 10kg 
of sugar and candy, about 180 eggs, about 60kg 
bread, about 44kg wheat flour, 20kg snacks, 
about 16kg fats are consumed annually.  
About 10% of the Dutch are obese and have a 
food intake above recommended norms.  
Household A thatched clay and brick semi-permanent dwelling 
with an average living space of <6 square meters per 
capita. No sanitation facilities or piped water supply 
in house. One hot meal a day on average cooked on 
an open fire or artisan made traditional stove using 
about 1 kg of biomass per capita a day for fuel. 2-3 
hours of poor quality lighting from candles and a 
primitive kerosene lantern consuming 0.5 liters of fuel 
per capita per month. Almost no appliances other than 
a small transistor radio run on batteries.  
A brick house or wooden frame house with a 
tiled roof.  A nationwide, average of 139m2 of 
dwelling surface (in terms of terrain so not taking 
into account different layers). Among the rich 
living space per capita exceeds 50m2. An average 
of 1-1.5 hot meals a day, prepared in a fully 
equipped kitchen with a gas or electric range, no 
constraints on lighting, all modern electronics. In 
the highest income quintile, most people own 
their house and an additional holiday home. 
Average electricity consumption of 5600 kWh, 
natural gas 3250m 
Production  Few personal effects and furniture – ownerships of 
few clothing and footwear, some bedding, some 
kitchen utensils, a few rudimentary household tools, 
and agricultural implements. Perhaps a bicycle.  
More than 1.5 cars on average for the upper 
income quintile. A fully equipped kitchen, plenty 
of clothes, tools, televisions, music systems, 
computers, refrigerators, washing machines and 
other home appliances and equipment. 
Services  No banking, a primary school in the village, 
secondary school and public health facilities at a 
distance of <5km for only 65% of Indian villages. 
One public telephone (landline) service in the village. 
No entertainment services other than singing and 
dancing by the locals on festivals and celebrations. If 
the village has an electricity connection, the local 
landlord may have a television which the other 
inhabitants get to view. 
Banking available virtually everywhere. Schools 
within an average distance of 0.6km for primary 
education, 2.4-3.2km for secondary education. 
All medical, groceries, convenience, recreational 
facilities and local railway station within a 
distance of 5km or less.  
Transport An average distance of <5km per capita per day 
traveled either on foot or by bicycle. Occasional 
longer distance travel to local markets or public health 
facilities either by bus (if roads and public bus service 
available) or bullock cart or renting space on a tractor. 
Nationwide, the Dutch travel on average 32.58km 
per capita per day by all means (little by foot). 
The rich make two-thirds of their trips by car. 
Persons in the top income decile take 2.32 short 
and 2.26 long holidays per year often traveled by 
flight or train.  
Source: Data for India from NSSO 2007; for the Netherlands from 
http://statline.cbs.nl/StatWeb/publication/?DM=SLNL&PA=37154&D1=a&D2=0-1,11,21,31,41,51,61,71,91-
110&HDR=G1&STB=T&VW=T 
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The income differences between these two groups are even starker, with the poor rural 
Indian earning about $3002005PPP (i.e., less than the $1 per day) and the rich Dutch earning about 
$48,4452005PPP. Globally, about 1.4 billion people were estimated to be living on less than $1.25 
a day in 2005. Over 70% of them live in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia and have a lifestyle 
similar to that of a poor rural Indian. By contrast, about 200 million people globally, most of 
whom live in OECD countries, are in the income bracket of the top 10% Dutch (Pinkovskiy and 
Sala-i-Martin 2009) and live a similar lifestyle.   
8.3 Disparities in Energy Use 
While fairness and equity are normative, ethical concepts, several methodologies and metrics 
exist to measure dispersions and distributions which help to describe disparities in energy use. 
Lorenz curves and Gini indices or coefficients are widely used to measure inequalities in 
income and wealth. The Lorenz curve is a graphical representation of a cumulative distribution 
function, often with a ranked cumulative distribution of population on the x-axis against a 
ranked distribution of cumulative value of a given variable such as income, wealth, or energy on 
the y-axis. A perfectly equal distribution is described by a straight line where y = x along the 
diagonal or along 45 degrees, where every given percentage of the population consumes or 
owns an equal percentage of the variable in question (e.g., energy, wealth, etc.). The greater the 
distance of the Lorenz curve from this diagonal, the greater the degree of inequality it represents. 
The Gini coefficient, also used as a measure of inequality, is mathematically represented as the 
ratio of the area between a Lorenz curve and the diagonal (or line of perfect equality) to the total 
area under the diagonal. The Gini coefficient can range from 0 to 1, with a value closer to 0 
representing a more equal distribution. In addition to Lorenz curves and Gini coefficients, other 
measures of inequality commonly in use are ratios of percentiles, deciles, quintiles, or quartiles 
of the population.  
Figure 8.4 illustrates inequality across nations by depicting the Lorenz curves for 
important energy and economic variables for the year 2005. The x-axis depicts the ranked 
cumulative distribution of population by nation, while the cumulative disposal of income (in 
PPP terms), final energy, and electricity are shown on the y-axis. 
In terms of income and final energy use, the poorest 40% of the world’s population only 
disposes of some 10% of global income and final energy use; the richest third disposes of two-
thirds of global income and final energy. It is noteworthy that final energy use mirrors 
prevailing (vast) income inequalities closely. Energy and economic poverty and wealth thus go 
hand in hand. Access to electricity is even more inequitable. In 2005, some 23% of the world’s 
population (1.4 billion people) had no access to electricity at all. 
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Figure 8.4. Lorenz curves of energy inequality, measuring cumulative global population (in 
percent) disposing of corresponding fraction of cumulative income (in percent of PPP$ (green), 
final energy (blue), and electricity use (red) (in percent of Joules energy used) for the Year 2005. 
Due to data limitations, the figure is based on national statistics and therefore does not account 
for inequalities within countries, therefore underestimate global inequality. Sources: national 
data from IEA, 2010 and UNDP and WHO, 2009. 
8.4 Changes in Energy Use with Rising Incomes and Improved Energy Access 
As incomes rise, people consume more of the same goods and services and shift towards 
consuming also higher quality goods and services. The same trend is evident in the case of 
energy services too. Higher quality energy carriers or fuels provide more economic value per 
unit energy consumed as they can be converted more efficiently into energy services. They are 
also more flexible and convenient to use, producing less local pollution. This is a primary 
reason for the observed energy transitions towards more high quality processed fuels (liquids, 
gases, and electricity) that have occurred historically in most industrialized nations (Grubler 
2008). Evidence of this transition is present even today, particularly when we examine the share 
of primary biomass for the poor nations of today and the historical trends in already developed 
or newly emerging economies over the last century. Figure 8.5 depicts the share of biomass in 
final energy for the world as a whole and a select group of nations plotted against their national 
GDP (in 1990GK$)23 covering the period between 1870 and 2010. While there has been an 
overall decline in the share of biomass in final energy with development, low incomes and the 
lack of access to alternative fuels explain the continuing high share of biomass in some nations 
even today. Globally, the share of biomass has hovered at around 12% over the last 3-4 decades. 
                                                 
23 The Geary-Khamis dollar (GK$), more commonly known as the international dollar, is a hypothetical unit of 
currency that has the same purchasing power that the U.S. dollar had in the United States at a given point in time. It 
is widely used in economics to compare monetary values across nations using the purchasing power parity (PPP) 
concept. (See also the discussion in Section 3.3 above). 
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Figure 8.5. Share of biomass in primary energy mix for select nations and for the World 
between 1870 and 2010. Sources: Grubler, 2008, IEA, 2010, Maddison, 2008 and Victor and 
Victor, 2002. 
Access to higher quality energy carriers is one factor responsible for the decline in the 
share of lower quality fuels (like solid biomass) with development, but this in turn is also a 
function of income. Historically, all nations have accorded high priority to providing universal 
access to electricity and access has improved with growth and rising income levels. Yet, many 
of today’s poor nations have to provide access to much larger populations and starting from 
much lower average per capita income levels than did most industrialized nations in the past 
(see Figure 8.6). About a fifth of the global population still lacks access to any electricity. While 
some nations like China and Egypt, through committed national policies, have been successful 
in achieving almost universal access to electricity, other nations like India and South Africa still 
need to electrify between a quarter and a third of their populations. The situation in many sub-
Saharan African nations is of special concern, where only 10% of the rural population is 
electrified even today. While the challenge is significant, the financial resources required to 
achieve universal access by 2030, at a global scale, are moderate (see Box 6 below).  
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Figure 8.6. Trends in electrification for select countries (percent of population with access to 
electricity) between1910 and 2010. Sources: Pachauri et al., 2012 and Maddison, 2008. 
Differences in the patterns of energy use, both in terms of the types and quantities of 
energy used, are clearly evident when examining cross-sectional data as well (see Figure 8.7). In 
particular, for households in developing countries, the concept of an “energy fuel ladder” has 
often been used to explain how households select fuels and energy technologies (Leach, 1992; 
Barnes and Floor, 1996; Smith, et al., 1994) with rising incomes. According to this concept, as 
incomes rise, households metaphorically ascend a ladder because modern energy carriers are 
preferred for their higher levels of efficiency, cleanliness, and convenience of storage and use 
relative to crop residues, dung, firewood and other traditional solid fuels as well as coal. 
However, many recent empirical studies suggest that household energy transitions do not take 
place as a series of simple discrete steps (Masera et al., 2000; Farsi et al., 2007; Pachauri and 
Jiang, 2008). Multiple fuel use arises for several reasons. First, households may have significant 
capital invested in “traditional” technologies (e.g., wood-burning stoves) and may not have the 
spare capital to purchase new energy-consuming appliances immediately upon gaining access to 
new energy sources (Saghir, 2004). Second, modern energy sources are usually expensive and 
thus used sparingly and for unique services. Thus, traditional fuels and technologies tend to exit 
more slowly than new ones arrive. Finally, multiple fuels can provide a sense of energy security. 
Complete dependence on commercially-traded fuels leaves households vulnerable to variable 
prices and often unreliable service (Pachauri and Spreng, 2012).  The traditional concept of the 
“energy fuel ladder” thus simplifies the household energy transition process. Households 
demand energy services that require both fuels and equipment, and which deliver a certain 
quality of service. With increasing income, households may therefore prefer to choose biomass-
based fuels (e.g., pellets) rather than gas, if these can be used in efficient stoves that provide the 
same level of performance and convenience as gas stoves.  
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Figure 8.7. Patterns of direct household final energy use in India and China for rural (left 
panels) and urban (right panels) households and per income category (income quintiles) in 
GJ/capita final energy use (bars) and 2005PPP$ income per year (stars). Small inserts show the 
same data, but as percent distribution. Sources: Riahi et al., 2012; Mainali et al., 2012; Ekholm 
et al., 2010. 
There is also growing recognition that non-market factors (other than income and prices) 
can often be important in explaining energy choices, especially in rural and poor households. In 
particular, how households value the inconveniences associated with collecting and using 
traditional solid fuels is an important determinant of fuel choice (Ekholm et al., 2010; Riahi et 
al., 2012; Mainali et al., 2012, see also Section 9 below). Inconvenience costs capture the 
disutility to consumers associated with collecting and using traditional solid fuels and are 
reflected in the premium households are willing to pay to avoid this disutility. In general, richer 
households place a higher value on their time and are willing to pay a larger premium for using 
more convenient and efficient fuels that are however, more expensive to purchase. Hence they 
associate higher inconvenience costs for traditional fuels compared to poorer households. 
Similarly, urban households, who have higher incomes on average than rural households and 
more non-farm employment opportunities, are also likely to pay higher premiums on average to 
avoid the disutility or inconveniences associated with using traditional solid fuels. The implicit 
discount rates24 that households use when deciding on the purchase of new equipment are also 
                                                 
24 Implicit discount rates reflect the marginal rate of time preference that households use when discounting 
investment costs over the life span of technologies. It represents the trade-off to consumers between immediate 
consumption (partly foregone with an investment) and future consumption. 
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income dependent and an important factor influencing the speed of transition to modern fuels in 
poorer households. For many cash-strapped poor rural households, implicit discount rates can 
be extremely high (over 70%; see Ekholm et al., 2010). Thus, for these households, the first or 
upfront capital cost of purchasing new equipment can become a significant barrier to 
transitioning to more efficient and convenient fuels. Designing appropriate polices to accelerate 
a transition to modern fuels and devices among households in developing nations requires 
recognizing the factors that affect energy choices for these populations (see Box 6 for a brief 
description of the challenge of meeting a universal modern energy access goal by 2030 and the 
policies and costs for attaining this). 
 
Box 6: Challenges and Pathways to Achieving Universal Access to Modern Energy by 2030 
About 20% of humanity today still lives without access to any electricity and 40% still depends 
on solid fuels such as unprocessed biomass, coal, or charcoal for cooking and space heating. 
While many developing nations have made significant strides in improving access to modern 
energy, close to 90% of rural sub-Saharan Africans lack access to electricity and an equivalent 
percentage still rely on solid fuels. Even in emerging nations, like China and India, 75% of the 
rural population still uses solid fuels. Solid fuel use in households accounted for 2.2 million pre-
mature deaths in 2005, and more than 41.6 million lost Disability Adjusted Life Years due to 
elevated levels of household air pollution and resulting respiratory diseases, mainly affecting 
women and children. 
The Global Energy Assessment estimates that in the absence of new policies by 2030 
about 2.4 billion people in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Pacific Asia will still be relying 
on solid fuels in their homes, and over 800 million rural inhabitants would lack electricity 
access. In such a scenario, over 90% of rural sub-Saharan Africans and over 80% of rural South 
Asians would still rely on solid fuels. Over 70% of rural sub-Saharan Africans would also 
continue to remain without electricity. 
Access to electricity and to modern cooking energy, such as advanced low-emissions 
biomass cookstoves and LPG, contributes to economic development and to reducing income 
poverty and hunger, improving education, health, gender equality, and water and sanitation 
conditions for the poorest segments of society. Increased access to electricity and mechanical 
power enables an increase in agricultural productivity and the transformation of agrarian 
economies to industry-based economies. Access to mechanical power can play a vital role in 
enhancing income and food security, and fostering agricultural growth, small-scale enterprises 
and manufacturing processes in rural areas. 
Improving access to modern cooking fuels alone has the potential to avert between 0.6 
million and 1.8 million premature deaths, on average, every year until 2030, including between 
0.4 million and 0.6 million deaths per year of children below the age of five in sub-Saharan 
Africa, South Asia, and Pacific Asia. 
From a technical and economic perspective, providing almost universal access to 
electricity and modern cooking fuels is achievable by 2030. This will require global investments 
of US$36-41 billion annually till 2030, which is approximately 3% of total energy infrastructure 
investments today. At the high end of this estimate, about half will need to be spent on 
electricity access and the rest on improving access to modern cooking fuels and stoves, with the 
most investments needed in sub-Saharan Africa. 
Achieving this goal will have a negligible or even negative impact on greenhouse gas 
(GHG) emissions, even when a shift to fossil-based alternatives occurs. This is due to the vast 
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efficiency gains reaped by replacing inefficient biomass use with modern cooking fuels and 
kerosene for lighting with electricity. Current technologies that use traditional biomass are 
associated with significant emissions of greenhouse gases and aerosols due to incomplete 
combustion. 
Supporting policies that provide a combination of subsidies and microfinance are likely to 
be most successful and cost-effective in achieving universal access. In addition, government-
supported investments towards energy access will need to be considerably ramped up, and 
targeted to rural and remote areas and poor urban communities. Increasing private sector 
involvement will also be crucial to reach the level of scale-up in access efforts required over the 
next decades (Pachauri et al., 2012; Riahi et al., 2012). 
9 Basic Energy Economics 
9.1 Introduction 
The Economist's Dictionary of Economics defines economics as “The study of the production, 
distribution and consumption of wealth in human society.” Energy economics is the sub 
discipline that studies the demand for, and the supply of, energy services, the interactions 
between the energy system and the overall economy as well as various levels of the 
environment. It analyses the roles of costs and prices, incentives, policies, market structures, 
among others on the ways and quantities our societies demand and use energy services and their 
distribution and affordability.  
Energy economics complements the physical and thermodynamic aspects of energy by 
adding monetary values ($) to fuels, technologies and infrastructures required to provide energy 
services. Thermodynamics deals with the conversion of energy (or rather energy’s potential to 
do useful work), and with the laws governing such conversions. The first law is about energy 
conservation, i.e., energy cannot be created (produced) or consumed - only converted into 
usable and unusable parts which together amount to the original energy input to the conversion 
process. In essence, the first law holds that conversion efficiencies cannot exceed 100% (you 
cannot win).  The second law reflects the simple fact that heat always flows from a hot body to 
a cold body but never from cold to hot. It thus places a limit on the conversion of energy into 
useful work (you even cannot break-even). For example, the conversion of chemical energy in 
coal to heat and subsequently to electricity inevitably also generates low temperature waste heat 
and combustion products - energy conversion also interacts with the environment. 
Energy economics deals with these scarcity and waste issues predominately through costs 
and prices as a way to reflect resource limitations, to balance demand and supply and to 
increasingly internalize “externalities”, i.e., costs associated with the conversion of energy and 
use of energy services but not yet included in energy prices such as the degradation of common 
goods. 
9.2 Costs and Prices 
Unlike wine or a meal in a fancy restaurant, energy is not purchased for pleasing one’s palate 
(or “utility” in economics speak). Energy in not an end in itself but an intermediary good for the 
provision of goods and services we actually want - food, shelter, conditioned living space, 
transportation, information, health care, etc. All goods and services produced, sold and 
consumed in an economy embody varying amounts of energy and the associated energy costs 
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are included in the prices we pay for goods and services. In addition, we also pay hard earned 
dollars for energy purchases - at the gas pump to fill up the car or on monthly electricity bills. 
The price of energy purchased, e.g., gasoline at the pump comprises a wide range of cost 
components ranging from upstream (e.g., oil exploration, production, and shipment to 
refineries) and downstream (e.g., refining, marketing and distribution, product sales) energy 
supply activities as well as taxes (which in some jurisdictions can be larger than the actual pre-
tax fuel costs).  
But expenditures for gasoline or electricity are only one component of the cost of the 
energy service getting home from work or illumination at home to read a novel. For getting 
home we need automobiles, roads, traffic control, etc. all of which incur costs (some costs are 
already paid for at the pump via the gasoline tax). To the consumer, the cost of the energy 
service “getting home”, therefore, is the sum of gasoline (energy) costs plus the costs of 
purchasing and maintaining the end use device converting energy (gasoline) into energy 
services (mobility), i.e., an automobile. Likewise, the costs of the energy service illumination is 
made up from the electricity price that covers all generation, transmission and distribution costs 
of electricity and the costs for a light fixture and light bulb.  
To put expenditures for transportation fuels into perspective: on average American 
households spend 4% of annual disposable income on fuel purchases but 10.5% on other car 
related expenditures such as depreciation, maintenance, insurance costs, etc. Thus energy costs 
(gasoline) represent only about one third of the costs of providing the energy service individual 
automobile mobility. 
In summary, any provision of an energy service requires energy (fuels) plus one or more 
end-use conversion devices and related infrastructures which complicates the quantification of 
the cost or price of an energy service as it involves both durable (a car) and non-durable 
(gasoline) components. Obviously, driving the car home from the workplace only once would 
make it an outrageously expensive service. The true service costs are also determined how often 
the automobile is used during its lifetime. But most importantly, the price paid at the pump is no 
way close to the full cost of the energy service. 
So far the terms costs and prices for energy services have been used interchangeably. 
Indeed, cost and price are identical for an individual paying for, and also consuming, energy 
services. For the service provider, the price received should be larger than the cost incurred for 
the provision of the service. Otherwise the business is unprofitable. 
9.3 Energy Demand 
9.3.1 Basic Concepts 
The demand for fuels (energy) is a function of the quantity of energy services desired by 
societies, i.e., affordability - the combination of income and service prices - and the 
performance of energy service or end-use technologies. Using the example of providing 
transportation services for individual mobility, at a given level of affordability (proxy used here 
is the gasoline price p0 and an income of Y0 $/yr) a person who just bought herself a second-
hand car, expects to drive it 15,000 km per year commuting between the home and the 
workplace. The amount of fuel demand per year is then the conversion efficiency of the engine 
and drivetrain of the vehicle (the specific fuel use of a car in liters per km multiplied by the km 
driven). The car’s specific fuel use is also influenced by the driving style, payload and 
occupancy rate.  
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Now let’s assume the gasoline price increases to p1 with no change in income. Motorists not 
willing to pay the higher price (and sacrificing other amenities to stay within their respective 
budgets), have several options to respond to the price change. In the short run these typically 
include: 
 Driving less by reducing unessential travels which does not reduce the need to commute;  
 Car sharing along the way to work which improves the car’s occupancy rate or usage 
efficiency; or 
 Switching to other transportation modes such public transit or biking. 
In the longer run, the short-term options are supplemented by changing the service 
technology, a.k.a. the car, to a more efficient one with a lower specific fuel use, relocating to a 
home closer to the workplace or vice versa. These options require time and incur investment 
cost. The person in our example had just bought a second-hand car using up all her savings and 
cannot afford the additional costs for a higher efficiency vehicle although this would allow her 
to resume to the pre-price increase pattern of driving at similar costs for the service (the lower 
specific fuel use compensates for both the higher gasoline prices and the higher service 
technology costs). 
Figure 9.1 depicts the short-term impact of increasing the usage efficiency μ (higher 
payload) and the longer-term impact of technology change (a more efficient car, i.e., 
technological efficiency η) on fuel demand E. At p0 and μ0, fuel demand amounts to Ei0. In this 
example, as the technology car and the economic budget for fuel remain unchanged and 
consumers are unwilling to lower their demand (i.e., drive less), the price increase to p1 can only 
compensated by higher usage efficiency, i.e., filling up the car with additional passengers (who 
leave their cars in the garage). This lowers the aggregate fuel demand along the solid curve Ti 
from Ei0 to Ei1. 
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Figure 9.1. Energy demand (E) as a function of usage efficiency (µ) and Technology T with 
technological (conversion) efficiency (η) in delivering a service demand S. Note both short- and 
longer-term demand responses when energy prices increase from p0 to p1: short-term response: 
increasing usage efficiency (from µ0 to µ1) of existing technology Ti (blue) leads to an energy 
demand reduction from Ei0 to Ei1. Longer-term: use of a new conversion technology Tj (green) 
with improved conversion efficiency η leads to a demand reduction to Ej0 or Ej1 for the two 
original and modified usage efficiencies µ0 and µ1 respectively. 
In the longer run, our person purchases a new, more efficient car. The solid curve now 
becomes the dashed technology curve Tj in Figure 9.1 and represents a new fuel demand to 
usage efficiency relationship where the previous usage of μ0 without car sharing, can be 
obtained at the lower fuel demand Ej0. The ultimate impact on energy demand now depends not 
only on the fuel efficiency of the new car Tj but also one the usage efficiency µj, i.e., whether or 
not care sharing continues with the new, more efficient car. Important to remember is that (a) 
the difference between Ei0 and Ei1 is the result of a change in of occupancy rate (a behavioral 
change) and (b) the difference between Ei0 and Ej0 reflects the impact of improved technological 
efficiency (a technological change). The distinction between usage and technological 
efficiencies also explains why the response to price changes differs between the short- term 
(changing usage efficiency) and longer-term (also changing technological efficiency) (see the 
discussion on elasticity below). 
9.3.2 Energy Demand and Elasticities 
What are the essential drivers of energy demand? Assuming for simplicity, no population 
growth, a given set of energy supply infrastructures and end-use technologies, energy demand is 
essentially determined by two economic drivers: income and energy prices. Generally, income 
is positively and prices are negatively correlated with energy demand: Rising incomes tend to 
increase energy demand, while increasing prices tend to lower energy demand. The dynamic 
response of demand to these economic drivers is captured in the concept of elasticity, i.e., the 
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responsiveness of demand to changes in its drivers or in the case of energy demand (E) to 
changes in income (Y) and energy prices (p) and mathematically represented as 
E = c Yαp-β 
where α and β denote the income and price elasticities respectively (the negative sign for the 
price elasticity β indicates its negative effect in energy demand, and the positive sign of the 
income elasticity α indicates its positive effect in energy demand) and c is a constant reflecting 
the fact that even at zero income subsistence needs require some form of energy.  
Examples of the responsiveness demand to different price elasticities and income levels 
are shown in Figure 9.2. For an income elasticity of 0.7 and constant c assumed to be 1, a 
doubling of income increases energy demand by 20.7 or by a factor of 1.6; a five-fold increase in 
income raises energy demand by 50.7 or by a factor of 3.1 (left hand axis). Likewise for any 
given income level, a doubling of prices with a price elasticity of -1 results in a decline of 
energy demand by 50% (2-1.0); a ten-fold reduces demand by 90% (10-1.0). For a price elasticity 
of -0.3, the demand reductions caused by a doubling of prices are 19% (2-0.3) and a ten-fold 
increase 50% (10-0.3), respectively. Figure 9.2 illustrates the demand responsiveness to several 
levels of incomes and prices in combination with a set of illustrative elasticity assumptions. 
Income and price elasticities observed in the real world vary considerably over time and 
across different types of energy demands, economic sectors, social groups and countries 
(Dargay and Gately, 1999; Ajanovic et al., 2012). Yet there appears to be a common aspect 
across all these groupings: Higher incomes lead to higher energy demand but at the same time 
demand becomes less sensitive to price changes. Affordability cushions price effects.  
As discussed above, demand responses to price changes vary significantly between the 
short-term and the long-term. In the short-run price elasticities are low reflecting the longevity 
of energy infrastructures and conversion technologies which limits demand-side responses 
(essentially to behavioral adjustments). In the longer run as aging technologies and 
infrastructures become obsolete and are progressively replaced with more efficient technologies 
higher price elasticities are possible. However, the time lag between the short and the long run 
may introduce some kind of irreversibility: When prices fall again after a price peak, demand 
does not respond correspondingly (different price elasticity as when price rose) – due to the 
previously induced improvements in technological efficiency (Walker and Wirl, 1993). Put 
differently, our driver form the example above will not sell the new, more efficient car and buy 
back the old clunker just because gasoline prices dropped back to earlier levels.  
Ener
Aug
Figu
diff
dou
pric
the 
befo
resu
“reb
con
whe
Stan
200
anyw
revi
com
dev
back
less
imp
conv
imp
9.3.
Mos
conv
subs
elec
Coo
be g
econ
gy Primer  
ust 2015 
re 9.2. Illu
erent incom
ble logarith
es shows up
However
owner’s ann
re or to pur
lt in increa
ound” effe
sidered: sm
n money is
ley Jevons
1). Empiric
here betw
ew in Sorel
pensating f
eloping cou
 effects ca
 in reductio
Irrespecti
rovements 
ersion tech
lying much
3 Substitu
t energy se
ersion tech
titutable, p
tricity, natu
king can us
enerated by
omic subst
strative pric
e levels Y,
mic scale w
 as straigh
, the higher
ual gasolin
chase addi
sing energy
ct.  The ext
all when th
 spent on an
 in 1865 (an
al studies s
een 0% and
l et al., 200
or take-bac
ntries (Roy
n approach 
ns of total e
ve of these
can be very
nologies a
 larger dem
tion 
rvices can b
nologies an
roviding id
ral gas, oil
e electricity
 coal, natu
itutes for o
e elasticitie
 2Y, and 5Y
here the ex
t line. 
 fuel efficie
e bill.  The
tional good
 demand.  T
ent of the “
e ‘fuel bill 
 additional
d hence is 
uggest that 
 40% (see 
9. If absolu
k effects le
, 2000) – e
100%. In th
nergy use a
 effects, wh
 large both 
s well as thr
and respon
e provided
d fuels. Th
entical ener
, or wood, a
, natural g
ral gas, nuc
ne another:
      
8
s β = -1.0 (
 with an as
ponentially
ncy of the 
se savings 
s and servic
his consum
take back” 
savings’ are
 leisure trav
referred to 
in high-inc
the 2000 sp
te reduction
ads to incre
.g., on comp
is case, the
nd rather i
at matters i
through ad
ough conti
ses and elas
 by differen
us differen
gy services
s each fuel
as, propane
lear, wind o
 the deman
   
1
blue), -0.5 
sumed inco
 declining 
new vehicle
allow the ow
es all of wh
er respons
effect depen
 spent on a
els. This e
also as "Jev
ome countr
ecial issue 
s of energy
ases in ene
act fluores
 effect of e
n vastly inc
s that in the
option of ex
nued innov
ticities in t
t combinat
t energy ca
 (Sweeney,
 can be con
, wood, or c
r hydropow
d for a parti
(red), and -
me elastici
energy dem
 and lower
ner either
ich entail e
e is referred
ds on the t
 meal in a f
ffect was fi
ons Parado
ies the take
of Energy P
 use are on
rgy prices v
cent lightin
nergy effic
reased hum
 long run, p
isting, mor
ation and te
he long run
ions of ene
rriers (fuels
 2005). Ho
verted to th
harcoal. B
er. Thus, d
cular fuel i
ww
0.3 (green)
ty of +0.7. 
and with in
 gasoline pr
 to drive mo
mbodied e
 to as “take
ype of prod
ancy restau
rst postulat
x," see also
-back effec
olicy 28(6
 the policy
ia taxes. St
g – suggest
iency impro
an welfare
otentials fo
e efficient 
chnologica
 than in the
rgy resourc
) can theref
mes can be 
ermal energ
ase load ele
ifferent fue
s – among o
w.energypr
©IIA
 
 for three 
Note the 
creasing 
ices reduce
re than 
nergy and 
 back” or 
uct or serv
rant; large 
ed by Willi
 Binswang
t can be 
-7) and the 
 agenda, 
udies in 
 that take-
vements ar
. 
r efficienc
end-use 
l change, 
 short-run.
es, energy 
ore be 
heated usin
y (heat). 
ctricity can
ls are 
thers- also
imer.org 
SA 
 
ice 
am 
er, 
e 
y 
g 
 
 a 
Energy Primer             www.energyprimer.org 
August 2015 82 ©IIASA 
function of the relative prices of all other fuels. This substitutability of energy is made possible, 
but also is limited, by the available set and vintage of energy conversion technologies. Typically, 
many conversion technologies can only be used in combination with a particular (single) fuel.  
Switching from one fuel to another then requires a change in conversion technology - in essence 
replacing previous devices and technologies with new ones (see our earlier automobile 
example).  
Because energy conversion equipment and infrastructures are inherently long lived, 
interfuel substitution generally does not occur overnight but slowly over time at the rate by 
which aging conversion technologies are replaced by new ones. Short-run substitution can be 
possible when energy conversion technologies have multi-fuel capability, e.g., a furnace can be 
operated on both oil and natural gas, or several conversion devices are simultaneously available, 
e.g., homes that are equipped with a central natural gas heating system plus portable electric 
heaters. “Flexfuel” cars in Brazil that can operate on any combination of pure ethanol to 
gasoline only (and in some cases also compressed natural gas (CNG)), is an example where 
innovative end-use conversion technologies specifically designed for fuel flexibility can 
substantially increase short-term fuel substitution rates. Without such “flex” technologies, 
various fuels are best viewed as “imperfect” substitutes for one another, with much greater 
substitutability via technology replacement/substitution in the long run than in the short run.  
While prices can be an important driver for fuel substitution, there are other important 
drivers that can have a more pronounced effect on fuel substitution than prices. These include 
the quality of energy service delivered, ease of use (convenience) or side-effects associated with 
the energy conversion such as adverse health impact caused by indoor air pollution from the 
combustion of traditional biomass in inefficient open-fire cookstoves.  The concept of an 
“energy ladder” of household cooking fuels is a good illustration (see also the discussion in 
Section 8 above). With rising incomes consumer preferences shift to more convenient and clean 
cooking fuels (from animal dung and fuelwood, to kerosene, LPG or gas, even electricity) 
despite these cleaner fuels enjoy a price premium. The qualitative characteristics (convenience 
and cleanliness) of fuels are “priced in” (e.g., willingness to pay) by consumers, reflecting an 
“inconvenience cost” associated with cheap, but inconvenient and polluting traditional cooking 
fuels (Pachauri et al., 2013). Likewise the time saved by avoiding labor-intensive fuel wood 
collection and using this time for more productive purposes or leisure activities are reasons for 
not always adopting the fuel with the lowest - at face value - costs. 
9.4 Energy Supply 
A core concept of economics is that transactions in the market place are governed by prices that 
clear the market (balance demand and supply).  Put differently, the “willingness to pay” of 
consumers for a particular good or service must match suppliers’ “willingness to sell”. The 
economic drivers of energy demand have already been discussed. We now also need to consider 
economics from the perspective of energy suppliers. Three basic features characterize the 
economics of energy supply: a) no supplier will be “willing to sell” at a loss; b) the costs of 
energy supply are very heterogeneous among different suppliers or between different energy 
conversion facilities (e.g., power plants); and c) energy supply typically relies on very capital 
intensive, large scale technologies and infrastructures, which tend to involve what economists 
call “natural monopolies” (see below). 
a) Energy supply industries extract and convert primary energy into secondary energy and 
transport and distribute secondary energy to the point of retail (final energy). In order to be 
economically viable, industry must be able to sell their products at a price higher than the sum 
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of their fuel input costs, capital costs (amortization of the capital expenditures and finance costs 
of their energy conversion facilities and distribution infrastructures) non-fuel operating and 
maintenance costs (labor, repairs, insurance, consumables, etc.) plus a fair margin of returns on 
investment to plant owners (shareholders) 
b) The costs of energy supply vary considerably from location to location. Producing a barrel of 
oil from a giant oil field in the Saudi Arabian desert is considerably cheaper than producing a 
barrel of oil from a small offshore field in the hostile environment of the North Sea. The costs 
of wind generated electricity vary significantly as a function of the quality of the wind resource 
available (wind speed and regularity of the wind blowing). Electricity generating costs are very 
different between old coal fired power plants (whose capital expenses have already been 
amortized) and new, high efficient “super-critical” coal power plants (not to mention new 
nuclear builds or large scale renewables). The different costs of supply options and of different 
suppliers in a given market are typically ranked by an ordered, upwards sloping “supply curve” 
that represents the energy supply costs from the cheapest to the most expensive 
supplier/conversion technology (Figure 9.3). Thus a given level of energy demand can only be 
satisfied as long as the most expensive supplier can still recover supply costs. Otherwise there 
would be no “willingness to sell” and demand could not be satisfied. In other words, the energy 
price that balances supply with demand is determined at the margin of the most expensive 
supplier/supply option, or in economic terms by the marginal energy supply costs. This yields a 
substantial “producer surplus” for low cost energy suppliers/options (Figure 9.3). 
 
Figure 9.3. Energy demand and supply with producer surplus under competition (left panel) and 
under monopoly (right panel). 
c) Energy supply is a business characterized by long-lived and capital intensive conversion 
technologies (refineries, power plants) and large-scale transport and distribution infrastructures 
that exhibit significant economies of scale (Definition: Unit energy costs fall with increasing 
scale of provision. For example, a large 1000 MW power plant has lower costs per kWh 
produced compared to 10 power plants at 100 MW, as the fixed plant costs [labor, equipment] 
can be spread over much larger production volumes.)  The energy system has historically 
evolved towards ever larger scales in conversion technologies and infrastructures with large 
upfront investment costs which firms were only willing to commit in exchange for some longer-
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term market security to recover their investment costs. Moreover, the infrastructure costs for gas 
pipelines or electricity grids are so high that it would be uneconomical to build several, parallel 
systems owned and operated by different entities (as is possible with relatively cheap cell phone 
towers).  Instead utilities have been awarded “natural monopolies” or markets void of real 
competition but usually under supervision of a regulator.  
Natural monopolies are characteristic for many capital intensive infrastructures: gas, 
electricity, water supply and sewage systems. Natural monopolies also tend to embrace “vertical” 
integration25 of supply conversion, transmission and distribution which can (and has) resulted in 
an accumulation of substantial “producer surplus” due to a lack of competition. As a result, 
monopoly break-ups26 and “unbundling” of energy conversion, e.g., electricity generation, from 
the delivery infrastructure have been and continue to be high on the policy agenda of 
governments.27 
9.5 Cost Components of Energy Services and Energy Carriers 
In one way or another, energy services carry a price tag. The price a consumer pays for a 
particular energy service, e.g., electric lighting, is made up by the energy costs (electricity 
demand times electricity price) themselves plus the costs of energy service delivery (light 
fixture and light bulb for instance). In turn, electricity prices are determined by a variety of 
components, the  most important of which are generating costs, systems costs, rents, profits, 
taxes, subsidies, and, if included in the price, previous externalities. 
Energy and energy service provision costs are not only a key component determining the 
price of a service but also a central decision criterion for investment and operating decisions 
alike; they consist of three major components: capital costs, fuel costs, and non-fuel operating 
and maintenance (O&M) costs. Capital costs are the costs associated with the 
construction/acquisition/purchase as well as finance of a power plant, refinery, or home furnace. 
Fuel costs are the expenditures associated with the fuel supply for plant operation or purchasing 
home heating fuel. O&M costs cover labor costs, insurance, consumables other than fuel, 
repairs, etc. More recently, capital and/or costs may also include decommissioning expenditures 
at the end of a plant’s service life, while fuel costs or O&M costs may include waste disposal 
costs. 
                                                 
25 Vertical market integration: an energy company covers all activities from primary energy extraction, conversion, 
all the way up to final distribution. Horizontal integration: markets are organized along distinct steps in the energy 
delivery chain with companies focusing exclusively on extraction, conversion, or transport and distribution of 
energy respectively. 
26 The break-up of the Standard Oil Trust Company in the US in 1911 that led to the emergence of the “seven 
sisters” of major international oil companies is one out of many examples of governmental regulation of the energy 
industry. 
27 “Fearful that an unregulated monopoly would exercise market power and overprice energy for consumers, most 
governments have chosen to tightly control or even nationalize their energy industries” (Sweeney, 2005). Taking 
the example of electricity, an electric utility sells two classes of products: electricity delivery services (wires) and 
electricity proper (kWh). Although these two classes of products have been traditionally bundled together into a 
single price per kilowatt hour of electricity, these two classes can also be (and actually have been) “unbundled” and 
sold by separate companies (and are billed separately to consumers). Electricity delivery services are characterized 
by substantial increasing returns to scale, while prospects for electricity generation are more limited. “Therefore the 
possibility is open for competitive market structure to sell electricity to consumers, separately from the electricity 
delivery services” (Sweeney, 2005). 
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While fuel and O&M costs are largely incurred on a per-use basis, capital or investment 
costs occur upfront – for some technologies spread over several years of plant construction – 
before earning revenue or providing energy services for the investor. Because of lifetimes of 
energy plant and equipment of up to several decades, capital costs must be allocated over the 
lifetime of the investment. As well, wear and tear of the plant and expected capital outlays for 
periodical plant refurbishment must be accounted for.  
This raises the question how to compare the generating costs of plants with different 
technical life times, unit sizes, plant factors, capital costs, using different fuels, etc. in order to 
make informed investment or policy decisions? 
The levelized cost of electricity (LCOE) is a widely used tool for comparing the provision 
costs of different technologies producing quasi undistinguishable products such as kWhs of 
electricity.28 Two levelized cost definitions and calculation methods dominate the literature (see 
Appendix A-6 for more detail). One method calculates the levelized unit costs of generating one 
kWh of electricity by dividing the sum of annualized capital costs plus fuel and maintenance 
costs over the year by the annual kWh output.  The other method uses a net present value (NPV) 
approach and LCOE is defined as ‘the ratio of total lifetime expenses versus total expected 
outputs, expressed in terms of their present value equivalent’. Both methods have strengths and 
weaknesses (see Appendix A.6). In the following paragraphs the first LCOE approach is used to 
compare electricity generation costs of different technologies and fuels. 
A key feature of the first LCOE approach is that it spreads the capital costs (including the 
finance costs) uniformly over the lifetime of an investment. It further accounts for the fuel and 
O&M costs, and calculates the specific costs per unit of energy delivered.29 A critical parameter 
in the LCOE approach is the discount rate, which reflects the interest rate on capital (cost of 
capital or return) for an investor in the absence of specific market or technology risks. The 
discount rate also accounts for the changing time value of money as well as opportunity costs. 
The relative structure of the various generating cost components varies significantly per 
unit of output for different generating options (see Figure 9.4 and Table 9.1, based on a real 
annual discount rate of 5%).  The variation indicates the inherent risks associated with a 
particular option. For example, gas combined cycle technology (CCGT) has the lowest capital 
costs but the highest fuel costs of the options. Consequently, CCGT generating costs are almost 
all fuel costs. Any change in natural gas prices thus greatly impacts its generating costs and the 
economics of gas-fired electricity generation are thus highly vulnerable to gas price volatility. 
Conversely, nuclear power generation is dominated by high capital costs (>70%), with fuel 
cycle and O&M costs assuming approximately equal shares of the remaining costs.30 The high 
share of capital costs exposes nuclear power projects to financial risks associated with rising 
interest rates and accrued  interest during construction (IDC) caused by construction delays due 
to technological complexity or public opposition (or both). Adding carbon capture and storage 
(CCS) to fossil generation can also increase costs substantially: typically adding some 
                                                 
28 For a review see Anderson, 2007. For a review quantitative cost estimates for electricity generation see 
Heptonstall, 2007 and NREL, 2010. 
29 Note: LCOE assumes perfect knowledge about future fuel prices and interest rates several decades into the future. 
Scenarios of different price trajectories are commonly used to reflect uncertainty. 
30 Unlike natural gas or coal-fired generation, the fuel cost of nuclear power generation is not dominated by the 
resource (uranium) input price but by enrichment and fuel fabrication costs. Uranium accounts for approximately 
25% of fuel costs only. 
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50$/MWh levelized costs to pulverized coal fired power plants (and 20-30 $/MWh for IGCC or 
natural gas electricity generation), see GEA Chapter 12, Larson et al., 2012. 
 
Figure 9.4. Structure of levelized generation costs of different electricity generation 
technologies (in percent based on a 5% discount rate) and representative cost ranges for 2030 as 
used in GEA Chapter 17, Riahi et al., 2012, for capital costs, operation and maintenance (O&M), 
fuel costs, as well as waste disposal costs for nuclear and advanced coal with carbon capture and 
sequestration (CCS). Values derived from the representative cost ranges presented in Table 9.1. 
Note: (a) Includes decommissioning costs for nuclear power and costs for transport and disposal 
of 90% of CO2 emissions for advanced coal power plants with carbon capture and storage 
(CCS). 
Table 9.1. Total levelized costs of different electricity generation technologies (using a 5% 
discount rate) and representative cost ranges in US$2005/MWh as used in GEA for a time 
frame to 2030. Note: These are direct energy costs only, i.e., excluding externality costs (see 
Section 9.6 below). Waste and decommissioning costs include decommissioning costs for 
nuclear power and costs for transport and disposal of 90% of CO2 emissions for advanced coal 
power plants with carbon capture and storage (CCS). 
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In addition to the generating costs, the price of electricity for consumers then includes 
transmission and distribution (T&D) costs plus taxes or subsidies.31 Taxes and subsidies are 
policy instruments to influence consumer or producer behavior. Taxes can be used to discourage 
politically undesirable behavior patterns, while subsidies provide incentives to adopt a more 
desirable investment or consumption pattern. They can also cause unwanted market distortion. 
Subsidized electricity or gasoline prices are also an instrument for extending access to energy 
services to low-income families, supporting small rural business developments, or connecting 
rural areas to markets. 
Figure 9.5 compares gasoline prices with and without taxes for a variety of countries. 
Road transportation fuels are almost invariably the most heavily taxed fuels worldwide. While 
prices without taxes vary by a factor of two, this doubles to a factor of four when taxes are 
included. The taxes imposed by countries reflect national policy objectives, e.g., revenue needs, 
trade balances, etc., and not necessarily the countries’ endowment with oil resources. For 
example, oil-exporting Norway features the second highest gasoline taxes in this comparison 
(equivalent to a carbon tax of US$576/tonne of CO2), while oil-importing US has the second 
lowest gasoline taxation (equivalent to US$56/tonne of CO2). Other oil-exporting countries such 
as Kuwait (not shown in Figure 9.5) even subsidize domestic gasoline use. 
 
Figure 9.5. Gasoline prices with and without taxes in US$/liter and implied price of carbon 
(US$/tCO2) for 1st quarter of 2010. Source: data from IEA, 2011. 
                                                 
31 In the most general definition, an energy subsidy is represented by the difference between (low) local and 
prevailing (high) world market prices (without taxes). When the local gasoline price is below the marginal costs of 
producing and refining crude oil, this represents a direct financial transfer/subsidy from energy producers (usually 
nationalized industries – i.e., from the government) to energy consumers (households, taxi companies). Beyond that, 
any difference between local and world market prices is best conceptualized as opportunity costs associated with 
foregone potential export revenues, and also classified as energy subsidy. The marginal costs of producing a barrel 
of crude oil in many oil-exporting countries can be as low as US$5/bbl. The difference to a world market price of 
say US$100/bbl (in economic theory determined by the global marginal [i.e., highest] production costs plus profits) 
is referred to in economics as “scarcity rent,” leading to vast financial transfers and wealth to energy producers, 
which may, however, not always have only beneficial effects (the so-called “resource curse,” Humphreys et al., 
2007). 
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Finally there are cost elements caused by the conversion and use of energy and energy 
services which – although real – are not included in the price paid by the consumer but paid by 
society at large. Examples of such costs, called “externalities,” are health and environmental 
damage costs resulting from air and water pollution from fossil fuel combustion or lower 
property values due to the proximity of a nuclear power plant or noise from wind converters. 
Ignoring externalities masks the true costs of energy and sends the wrong signal to the market 
place. Charges or taxes on carbon emissions or investment in carbon capture and storage (CCS) 
technology are ways to internalize externalities caused by GHG emissions. They also change 
the merit order of electricity generation favoring low-GHG emission technologies. 
While investment decisions are guided by LCOE considerations, operating decisions and 
dispatch of an existing fleet of power stations are based on short-term marginal costs – in 
essence, fuel costs and possibly emission charges. Capital costs are no longer a decision 
criterion, as these are “sunk.”  
Figure 9.6 explains the inherent substitutability between capital and fuel costs using the 
example of providing heat for cooking. Higher-efficiency stoves are more capital-intensive but 
reduce fuel costs, which in a rural developing country context often mean time spent collecting 
fuel wood. Switching to more capital-intensive stoves (and higher-quality fuels) reduces the 
time spent on fuel wood collection and at the same time improves indoor air quality through 
lower combustion-related emissions. The time released from gathering fuel is then available for 
more productive uses. This freed time, lower pollution exposure, and improved human health 
are important examples of positive externalities of moving to cleaner household fuels. 
A transition to clean cooking services can occur in two ways as shown in Figure 9.6. A 
simple shift or substitution to higher-quality fuels (e.g., from firewood to liquefied petroleum 
gas – LPG) will result in higher combustion efficiency, lower combustion-related emissions, 
lower time costs associated with fuel collection, but higher capital costs for stoves (and cash 
expenditure for LPG). Improvements in cooking services can also be achieved through the use 
of more capital-intensive but improved technologies that continue to use traditional fuels (e.g., 
firewood and residues) but more efficiently (e.g., via biogasifiers).  
Further cost components related to Figure 9.6 are “inconvenience” or “opportunity” costs. 
Depending on the levelized costs of the heat for cooking, it might well be that using traditional 
fuel wood in an inefficient stove is the cheapest way to produce the required heat. However, 
factoring in alternative uses of the time spent for wood collection – for example, for other 
productive uses or just leisure activities – turns wood collection into an inconvenient task. 
Estimate for rural households in South Asia suggest that perceived inconvenience costs of 
traditional biomass cooking fuels can double the costs of biomass fuels for higher income 
households making cleaner alternatives like LPG competitive (Pachauri et al., 2013). A more 
efficient stove using commercial fuels reduces pollution and time spent gathering fuel wood, 
and hence reduces inconvenience costs. However, the capital spent on a more efficient stove 
may not be available for other investments – say, a pump for irrigation – and thus represents an 
opportunity cost. 
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Health and environmental costs include the deaths, injuries and illnesses suffered by the 
workers in the energy supply industries as well as the public at large as a result of effluents and 
accidents associated with energy supply; damages to buildings, infrastructures, agriculture and 
forestry productivity, tourism, etc.;  climate change, overloading the carrying capacities of 
ecosystems, loss of biodiversity; and nuisance from noise and odor, congestion or visual blight 
(Schipper and Meyers, 1992).  
Sociopolitical costs include adverse impacts on energy security, geopolitical relations, 
income distribution or land-use pattern resulting from energy supply and use. Also included are 
undesired impacts on cultural, community and family values. 
While the monetary costs associated with energy supply and use are fully paid by the 
producer or user, this is only partially the case for the opportunity, health and environmental, 
and socio-political costs. In so far these are not incorporated into the monetary costs, there are 
termed “externalities”. 
9.6.2 Externalities 
Externalities arise when an economic agent enjoys benefits or imposes costs without having to 
make a payment for doing so. As such externalities can be positive or negative. For example, 
the adverse health and environmental damages (hidden costs) caused by fossil sourced 
electricity generation and that are not compensated by the producer are negative externalities. 
At the same time the cheaper electricity (without externalities) enjoyed by consumers and that 
contribute to overall welfare generation represent positive externalities.  Factoring external costs 
into the market price of electricity (‘internalization”) would necessarily result in higher prices. It 
would send correct pricing signals to the market place thus change the merit order of investment 
and operating decisions as well as reducing demand and emissions with subsequent lower 
externalities. 
Negative externalities are often associated with using public goods provided by the 
environment for free (e.g., air, soil, water, landscape, eco-systems services). To reduce negative 
externalities a utility needs to take countermeasures, such as installing pollution abatement 
equipment or making compensation payments for the damages caused. Identifying, measuring 
and monetizing externalities are particularly important for the quantification of hidden costs and 
assessing the effectiveness of policy instruments for the internalization of external costs. Since 
private enterprise normally does not incorporate external costs in investment decision making, 
government intervention is necessary to “internalize externalities” resulting from energy supply 
and use. “Governments are best positioned to assess, on a broad scale, the social and 
environmental costs and benefits associated with power generation, as well as the energy 
security aspects of, for example, a high dependence on natural gas imports destined to the 
power sector” (IEA, 2010). 
With the exception perhaps of climate change, the internalization of externalities has been 
extricable linked with socioeconomic development. As incomes and welfare grow, parts of the 
health and environmental impacts costs have been increasingly internalized through regulation, 
e.g., mandatory emission abatement, caps on effluents or waste charges, higher wages 
compensating for occupational risks, employer-paid insurance schemes, user fees, etc.  As 
regards climate change, cap and trade arrangements such as the European Emission Trading 
System (ETS) are tools for internalizing the costs of using the atmosphere as carbon dioxide 
waste repository. 
The evaluation or monetization of externalities is highly controversial. While the evidence 
that externalities are real is generally unquestioned, their quantification has been fraught with 
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uncertainties arising from issues of boundaries (what is included and what is not) to the 
valuation of loss of human life.  Externalities attributed to emissions from energy production 
and use have been assessed using the impact pathway approach (IPA), i.e., the pathway from 
emission through dispersion, exposure, physical impact and damage to monetization of the 
damage costs to individuals or society at large (see Figure 9.7) (Rabl and Spadaro, 1999; Ricci, 
2010). Controversy usually emerges in the last steps of this chain. 
 
Figure 9.7. Impact pathways approach (IPA) for deriving externality costs. Source: Adapted 
from Rabl and Spadaro (1999). 
Other methodologies include the willingness to pay (WTP)/willingness to accept (WTA) 
approach (Markandya and Boyd, 2002). Both WTP and WTA are closely related to the 
valuation of opportunity costs. WTP/WTA can be interpreted as the willingness to pay for the 
avoidance of a damage cost or the financial compensation for any damage inflicted that is 
deemed acceptable. Paying tolls for the use of a highway to avoid congestion and reduce 
commuting time is an example for WTP (Note: the congestion charge presents a positive 
externality for motorist staying on the regular roads that now are less congested). Accepting a 
higher wage for a risky construction job is an example for WTA. 
Climate change damage costs are particularly uncertain to valuate. Key uncertainties arise 
from the yet insufficient scientific knowledge about the physical phenomena associated with 
climate change, the monetary value of subsequent physical impacts (health effects, impacts on 
crops and ecosystems, impacts of extreme weather events, rising seawater level, increased needs 
of air conditioning or lower demand for heating). Moreover, the very long temporal scope of 
climate change effects and the subsequent very high sensitivity to the future evolution of 
welfare, individual preferences, discount rates etc. add complexity and controversy (Ricci, 
2010). 
9.6.3 Some Results of External Cost Estimation Studies 
Several studies have attempted to quantify externalities most of which focus on electricity 
generation (EU, 2003; NRC, 2009; Ricci, 2010). The latest systematic analysis of external costs 
of various electricity supply technologies and their associated chains is available from European 
Commission’s CASES project (Markandya et al., 2011). Figure 9.8 below shows the summary 
results for the 27 countries of the European Union (EU27), estimated for the period 2005-2010.   
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Figure 9.8 Average estimated external costs for electricity generation the European Union 
(EU27) in 2005-2010, in US$2005 per MWh (converted from 2005 Euros with an exchange rate 
of 1.24 $/Euro). Data source: EU CASES Project (Markandya et al., 2011). 
Human health impacts due to classic air pollutant emissions (such as NH3, NMVOC, NOX, 
SO2 and particulate matter) and the adverse consequences from greenhouse gas emissions 
dominate the external cost estimates across all technologies from the EU study. The magnitude 
of external costs associated with electricity generation approaches the levelized generating costs 
of electricity summarized in Table 9.1 above. Available recent estimates (Muller, Mendelsohn, 
and Nordhaus, 2011) for the US that have focused on air pollution induced human health 
impacts from electricity generation confirm the orders of magnitude illustrated in Figure 9.8 
above. Externality costs of US coal electricity generation are estimated to total some 53 billion 
US$ annually due to human health impacts alone, which is more than twice as large as the entire 
value added of that industry. This translates into some 28$/MWh external cost from human 
health impacts from US coal electricity generation, a number that would increase to some 
47$/MWh when the social costs of carbon would be included as well (Muller, Mendelsohn, and 
Nordhaus, 2011). Thus, for fossil-based electricity generation, internalization of externalities 
would at least double electricity prices, but by themselves do not justify investment into 
expensive energy options such as high costs solar PV systems with LCOE of up to some 
150$/MWh (Table 9.1), which therefore require continued innovation efforts to drive down 
costs further.  
On a life-cycle basis, renewables and nuclear power emit no traditional air pollutants and 
only a few grams of greenhouse gases (GHG) per kWh. The main contributors to GHG 
emissions are plant construction (emissions from cement and material production and 
component manufacturing) and, in the case of nuclear power, enrichment of uranium 
(depending on enrichment technology and fuel mix used for the electricity input).  
Due to the higher amount of GHG emissions and air pollutants throughout the fuel chain, 
fossil-based electricity generation followed by biomass-sourced technologies have considerably 
higher external costs than renewables and nuclear power. 
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For the nuclear power, most externalities are internalized (hence the low value shown in 
Figure 9.8 above) except the costs of severe nuclear accidents. Although damage costs of such 
events may be tens to hundreds of billions of €, given the low probability of such events results 
in very small expected damage costs. However, as witnessed by Chernobyl and Fukushima 
events such accidents do happen and the resulting damages could be as high as 5-10 € cents per 
kWh or more. Some costs arising from severe accidents are compensated, i.e., internalized 
through operator payments and insurances. According to the European Commission’s New Ext 
project (Friedrich  et al., 2004) which analyzed accident related external costs using the 
comprehensive accident database (1969-2000) maintained by the Paul Scherrer Institute (PSI), 
monetary damages of the Chernobyl reactor accident were estimated, though speculative and 
highly uncertain, at 370 billion US dollar (in 2000 prices). This was two orders of magnitude 
higher than any other accident. Second biggest damages were from the Three Mile Island 
reactor accident in the US and estimated at 6 billion US dollar. The most costly of the non-
nuclear accidents in the PSI accident database was the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989, estimated 
at 2.8 billion US dollars. The initial costs estimates for the BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 
2010 suggest that the damage costs may amount to 40-100 billion dollar. 
In the event of accidents, fatality and injury may occur among workers and residents. 
Evacuation and resettlements of residents also may take place. With a coal chain, mining 
accidents are the major component of the accident related external costs. According to the PSI 
database, over 25,000 fatalities with severe coal-related accidents have been reported. With the 
oil and natural gas chains, fatalities related to severe accidents at the transport and distribution 
stage are the major component of the accident related external costs. Over 20,000 fatalities for 
oil chain and nearly 2,000 for the natural gas chain in the severe accidents are reported. For 
hydropower, a single event, the Banqiao/Shimantan dam failure in China, accounted for 26,000 
fatalities. Total fatalities from hydro chain amount to nearly 30,000 and this makes the hydro 
chain to have the highest accident related external costs among all the fuel chains. At the time of 
analysis, there were two severe nuclear accidents, Chernobyl and Three Mile Island. For Three 
Mile Island no fatality or injuries are reported. For Chernobyl, 31 immediate fatalities and 
injury of 370 persons occurred. Including longer-term health impacts the accident may 
ultimately cause premature death between cumulative 4,000 to 10,000 people, mostly from 
cancer. “Coal plants are much deadlier: the fine-particulate air pollution they produce kills 
about 10,000 people each year in the United States alone” (von Hippel, 2011). 
The steady and strong market penetration of intermittent renewable energy technology has 
created some intriguing electricity system externalities. Electricity is difficult and costly to store 
(currently largely restricted to pumped hydro storage) and demand and supply need to be 
balanced instantly all the time. The intermittency of wind or solar photovoltaics adds further 
complexity and stress on the ability to balance the system (IEA, 2010) and requires fossil or 
nuclear power plants to provide the necessary reserve and backup capacity (in essence an 
externality of wind and PV) or, at times of ample wind, reduce their output and operate at below 
optimum efficiencies (and increased per kWh CO2 emissions). 
Transportation is another energy use creating significant externalities. Next to air 
pollution and climate change externalities, transport systems, contrary to routine operations of 
energy supply systems, exert a high toll on human health (death and injuries) from traffic 
accidents, a significant social externality. According to the Global Burden of Disease 
assessment Lim et al., 2012, see Section 7 above) 1.4 million people were killed in traffic 
accidents in 2010, including 1.3 million in road accidents with a total impact of 75 million 
DALYs (82 million DALYs for all traffic accidents). 
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Figure 9.9 from the ExternE study (EU, 2003) illustrates the costs of goods transport 
using different modes broken down in externalities associated with accidents, air pollution, up- 
and downstream (fuel supply, vehicle manufacturing, infrastructure provision, etc.), congestion, 
climate change and noise. In this comparison, road transport by trucks causes the highest 
externalities, especially from accidents and air pollution. While accidents and noise contribute 
little to the externalities of water transport via containerships and barges, NOx emissions are 
chiefly responsible for their high air pollution cost but also climate change costs. Electric freight 
train in the ExternE study causes comparably low externalities dominated in almost equal parts 
by the external costs from electricity generation (included in the up- and downstream category), 
climate change, noise and accidents.  
 
Figure 9.9 External costs due to goods transport in Europe for the year 2000, in Euro per TEU-
km (twenty-foot container equivalent volume transported over one km). Source: Adapted from 
EU (2003) 
Finally a few words of caution: In addition to the uncertainties associated with quantifying 
externalities, the external cost data discussed here are dynamic over time and highly non-linear. 
Technology change affects the overall economic and environmental performance of energy 
conversion technologies (higher efficiency, better abatement equipment, etc.). Pollution 
reductions often result from capital turn-over of retired plant and equipment by new technology. 
Externality costs are also highly non-linear because of either saturation or threshold effects, 
which have different implications. 
 An example of a saturation effect is found in certain disease risks from air pollution in 
which an increase in pollution causes  a much larger increase in health burden for 
populations living in relatively clean environments than the same pollution increase 
causes in populations already living with high pollution levels 
 An example of a threshold effect is found in the impact of acid precipitation on some 
ecosystems in which the environment is able to absorb extra acid up to a point without 
much damage but above that level (sometimes called a “tipping point”), the damage 
increases dramatically. 
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Moreover, external costs vary considerably from location to location, e.g., depending on 
population density, geography, land-use patterns, wind speeds and direction, regulation, etc. As 
well, the boundaries of assessments are often not clearly defined, i.e., which cost factors are 
included and which are not (not everything that is measurable is also important). 
Lastly, external cost estimation methods and their resulting ranking of energy technology 
options are as classical risk32 assessment methods often highly controversial in the public 
discourse about benefits and disbenefits of technology options. This is because probabilistic risk 
estimations differ significantly from subjective perceptions of risks (Slovic, 1987). While car 
driving in probabilistic risk terms is highly risky, most people consider it (“I’m a safe driver”) 
much less risky than it actually is. For nuclear power, the exact opposite holds true. This 
difference between probabilistic and subjective risk assessment also highlights yet another 
critical issue: addressing technological risks and other externalities from energy production and 
use always needs to consider distributional aspects: who imposes risks and who is exposed to it. 
                                                 
32 The canonical definition of risk is the product of the probability of occurrence of an event times its 
consequence (e.g., damage). 
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Appendix A: Accounting for Energy 
A.1 Introduction  
The discussion of energy systems above described how primary energy occurs in different 
forms embodied in resources as they exist in nature, such as chemical energy embodied in 
fossils or biomass, the potential kinetic energy of water drawn from a reservoir, the 
electromagnetic energy of solar radiation, or the energy released in nuclear reactions. A logical 
question is, therefore, how to compare and assess the potential substitutability of these energy 
“apples and oranges.” This is the objective of this more technical section. 
The primary energy of fossil energy sources and biomass is defined in terms of the 
heating value (enthalpy33) of combustion. Together, combustibles account for about 90% of 
current primary energy in the world, corresponding to some 440 EJ in 2005. There are two 
different definitions of the heat of combustion, the higher (HHV) and lower heating values 
(LHV – see the discussion below), but otherwise the determination of apple-to-apple primary 
energy comparisons among combustible energy sources is relatively straightforward.  
The situation is more complicated for non-combustible primary energy sources such as 
nuclear energy and renewables other than biomass. In these cases, primary energy is not used 
directly but is converted and transformed into secondary energy (energy carriers) such as 
electricity as in the case of modern wind or photovoltaic power plants. The measurable energy 
flow is the secondary energy, whereas the primary energy input needed to generate electricity 
needs to be estimated. In the two examples of wind and solar photovoltaics, primary energy 
estimates of the kinetic energy of wind and the electromagnetic energy of solar radiation are 
needed to determine primary energy equivalences to other energy sources. There are various 
conventions that specify the appropriate conversion from different renewable energy forms 
based on the generated electricity. For these conventions, the type of energy flow and its 
technological characteristics – such as the efficiency of the wind converters or photovoltaic cells 
– are needed. These various important accounting issues are dealt with below, starting with 
units and heating values. 
A.2 Energy Units, Scale, and Heating Values (HHV/LHV) 
Energy is defined as the capacity to do work and is measured in joules (J), where 1 joule is the 
work done when a force of 1 newton (1 N=1 kg m/s2) is applied over a distance of 1 meter. 
Power is the rate at which energy is transferred and is commonly measured in watts (W), where 
1 watt is 1 joule/second. Newton, joule, and watt are defined as basic units in the International 
System of Units (SI).34  
There is a wide variety of energy units which can be converted into each other. Figure 2.3 
in Section 2.1 above, gives an overview of the most commonly used energy units and also 
indicates typical (rounded) conversion factors (see also Appendix B). Typically, the choice of 
                                                 
33 Enthalpy – from the Greek “to warm/heat” – is the product of the mass of a fuel times its specific enthalpy, 
which is defined as the sum of its internal energy (from combustion) plus pressure times volume. Heating values 
per unit mass of a fuel are, therefore, defined for standardized pressure/volume conditions. 
34 International System of Units – SI from the French le Système international d'unités. 
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an energy unit depends on various factors such as the type of the energy carrier itself, the 
respective energy sector, as well as geographical and historical contexts. Next to the 
internationally standardized SI units, the most common energy unit used for electricity is the 
kilowatt-hour (kWh), which is derived from the joule (one kWh (1000 Watt-hours) being 
equivalent to 3600 kilo-Watt-seconds, or 3.6 MJ). In many international energy statistics (e.g., 
IEA and OECD) tonnes of oil equivalent (1 toe equals 41.87 x 109 J) is used as a core energy 
unit, but it is not included in the SI system. Certain energy subsectors often use units that apply 
best to their respective energy carrier. For example, the oil industry uses barrels of oil 
equivalent (1 boe equals 5.71 x 109 J or about 1/7 of a toe), the coal industry tonnes of coal 
equivalent (1 tce equals 29.31 x 109 J), whereas the gas industry uses cubic meters of gas at a 
normalized pressure (1 m3 of methane equals 34 MJ – all numbers refer to LHV; see the 
discussion below). Some countries such as the US use the imperial system of units, which 
include British Thermal Units (1 BTU equals 1055 J) as a unit for energy, cubic feet (for natural 
gas, one ft3 equals about 1000 BTU, or 1 MJ), and barrels as volumetric energy units (bbl is 
another name for boe).  
The calorific value or heating value of a fuel expresses the heat obtained from combustion 
of one unit of the fuel. It is important to distinguish between the higher heating value (HHV or 
gross calorific value) and the lower heating value (LHV or net calorific value). Most 
combustible fuels consist of hydrocarbon compounds that are primarily mixtures of carbon and 
hydrogen. When the hydrogen combines with oxygen, it forms water in a gaseous state, which 
is typically carried away with the other products of combustion in the exhaust gases. Similarly, 
any moisture present in the fuel will typically also evaporate. When the exhaust gases cool, this 
water will condense into a liquid state and release heat, known as latent heat, which can be 
captured and utilized for low-temperature heating purposes.  
The HHV of a fuel includes the latent heat recovered from condensing water vapor from 
combustion. Modern condensing natural gas or oil boilers can capture this latent heat.35 The 
LHV excludes the latent heat of the water formed during combustion.  
The differences between LHV and HHV are typically about 5–6% of the HHV for solid 
and liquid fuels, and about 10% for natural gas (IEA, 2005). Typically, the LHV is used in 
energy balances, since most current energy conversion devices are still not able to recover latent 
heat. The distinction between HHV and LHV becomes important when comparing international 
energy statistics and balances (usually based on LHV, as in IEA or UN statistics) with national 
ones that can sometimes be based on HHV (as in case of the US Energy Information 
Administration, EIA). Care is also required when applying fuel-specific emission factors – for 
example, for CO2 – that are specified separately per HHV or LHV to the corresponding heating 
value of the fuel as defined in the underlying energy statistics but not always spelled out 
prominently. As a precautionary measure to avoid accounting errors, literature sources on 
emission factors and energy use numbers that do not specify their underlying heating value 
concept definition should be avoided. In this publication both definitions are used, but the LHV 
is the default, as in most international energy statistics (e.g., UN or IEA). 
                                                 
35Commercial advertisements often inappropriately refer to furnaces as “more than 100% efficient,” which is 
thermodynamically impossible. The seeming paradox simply results from comparing apples and oranges in the 
form of LHV fuel energy inputs but HHV combustion energy releases. 
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A.3 Accounting for Primary Energy 
As discussed above, the determination of the primary energy equivalent of combustible fuels 
(all fossils as well as biomass) is straightforward (only a consistent HHV or LHV reporting 
format needs to be adopted). For non-combustible energies (modern renewables such as wind or 
solar photovoltaics, geothermal, hydropower, and nuclear), there are different conventions that 
specify the appropriate conversion factors to account for primary energy equivalents: the 
substitution, the direct equivalent, and the physical energy content method (which is a hybrid 
combination of the substitution and direct equivalent methods). The share of non-combustible 
energy sources in total primary energy supply will appear to be very different depending on the 
method used (Lightfoot, 2007; Macknick, 2009): 
The (partial) substitution method estimates the primary energy from non-combustible 
sources as being equivalent to the LHV or HHV of combustible fuels that would have been 
required in conventional thermal power plants to substitute the generated electricity or some 
other secondary energy form. Basically, this means that some average or representative 
efficiency of thermal power plants is applied to calculate the equivalent primary energy from 
the generated electricity from nuclear and renewables outside biomass.36 This method is used, 
for example, by BP (2010a) and WEC (1993) and as the default method in the GEA to maintain 
a consistent accounting framework across different energy options.37 Throughout the GEA there 
is always a clear indication if another method is used. The difficulties with this method include 
choosing an appropriate thermal power generating efficiency factor and the fact that the method 
displays “hypothetical” transformation losses in energy balances which end up as reported 
primary energy use, but which do not have any physical basis. 
The (direct) equivalent method counts one unit of secondary energy such as generated 
electricity from non-combustible sources as one unit of primary energy. This method is also 
often used in the literature – for example, by UN Statistics (2010) and in multiple IPCC reports 
that deal with long-term energy and emission scenarios (Watson et al., 1995; Nakicenovic and 
Swart, 2000; Morita et al., 2001; Fisher et al., 2007). The difficulties with this method are 
twofold: (i) an increase in the share of non-combustible energy sources results in the apparent 
efficiency improvement of the whole energy system because ever higher shares of primary 
energy have a definitional 100% “efficiency” of conversion into secondary forms, and (ii) actual 
conversion efficiencies even for these non-combustible sources of primary energy are 
substantially lower than 100% – for instance, the theoretical maximum efficiency (under 
optimal conditions) of converting wind kinetic energy into electricity is about 59%, but actual 
machines today achieve at best 47%.  
The (physical) energy content method adopts a hybrid approach, using the direct 
equivalent approach for all energy sources other than those where primary energy is heat, such 
as nuclear, solar thermal, and geothermal energy sources. Thermal energy generated in a nuclear, 
geothermal, or solar power plant is considered primary energy equivalent. For example, in the 
case of nuclear energy, the heat released by fission is taken as primary energy, even though two-
                                                 
36 Note, however, that different variants of the substitution method use somewhat different conversion factors. For 
example, BP applies 38% conversion efficiency to electricity generated from nuclear and hydro (BP, 2010a; 2010b), 
whereas the World Energy Council uses 38.6% for nuclear and non-combustible renewables. 
37 In the GEA a uniform primary accounting equivalent of 35% conversion efficiency for electricity from non-
combustible sources (equivalent to the global average of fossil-fuel power generation in 2005) and of 85% 
conversion efficiency for heat is applied. 
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thirds are dissipated38 to the environment through the turbine’s condenser and the reactor 
cooling system and only one-third is actually delivered as electricity. This approach is identical 
to the case of fossil energy, for which the heat of combustion is taken as primary energy. In 
effect, the hybrid system leads to the following assumed primary energy accounting: (i) 
substitution method for heat from nuclear, geothermal, and solar thermal, and (ii) direct 
equivalent method for electricity from hydropower, wind, tide, wave, and solar photovoltaic 
energy. This hybrid method is used by the OECD, the International Energy Agency and 
Eurostat (IEA, 2005). The difficulty with this method is that it can result in confusion, as some 
energy forms such as hydropower are accounted for by the direct equivalent method, while for 
others such as nuclear conversion efficiencies are applied. Even though they both generate 
about the same electricity in the world, nuclear’s primary energy equivalent is counted as three 
times larger than that of hydropower.39  
A detailed overview of differences in primary energy accounting from different energy 
statistics is described in Macknick (2009); see also Figure A.2 below (the paper also contains a 
link to a data base where users can specify their own standardized accounting convention 
applied to the main international energy statistical data sources).  
Table A.1 compares the differences across the primary energy accounting methods for the 
world by energy source using the GEA primary substitution equivalent (see GEA Technical 
Guidelines, Annex 1 (GEA, 2012)), the direct equivalent, and the physical energy content 
methods for the year 2005 based on IEA data (IEA, 2010). As is to be expected, the main 
differences in absolute terms across the methods are for nuclear, hydropower, and other 
renewables (except biomass). Great care is, therefore, advised when using and comparing 
reported primary energy across different statistical sources in general and in comparing the 
numbers reported in the GEA in particular. 
Table A.1. Comparison of global primary energy supply in 2005 using three different 
accounting methods for primary energy. Source: data from IEA, 2010. 
GEA Substitution 
Method 
Direct Equivalent 
Method 
Physical Energy 
Content Method 
EJ % EJ % EJ % 
Fossil fuels 389 78 389 85 389 81 
Biomass 46 9 46 10 46 10
Nuclear  28 6 10 2 30 6 
Hydro 30 6 11 2 11 2 
Other Renewables < 3 1 1 <1 3 1 
Total 496 100 457 100 479 100 
A.4 Limitations of Primary Energy Accounting 
The alternative primary energy accounting methods outlined above show significant differences 
in how non-combustible energy sources are presented in energy statistics. As the differences are 
                                                 
38 In principle such waste heat could be “recycled” but would require a close co-location of nuclear power plants 
with main energy uses such as major cities, which raises issues of safety and public risk perception. 
39For example, in IEA/OECD (2005) the assumed conversion efficiency factor for hydropower, solar electricity, 
and wind is 100%, for nuclear power it is 33%, and for geothermal electricity it is 10%. 
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in terms of energy coverage ranging from primary energy (PE), primary and secondary energy 
(EIA, IEA, UN), to primary, secondary, and final energy (IEA).  
Table A.2. Overview of the four major data sources for Global Energy Statistics.  
 BP EIA IEA UN 
Primary energy X X X X 
Secondary energy  X X X 
Final energy   X  -1 
New renewables2  X X X 
Traditional biomass3   X X 
Electronic availability Online free Online free Online subscription ($) Offline tape order ($) 
1 Not reported directly by UN but can be calculated from full data base statistics. 
2 New renewable refers to solar, wind, modern bioenergy, and geothermal. 
3 Traditional biomass refers to fuelwood, dung, and agricultural residues. 
Data are mainly collected through questionnaires and exchanges between the 
organizations as well as with others, including but not limited to publications from the 
Statistical Office of the European Communities (Eurostat), the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA), the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the 
Organización Latinoamericana de Energía (OLADE), etc.  
Statistics differ in the extent to which they include non-commercial energy (use of 
traditional biomass), which is fully covered in the IEA statistics (all sources) and partially in 
UN (mainly fuel wood), as well as modern renewables (outside hydropower), with only IEA 
and UN providing (near) full coverage (with BP reporting selected modern renewables). 
Different reporting organizations also use different methods for expressing the primary energy 
equivalent of non-combustible energies (see Section A.3 on Primary Energy Accounting above) 
and in their use of heating values (see the discussion above). LHV are used by the UN and IEA 
(and unless otherwise specified in this report). HHV are used in US EIA statistics (which 
therefore tend to report systematically higher energy use compared to other data sources), with 
BP using a hybrid approach which is closer to UN/IEA statistical values). 
Both the UN and IEA provide comprehensive energy statistics on the production, trade, 
conversion, and use of primary and secondary, conventional and non-conventional, and new and 
renewable sources of energy covering the period from 1970 onwards (UN, 2010; IEA, 2010).40 
IEA’s energy balances represent convenient aggregates of all energy flows in a common (non-
SI) energy metric in tonnes of oil equivalent, summarized from IEA’s energy statistics and for 
global and regional aggregates as well as for individual countries. The IEA statistics cover 
approximately 130 countries (of 192 UN Member countries), which represent about 98% of 
worldwide energy use (IPCC, 2006). BP statistics focus on commercial and conventional energy 
carriers and exclude fuels such as wood, peat, and animal waste and energy flows of other 
                                                 
40 Electronic data need to be purchased from the UN and processed with appropriate data base software tools as few 
aggregates are contained in the statistics. For instance final energy use is not reported directly by the UN, but can 
be calculated from a multitude of individual energy flows reported. The UN data portal allows free electronic 
access to statistics of individual energy flows as well as few aggregate energy indicators (primary energy use, 
electricity generation) from 1990 onwards. Full IEA energy balances, by energy flow, use, and sector since 1971 
are available online to subscribers (including many universities) of the OECD iLibrary online publication and 
statistical query service:  The statistics of the EIA and BP are available online free of charge but provide a 
somewhat more limited coverage as well as adopt differing accounting conventions to UN and IEA. 
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renewables such as wind, geothermal, and solar power generation41 (BP, 2010a). Its statistics 
cover the period since 1965, are updated regularly,42 and are available free of charge on the 
Internet. Cumulative installed renewable power capacity data are provided in BP’s full 
workbook of historical statistical data from 1965–2009 (BP, 2010b). US EIA energy statistics, 
which are also freely available online, cover primary and secondary energy use by fuel category 
and per country since 1980, using the (non-SI) BTU as a common energy metric and based on 
HHV, which is different than other energy statistics. 
As a result of differences in data collection sources, boundary conditions, methodologies, 
and heating values used in different statistics, global primary energy use numbers reported by 
these four organizations differ from 442 EJ (BP) to 487 EJ (EIA), or by some 10%, for the GEA 
base year 2005 and throughout their entire reporting horizon (see Figure A.2). Adjusting43 the 
different primary accounting conventions to the GEA standard and completing non-reported 
energies (non-commercial, traditional biomass using the IEA numbers) reduces this data 
uncertainty to a range from 495 EJ (IEA and BP) to 528 EJ (EIA44), or some 7%, with the UN 
statistics taking an intermediary position (506 EJ) for the GEA base year 2005 (see Figure A.2). 
This GEA assessment adopted a value of 495 EJ for the level of world primary energy use in the 
year 2005. 
 
Figure A.2. World primary energy (in EJ). Original data by four reporting agencies (dots) and 
harmonized primary energy equivalences (lines). Source: data from Macknick, 2009.  
                                                 
41 With exception of ethanol, only installed capacity data for geothermal, wind, and solar are reported by BP. 
42 Updates are fastest among all energy statistics and available by September each year for the preceding year. 
43 A software tool performing data comparison and adjustments to consistent and comparable accounting 
conventions for the 20 largest energy-using countries worldwide as well as the global total has been developed by 
Macknick (2009) and is available online: 
www.iiasa.ac.at/Research/TNT/WEB/Publications/Energy_Carbon_DataBase/. 
44 Due to the use of HHV in the EIA statistics. 
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A.6 Levelized Costs Definition 
The notion of levelized costs of electricity (LCOE) is an ex ante planning and analysis tool for 
comparative assessments of different investment options producing a quasi identical output. 
LCOE has been widely used for decades in the electric utility industry for comparing the 
generating costs of different technology and fuel combinations over their respective economic 
life for the purpose of identifying least-cost power plant capacity expansion plans.  As well, 
policy makers and market regulators have used the concept for rate setting purposes and pricing 
policies (Anderson, 2007).  
Two levelized cost definitions dominate the literature. The first calculates the levelized unit 
costs of generating one kWh of electricity by dividing the sum of annualized capital costs plus 
fuel and maintenance costs over the year by the annual kWh output. This approach requires at 
least the following information: 
 Investment costs per kW of installed capacity, $/kWe (INV) 
 Decommissioning  costs per kW of installed capacity, $/kWe (DECOM) 
 Fixed operating and maintenance costs (O&M) per year (FOM), $/kWe 
 Variable operating costs including emission charges per kWh, $/kWh (VOM) 
 Fuel price per kWh, in $/kWh input (PFUEL) 
 Plant factor, i.e., full load hours of plant operation per year, fraction of year (PLF) 
 Plant life time, years (PLT) 
 Plant thermal efficiency, in % (η) 
 Discount rate, in % (i) 
 LCOE, in $/kWh of electricity output 
 
LCOE ൌ ൬INV ൈ CRF ൅ FOMܲܮܨ ൰ /8760 ൅ VOM൅
P୊୙୉୐
ߟ ൅ ൬
DECOM
PLF ൈ ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ
ିሺ୔୐୘ା୘ሻ൰ /8760 
CRF ൌ ݅	ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ
୔୐୘
ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻ୔୐୘ െ 1 
The annuity or capital recovery factor (CRF) distributes the up-front investment costs of the 
plant at equal installments per year over the lifetime of the plant. Generally, the discount rate 
reflects the time value of money. In LCOE calculations it represents the cost of capital, usually 
as the weighted average of the interest on loans and expected return on equity in the absence of 
specific market or technology risks (IEA, 2010).  
The investment component as well as the fix O&M costs are divided by the plant factor so as to 
account for the actual utilization of the plant over the year and to arrive at a comparable “service 
quality” of the output (a proxy for equal reliability of generating the same firm kWh over the 
full 8760 hours per year). The decommissioning cost are incurred when the plant is taken out of 
service and the term T represents the additional time before decommissioning can begin (for 
plants that need extra time before safe decommissioning can commence, e.g., nuclear power 
plants).  
Using the illustrative economic data of Table 9.1 above (upper range) for the advanced coal 
power plant with carbon capture and storage and assuming: 
 Thermal conversion efficiency (η) of 35 per cent 
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 O&M costs of $ 96 per kWe per year, split into FOM of $ 60 per kWe per year and VOM 
of $ 2.97 per MWh 
 Variable CCS cost of $ 2.50 per MWh 
 5 per cent real discount rate (i) 
 Plant lifetime (PLT) 40 years 
 Load factor (PLF) of 80 per cent 
 No decommissioning costs (DECOM) 
 No inflation 
leads to a CRF of 0.0583 and LCOE of $ 64 per MWh. 
CRF ൌ 0.05	ሺ1 ൅ 0.05ሻ
ସ଴
ሺ1 ൅ 0.05ሻସ଴ െ 1 ൌ 0.0583 
LCOE ൌ 	0.8 /8760 ൅ ൬
2.97 ൅ 2.5
1000 ൰ ൅
2.8 278ൗ 45
0.35 ൌ 0.064
$
ܹ݄݇ 	݋ݎ	64	
$
ܯܹ݄ 
 
 
Alternatively LCOE are defined as ‘the ratio of total lifetime expenses versus total expected 
outputs, expressed in terms of the present value equivalent’ (IEA, 2005). This approach 
accounts for the full lifetime expenditures of a generating station as incurred and allocates these 
costs over the lifetime revenues generated by the plant, with both future expenditures and 
revenues discounted to present values. LCOE then is equal to the price for the electricity. Here, 
information about the price at which the electricity can be sold over the lifetime of the plant in 
the market place (i.e. the revenue to an investor) is another input requirement. The plant factor 
is reflected through the annual electricity generation. 
 
 
෍ሾELE௧ ൈ Pா௟௘ ൈ ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻି௧ሿ
௧
ൌ෍ൣINV௧ ൈ VOM௧ ൈ DECOM	 ൈ ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻିሺ୔୐୘ା୘ሻ൧
௧
 
ாܲ௟௘ ൌ
∑ ൣINV௧ ൈ VOM௧ ൈ DECOM	 ൈ ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻିሺ୔୐୘ା୘ሻ൧௧
∑ ሾELE௧ ൈ ሺ1 ൅ ݅ሻି୲ሿ௧ ൌ LCOE 
 
Note: Discounting physical entities appears counterintuitive as physical units neither change 
magnitude over time, nor do they pay interest.  However, from a utility’s or investor’s 
perspective, the economic function of electricity generation is to produce a revenue stream that 
generates future revenues. From today’s point of view a MWh produced this year thus does not 
have the same economic value as does a MWh produced next year, it has a higher value. What 
is discounted is the value of output, i.e., the physical production times its price, in the above 
formula, and not output itself. It is only after mathematical transformation that it appears as if 
physical production was discounted (IEA, 2010). 
                                                 
45 Conversion of GJ to kWth (1 GJ = 278 kWhth) 
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There are several limitations associated with LCOE that do not include: 
 Diurnal, weekly and seasonal fluctuations in demand 
 Price uncertainty of both fuel input prices and electricity rates 
 Market and technology investment risks 
 System costs, i.e. the impact of a power plant on the electricity system such as grid 
integration 
 Externalities 
 
The absence of market and technology risks results in a gap between LCOE and true 
financial costs of an investor operating in real electricity markets. LCOE is closer to the 
real cost in regulated monopoly electricity markets with loan guarantees and regulated 
prices rather than to the real costs of investments in competitive markets with variable 
prices (IEA, 2010). 
Verification of ex-ante LCOE estimates with actual ex-post real costs is inherently difficult as 
actual generating cost information in liberalized markets reside with the utilities which treat this 
as commercially sensitive information. Also often certain common costs are shared by several 
plants making plant specific cost data either too restrictive or affected by cost allocation 
uncertainties (Heptonstall, 2007). 
In principle, it is possible to incorporate some of these omitted factors in LCOE analyses, e.g. 
by expanding the number of cost factors, adjusting current ones. or redefining individual cost 
elements but generally at the cost of introducing additional assumptions and uncertainty and 
potential loss of transparency. 
Given these limitations, LCOE are usually used for a first order assessment of generating costs 
at the plant level or for comparative assessments of different new generating options and 
identification of the least cost option among alternatives. Other applications include the impact 
of variations of key cost factors but also policy changes (e.g., carbon prices) on the cost 
structure of generation and thus the merit order of alternatives.  Comparative assessments of 
various alternative technologies based on the LCOE methodology could be significantly 
enriched if they are included in a full energy systems context, e.g., by a comprehensive  
modeling approach with proper consideration of load curves, transmission and distribution 
networks, and integration and balancing costs associated with each generation technology. 
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Appendix B: Conversion Tables 
Table B.1. Conversion factors. Source: Nakicenovic et al., 1998. 
TO-> 
FROM MJ TCE btu toe boe kWyr kcal TJ Gcal Mtoe Mbtu GWh GWyr 
MJ 1 3.4121E-05 947.8134 2.39E-05 0.000175 3.171E-05 238.8459 0.000001 0.00023885 2.3885E-11 0.00094781 2.7778E-07 3.171E-11 
TCE 29307.6 1 27778140 0.7 5.131 0.9293379 7000000 0.0293076 7 0.0000007 27.77814 0.008141 9.2934E-07 
btu 0.00105506 3.6E-08 1 2.52E-08 1.85E-07 3.346E-08 0.2519968 1.0551E-09 2.52E-07 2.52E-14 0.000001 2.9307E-10 3.3456E-14 
toe 41868 1.428571 39683050 1 7.33 1.327626 10000000 0.041868 10 0.000001 39.68305 0.01163 1.3276E-06 
boe 5711.869031 0.19489378 5413784.9 0.136426 1 0.1811222 1364256 0.00571187 1.364256 1.3643E-07 5.413786 0.00158663 1.8112E-07 
kWyr 31536 1.07603488 29890240 0.753224 5.521135 1 7532244 0.031536 7.532244 7.5322E-07 29.89024 0.00876 0.000001 
kcal 0.0041868 1.4286E-07 3.968305 1E-07 7.33E-07 1.328E-07 1 4.1868E-09 0.000001 1E-13 3.9683E-06 1.163E-09 1.3276E-13 
TJ 1000000 34.12084 947813400 23.88459 175.074 31.70979 238845900 1 238.8459 2.3885E-05 947.8134 0.27777778 3.171E-05 
Gcal 4186.8 0.14285714 3968305 0.1 0.733 0.1327626 1000000 0.0041868 1 0.0000001 3.968305 0.001163 1.3276E-07 
Mtoe 41868000000 1428571 3.968E+13 1000000 7330000 1327626 1E+13 41868 10000000 1 39683050 11630.0004 1.327626 
Mbtu 1055.06 0.03599953 1000000 0.0252 0.184714 0.0334557 251996.8 0.00105506 0.2519968 2.52E-08 1 0.00029307 3.3456E-08 
GWh 3600000 122.835 3.412E+09 85.98452 630.2666 114.1553 859845200 3.6 859.8452 8.5985E-05 3412.128 1 0.00011416 
GWyr 31536000000 1076034.88 2.989E+13 753224.4 5521135 1000000 7.5374E+12 31536 7532244 0.7532244 29910720 8759.99625 1 
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Table B.2a. Typical calorific values of solid energy carriers. Source: IEA/OECD/Eurostat, 2005.  
 Gross calorific value HHV [MJ/kg] 
Net calorific value 
LHV [MJ/kg] 
Anthracite 29.65 – 30.35 28.95 – 30.35 
Cooking coals 27.80 – 30.80 26.60 – 29.80 
Other bituminous 23.85 – 26.75 22.60 -25.50 
Metallurgical coke 27.90 27.45 
Gas coke 28.35 27.9 
Low-temperature coke 26.30 25.4 
Petroleum coke 30.5 – 35.8 30.0 – 35.3 
Wood 15 - 19 - 
Note: Detailed information on energy and chemical characteristics for a wide range of biomass fuels can be found at 
IEA Task 32 biomass database: http://www.ieabcc.nl; Phyllis biomass database: http://www.ecn.nl/phyllis; TU Vienna 
biomass database: http://www.vt.tuwien.ac.at/biobib. 
Table B.2b. Typical calorific values of liquid energy carriers. Source: IEA/OECD/Eurostat, 2005; 
IEA, 2009b; Agarwal, 2007. 
 Gross calorific value HHV [GJ/tonne] 
Net calorific value 
LHV [GJ/tonne] 
Ethane 51.90 47.51 
Propane 50.32 46.33 
Butane 49.51 45.72 
LPG 50.08 46.15 
Naphtha 47.73 45.34 
Aviation gasoline 47.40 45.03 
Motor gasoline 41.10 44.75 
Aviation turbine fuel 46.23 43.92 
Other kerosene 46.23 43.92 
Gas/diesel oil 45.66 43.38 
Fuel oil, low sulphur 44.40 42.18 
Fuel oil, high sulphur 43.76 41.57 
Biodiesel - 36.8 – 40.9 
Biogasoline - 24.0 – 37.4 
Ethanol 29.4 26.87 
Methanol 22.36 19.99 
Dimethyl ether 30.75 28.62 
 
Table B.2c. Typical calorific values of gaseous energy carriers, per kg and m3. Source: 
IEA/OECD/Eurostat, 2005; IEA, 2009 
 
Gross calorific 
value 
HHV [MJ/kg] 
Net calorific 
value 
LHV [MJ/kg] 
Gross calorific 
value 
HHV [MJ/m3] 
Net calorific 
value 
LHV [MJ/m3] 
Methane 55.52 50.03 37.652 33.939 
Natural gas (Norway) - - 39.668 - 
Natural gas (Netherlands) - - 33.339 - 
Natural gas (Russia) - - 37.578 - 
Natural gas (Algeria) - - 42.000 - 
Natural gas (United States) - - 38.341 - 
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Table B.3. CO2 emission factors on a net calorific basis. Source: IPCC, 2006. 
Fuel type IPCC default [kg/GJ] 
Range from 
[kg/GJ] 
to 
[kg/GJ] 
Crude Oil 73.3 71.1 75.5 
Motor Gasoline 69.3 67.5 73.0 
Jet Gasoline 70.0 67.5 73.0 
Jet Kerosene 71.5 69.7 74.4 
Kerosene 71.9 70.8 73.7 
Gas / Diesel Oil 74.1 72.6 74.8 
Residual Fuel Oil 77.4 75.5 78.8 
Liquefied Petroleum Gases 63.1 61.6 65.6 
Ethane 61.6 56.5 68.6 
Naphtha 73.3 69.3 76.3 
Petroleum Coke 97.5 82.9 115.0 
Anthracite 98.3 94.6 101.0 
Coking Coal 94.6 87.3 101.0 
Lignite 101.0 90.9 115.0 
Oil Shale and Tar Sands 107.0 90.2 125.0 
Brown Coal Briquettes 97.5 87.3 109.0 
Natural Gas 56.1 54.3 58.3 
Compressed Natural Gas 56.1 54.3 58.3 
Liquefied Natural Gas 56.1 54.3 58.3 
Municipal Wastes (non-biomass fraction) 91.7 73.3 121.0 
Municipal Wastes (biomass fraction) 100.0 84.7 117.0 
Industrial Wastes 143.0 110.0 183.0 
Waste Oils 73.3 72.2 74.4 
Peat 106.0 100.0 108.0 
Wood / Wood Waste 112.0 95.0 132.0 
Sulphite lyes (Black Liquor) 95.3 80.7 110.0 
Other Primary Solid Biomass 100.0 84.7 117.0 
Charcoal 112.0 95.0 132.0 
Biogasoline 70.8 59.8 84.3 
Biodiesels 70.8 59.8 84.3 
Other liquid biofuels 79.6 67.1 95.3 
Landfill Gas 54.6 46.2 66.0 
Sludge Gas 54.6 46.2 66.0 
Other Biogas 54.6 46.2 66.0 
Note: Values represent CO2 emissions that arise with 100% oxidation of fuel carbon content at the point of combustion. 
Life-cycle CO2 emissions for various fuels can be higher or lower, due to emissions in the supply chain of the fuel and 
due to carbon absorbed during the growth phase of biomass feedstock. 
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Figure B.1. Definition of GEA world regions used in the Energy Primer. For country listings and 
finer resolution regional definitions see GEA Technical Guidelines Annex-II. 
http://www.iiasa.ac.at/web/home/research/Flagship-Projects/Global-Energy-
Assessment/GEA_Annex_II.pdf 
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